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DOES ANYTHING MATTER? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
I defend the claim that some things genuinely matter to human beings. This 
involves overcoming a series of arguments which suggest that the things that matter to 
us are arbitrary. These arguments arise out of Nagel’s claim (in Mortal Questions) that 
life is absurd.  
The thesis also discusses different senses in which life can be said to have 
meaning. I put religious accounts of the meaning of life to one side. Instead, I focus on 
outlining how someone can experience their own life (and the world) as meaningful.  
My main aim is to show that some things genuinely matter. I argue that some 
things genuinely matter from the perspective of the individual in virtue of the fact that 
they can become conscious of their own needs. So, there are facts about human nature 
(we are self-consciousness and have needs) that, taken together, show that some things 
genuinely matter to us (non-arbitrarily). These include our vital needs, our happiness 
and positive relationships with others. 
I argue that these things matter to us not simply in virtue of the fact that we 
happen to think that they matter (although this is certainly true). Rather, they genuinely 
matter to us given our nature. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This thesis is an attempt to discover whether anything genuinely matters. Quite 
early on in this thesis, it becomes clear that human beings think some things matter. For 
example, there are many things that I think matter. I care about this PhD. I care about 
my family and friends. I care about my health. I care about Tai Chi and playing the 
guitar. I care about my work. There are then many different things that matter to me. 
But, it also quickly becomes clear that, just because I happen to think these things 
matter, this doesn’t ensure that they genuinely do. 
For example, there may be reasons to think that none of the things I care about 
genuinely matter, because nothing could genuinely matter. Perhaps we might worry that 
if we just die, nothing could really matter. We might worry that, because we are such an 
insignificant portion of the universe, nothing related to human life could really matter. 
We might worry that science, with its objective view of the world, teaches us that 
nothing really matters. 
Or, we might feel unable to say whether life has a meaning. We might be 
worried that, unless life has a meaning, the things we care about couldn’t genuinely 
matter. If we are unable to prove there is a God, we might worry that, because we don’t 
have a true religious account of the meaning of life, nothing could be genuinely 
meaningful. 
Even if it turns out that some things genuinely matter, we might still worry that 
we are choosing the wrong things to care about. As I said, I think a number of things 
matter, but perhaps I am focusing on the wrong kinds of things to care about. Maybe 
some of the things I think matter don’t really matter. 
This thesis is an attempt to get clear about all these issues. I will be arguing that 
there are some things that can be shown to genuinely matter. I make two assumptions. 
Firstly, I assume that death is the end of our existence. Secondly, I assume that religious 
beliefs cannot help us decide what genuinely matters. It should be clear that these 
assumptions don’t make the attempt to find things that genuinely matter easier. In fact, 
in each case, by making these assumptions, I will have to face arguments that attempt to 
show that it is precisely these facts that show that life couldn’t have a meaning.  
I will attempt to show that some things genuinely matter without making 
reference to any religious beliefs or spiritual traditions. I try to set out a way of looking 
at the issues that is neither scientific, nor religious. But, the position I adopt is also not 
anti-scientific, or anti-religious. In order to avoid disappointment, I want to make clear 
in advance that there is nothing particularly ‘profound’ about the answers I reach. I 
argue that, given the nature of human existence, our vital needs, our happiness and our 
relationships with others all genuinely matter to us. As should be clear from this list, my 
intention is not to produce ‘surprising’ counter-intuitive conclusions. Rather, I hope the 
answers I reach would generally be accepted by everyone. In a way, the purpose of this 
thesis is to remove the potential reservations that people may have to the thought that 
these everyday things genuinely matter. I do so by paying careful attention to the nature 
of human existence.  
This thesis also provides an opportunity to think about what it takes for a life to 
be experienced as meaningful. I hope that this will provide an opportunity to think about 
the things we care most about. I will argue that, when we care about the right kinds of 
things, we can find a way to experience our life (and the world we live in) as 
meaningful. We can feel that our life hangs together in a satisfying way. We can feel as 
 1
though we make a difference to something we feel is valuable. I will be pointing out a 
number of potential mistakes we can make concerning the things that matter most to us, 
and I will set out what we need to do to avoid these potential errors. 
As I said, the central focus of this thesis is the attempt to discover whether, and 
in what way, things matter. I will be arguing that we are right to think that some things 
matter to us (and this means more than saying that things matter in virtue of the fact that 
we think they matter). My argument is based on claiming that some things (our needs, 
our happiness and the quality of our relationships) genuinely matter from our own 
perspective. In Chapter VIII, I argue that it is a mistake to think that human beings are 
fundamentally isolated (we are social beings). Nevertheless, the perspective of the 
individual ends up being the most convenient place to start in examining whether 
anything genuinely matters (and, as it happens, in Chapter VIII, I argue that, if we are 
starting from the perspective of the individual, it still turns out that other people 
genuinely matter). I will be arguing that our needs, our happiness and positive 
relationships with other people genuinely matter to us, given the nature of our existence. 
As a matter of fact, these things do (in general) matter to people. I will be defending the 
idea that people are right to think that these things matter. 
While I do initially draw on the thoughts of other philosophers (Nagel in 
particular in the first two chapters) my central interest is not with assessing the 
philosophical system of particular thinkers. I am not attempting to assess whether a 
particular philosopher’s overall system is correct, or internally coherent (except insofar 
as it relates to the issues). Where I do discuss the arguments of particular philosophers 
my interest is in trying to discover the key questions and issues relevant to an 
investigation into whether anything genuinely matters (and to provide some resources 
that will help answer these questions). My central concern is always with the issues. 
 
Chapter I 
 
In the first chapter, I discuss whether our own death (our mortality) matters to 
us. Most people would assume that the fact that we are going to die is a bad thing for us. 
I discuss three arguments from the Greek philosophers Epicurus and Lucretius, each of 
which attempts to prove that our own death needn’t concern us. They argue that there is 
no need to worry about the fact that we are mortal. Nagel presents a view he sets in 
opposition to the Greek’s view. Nagel argues that death can in fact be described as bad 
for us, as it brings to an end something of value; namely the state of being alive. Nagel 
then takes it that he needs to undermine the Greek philosopher’s three arguments (as 
only one of their arguments needs to be justified to prove that our own death couldn’t be 
bad for us). I will be arguing that Nagel’s attempts to undermine Epicurus’ and 
Lucretius’ arguments are forceful (but perhaps not conclusive). As it is, Both Nagel and 
the Greek philosophers both seem to agree on two points: Firstly, that the state of being 
dead is not a bad one. Secondly, that the state of being alive is a (potentially) valuable 
one. In the end, I accept Nagel’s hypothetical conclusion; if our life is valuable, then our 
death will be a bad thing for us. This seems to imply that death is only bad if life itself is 
valuable. Whether life is valuable or matters, is then the key question I explore for the 
rest of the thesis. 
 
 Chapter II 
 
In chapter II, I discuss Nagel’s claim that life is absurd. Nagel claims that, while 
all human beings think some things matter (the unavoidability of seriousness) we are 
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unable to provide any reasons for thinking that anything actually matters (the 
inescapability of doubt). Because there is a tension between these two claims, Nagel 
describes human existence as absurd.  
Nagel claims that people are unavoidably serious. Human beings by their very 
nature think some things do matter. I will argue that we have good reasons to accept the 
claim that human existence is unavoidably serious. 
Nagel also claims that doubts about whether anything genuinely matters are 
inescapable (the inescapability of doubt). This is an important argument. If Nagel is 
right that we can never know whether anything genuinely matters, and I would have to 
admit that my central question will be unanswerable. Nagel has two arguments for the 
inescapability of doubt. Firstly, the special experience argument raises doubts about 
whether anything matters by reference to the fact that we are capable of adopting a 
‘distanced perspective’ on our lives. When we adopt a totally detached view on our life 
and the world, we find that everything that normally looks important to us no longer 
looks important from this distanced perspective. Nagel suggests that this may raise 
genuine doubts about whether anything really matters. In chapter II, I argue that Nagel’s 
arguments are weak. But a stronger version of the special experience argument gets 
discussed at length in Chapter IV (the argument from non-objectivity). 
Nagel’s other argument for the inescapability of doubt is the epistemological 
argument. Nagel sets out what he takes to be a real difficulty in justifying any claim that 
something genuinely matters to us. I describe this argument through thinking of a 
‘curious friend’ intent on making me defend the claim that something in particular 
matters. My curious friend wants me to defend the claim that something (e.g. writing 
my PhD) really matters. He asks me ‘why does this matter?’ I might answer that it will 
help me get teaching work. Whatever answer I give, my curious friend can simply ask 
me ‘why does this matter?’ If I answer this further question, my curious friend can just 
pose the same question again for this answer. It seems that, in answering my curious 
friend’s questions, we are faced with two choices (neither of which seem particularly 
appealing). If we carry on answering my curious friend’s questions forever, we don’t 
seem to ever provide a definitive answer to my curious friend’s question. On the other 
hand, if we stop at a particular answer, we seem to be claiming that something matters, 
even though we provide my curious friend with no reason to think it does matter. In 
chapter II, I will argue that the key issue is not whether our justifications for whether 
something matters stop, but whether they stop anywhere good (or reasonable). So, I 
argue that the epistemological argument is not particularly convincing. Still, my curious 
friend’s questions play a key role in the rest of the thesis. I attempt to discover what it 
would take for an answer to my curious friend’s questions to stop somewhere good (and 
to find out what makes it the case that a particular answer to my curious friend is a good 
one.)  
 
Chapter III 
 
In Chapter III, I assess a number of different kinds of activities. I attempt to see 
if I can give a cast iron justification for the claim that certain kinds of activities 
genuinely matter to us, by attempting to provide satisfying answers to my curious 
friend. I suggest that there are certain activities that seem to avoid the difficult questions 
posed by my curious friend. Discussing these activities (skilful, creative activities) gives 
me the opportunity to introduce a number of issues that I return to later in the thesis. In 
the end, this discussion just forces us back to some unresolved issues. In particular, 
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there seem to be a number of reasons that people might give for thinking that nothing 
about human life could genuinely matter.  
 
 
 Chapter IV 
 
So, in chapter IV, I examine a number of arguments which attempt to show that 
all answers to my curious friend’s questions must be equally bad (as the arguments 
attempt to prove that nothing could genuinely matter). The first argument (the argument 
from non-objectivity) is a variation on the special experience argument (one which 
seems to supply something missing from the original special experience argument). If 
we take up an objective view of the world (a view of the world independent of any form 
of awareness) we find that, from this perspective, nothing is revealed as mattering. This 
might suggest that, because nothing objectively matters, we must accept that nothing 
genuinely matters (it only seems to matter to us). Through discussing what it is to matter 
(to be significant) it becomes clear why nothing could objectively matter. In the end, I 
argue that we can accept that nothing could matter objectively, without having to accept 
that nothing could genuinely matter.  
I then discuss three arguments that attempt to show that nothing could genuinely 
matter to us because of facts about the nature of our existence (our size, the duration of 
our existence, the fact that we are mortal) or facts about the nature of our activities. I 
argue that none of the arguments discussed in this chapter give us any conclusive 
reasons for thinking that nothing could genuinely matter. In other words, they give us 
no reason to think that all answers to my curious friend must be equally bad. 
 
Chapter V 
 
In chapter V, I attempt to face head on the claim that unless things matter ‘in the 
scheme of things’ they cannot genuinely matter. This involves exploring whether life 
only has a meaning if there is a true religious account of the universe. Religious 
accounts of the creation or functioning of the universe provide a ‘story’ of the universe 
through which the significance of things can be revealed. So, religious beliefs seem to 
be one possible way of grounding the claim that some things genuinely matter. 
I compare the religious view of the universe with the scientific view. It is often 
thought that science has shown that there is no true religious account of the universe. I 
try to show that this is not in fact that case. But I also argue (although, in the end it is 
more of an assumption) that philosophy is not an arena in which religious accounts of 
the universe can be rationally assessed. So, I assume that we cannot prove that there is a 
religious account of the universe that is true. 
This seems to rule out using religious accounts of the universe to ground the 
things that genuinely matter (as I will not be able to provide my curious friend with a 
satisfactory answer to why I believe my religious views are true). Having said this, there 
may remain a worry that without religious belief, nothing could genuinely matter. I look 
at a number of arguments which attempt to show that, without something that only God, 
or religious belief could provide, nothing could genuinely matter. None of these 
arguments provides us with conclusive reasons to think that this is true, but this 
discussion does bring forward a number of challenges that any non-religious account of 
meaning needs to meet. 
The rest of the thesis is an attempt to set out what genuinely matters. It is not a 
strictly scientific account. Neither is it a religious account. But, my claims are based on 
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facts about human existence which seem to be true even if we have strong religious 
beliefs, or even if we think that the scientific account of the world is a true one. 
I argue that some things genuinely matter in virtue of certain facts about human 
existence. At the end of Chapter V, I turn to the perspective of the individual human 
being – in order to see whether this perspective might allow us to show that some things 
genuinely matter. It becomes clear that the perspective of the individual is the kind of 
perspective that can be a source of meaning. 
It was clear (in chapter II) that people think some things matter (the 
unavoidability of seriousness). Adopting the perspective of the individual seems to 
bring up a new worry. If things genuinely matter to people simply in virtue of the fact 
that people think (or act as though) they matter to them, we seem faced with the threat 
that the things that matter to us are arbitrary. If this is the case, it looks as though there 
is no way to distinguish different claims we might make about things mattering. All 
claims that something matters would be equally good (as no answers could be better 
than any others). It can start to look like it doesn’t matter what we choose to think 
matters, as our claims about what matters are arbitrary. I want to argue that our claims 
about what matters are not arbitrary. In order to do this, I will need more than the mere 
fact that people think things matter. I will also need to distinguish between things that 
genuinely matter, and things that don’t. And I will need to say what makes it the case 
that some things genuinely matter. This will be done in Chapters VII and VIII. 
 
Chapter VI 
 
Before turning to my examples of things that genuinely matter, I first discuss the 
question of the meaning of life (from the perspective of the individual). In Chapter VI, I 
explore what is involved in experiencing our own lives as meaningful (independent of 
religious beliefs). This involves introducing the idea of our ‘ultimate concerns’ – the 
things that matter most to us.   
I assess whether we can justify the claim that our ultimate concerns genuinely 
matter. In the end, I argue that, simply because something is the thing we care most 
about, that alone doesn’t ensure that our ultimate concerns genuinely matter. But, I do 
argue that our ultimate concerns are not arbitrary. I attempt to show that there are ways 
in which we can make mistakes about the things we care most about. (In other words, 
some ultimate concerns are worse than others). I argue that some ultimate concerns are 
more (or more likely to be) effective for us in delivering a sense that our life is 
meaningful. This is important, as in Chapter VII Part 2 I will argue that whether or not 
our ultimate concerns are effective is something that genuinely matters to us. 
 
Chapter VII & VIII 
 
In the final two chapters, I will claim that three things in particular genuinely 
matter to us. These are our vital needs and our happiness (in chapter VII) and 
relationships with other people (in chapter VIII). I argue that these things matter to all 
people, not because they have made an arbitrary choice to think they matter. Rather 
people are right to think that they genuinely matter to them in virtue of the nature of 
human existence. 
In particular, I argue that some things genuinely matter to human beings because 
human beings are self-conscious. Our self-consciousness means that we are capable of 
experiencing the facts about our existence from our own perspective. When we do this, 
some things are revealed as genuinely mattering to us. 
 5
I will argue that our own vital needs genuinely matters to us. This is not some 
arbitrary choice we make. It is a fact about our existence. Just about everyone thinks 
that their own needs matter. I will be arguing that this is not a mistake. 
In chapter VII, I also argue that there are strong links between a happy and a 
meaningful life. So the argument that our own happiness genuinely matters also implies 
that experiencing our own life as meaningful genuinely matters to us. This means that it 
matters to us whether our ultimate concerns are effective in delivering the sense that our 
lives are meaningful. 
 Chapter VIII is also an opportunity to qualify the individualistic nature of the 
conclusions of chapters VI and VII. In adopting the perspective of the individual, we 
have found that a person’s own needs and happiness genuinely matters to them. This 
might suggest that people would be right to be selfish. In chapter VIII, I argue that 
human beings are not inherently selfish. I also argue that being selfish is not the most 
reasonable way to achieve the things that matter most to us. I argue that the quality of 
our relationships genuinely matters to us. Even if we are talking instrumentally, I argue 
that positive relationships with other people are necessary if we are to have our needs 
met (in the early years of our lives). I also set out ways in which our happiness depends 
on positive relationships with others.  
 
 Conclusion 
 
 The title of each chapter poses a particular question. Many of the chapters will 
end with a qualified or tentative conclusion. Once the thesis can be seen as a whole, I 
will be in a position to provide much more detailed answers to each of these questions. I 
will be showing that, despite all the challenges that can be posed against the thought 
that some things genuinely matter, not only do human beings act as though some things 
matter, in many cases they are right to think that certain things really do matter. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
IS OUR OWN DEATH BAD FOR US? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I want to assess what attitude it is most reasonable to have 
towards our own death. The issue of death is not particularly central to my thesis, 
although the fact that we die is often cited as one of the reasons why nothing matters 
(this is explored in Chapter IV.4). I start with this discussion because this allows me to 
raise a number of themes that are central to my thesis. This discussion allows me to start 
examining what makes something valuable for us and what the relationship between our 
experiences and something being valuable to us is. Importantly, it also allows me to set 
out aspects of the relationship between death and the value of life. (An account which is 
developed in Chapter VII. Part 1). 
In this chapter, I will be outlining three arguments presented by Epicurus and 
Lucretius1. Each of the arguments aims to prove that our own death cannot be a 
problem for us. The discussion is entirely focused on the correct attitude to have to o
own death. I am not going to be concerned with how our own death may affect others
or how other people’s death might affect u
ur 
, 
s. 
I will be outlining, then assessing each argument in turn. My assessment of the 
arguments is to a large extent based on Nagel’s attempts to disprove all three of the 
arguments. In the chapter ‘Death’2 in Mortal Questions, Nagel argues that our own 
death is bad for us in virtue of the fact that life is something of value. So, because death 
robs us of something valuable, we can say that our own death is bad for us. In order to 
defend this conclusion, Nagel first needs to show what is wrong with Epicurus’ and 
Lucretius’ arguments. The onus is on Nagel, as only one of the Greeks’ arguments 
needs to be sound to provide us with proof that our own death cannot be a problem for 
us. 
 
 
2. Is death the end of our existence? 
 
Each of the Greeks’ arguments relies on the claim that death is the end of our 
existence; and so death involves a state of non-existence, where we no longer 
experience anything. My original intention was to provide a lengthy defence of this 
claim. Unfortunately, I do not have the space to do this. This means that the claim that 
death is the end of our existence will be an assumption in my discussion. Having said 
that, in this section I want to provide reasons for thinking that it is not an unreasonable 
assumption. 
If human beings are simply physical things, then we would have good reason to 
think that death is the end of our existence. The claim that death is the end of our 
existence only seems contentious if it is thought that our spirit continues to exist after 
our death. So, for the sake of argument, let’s assume that, on death, our spirit separates 
                                                 
1 The arguments are taken from Epicurus and Lucretius in A. Long and D. Sedley (ed.) (1987) 
The Hellenistic Philosophers Vol 1. Cambridge University Press: London pp. 149-3 
2 Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge pp.1-10 
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from our body, and carries on having an existence after our death. Even if this is 
accepted, we might wonder if it is right to identify the spirit of someone who dies with 
the person who has died (In other words, even if some part of a person does survive 
their own death, we might still think that the person they were while alive no longer 
exists). 
It seems as though there can be genuine doubts about whether the fact that (e.g.) 
David Beckham’s spirit survives David’s death gives us good reasons for thinking that 
David Beckham has survived his own death. There may be reasons for thinking that 
David’s identity is entwined with his physical form, and his physical capabilities. Given 
the fact that many of the things that David cares most about (playing football, having a 
fashionable hairstyle etc.) are to do with his physical form, there may be genuine doubts 
about whether the mere continued existence of a spirit should lead us to say that 
whatever continues to exist after his death is properly described as him. 
So (even if some part of a person survives their own death) we might still have 
good reasons to say that the person who has died no longer exists. The claim that death 
is the end of our existence is one that is assumed in all the arguments we are looking at 
(and is similarly assumed by Nagel in his attempts to refute the arguments.) As I say, 
these comments do not amount to conclusive reasons for accepting this claim, but I will 
be assuming that this claim is true in the rest of this chapter. The discussion then is 
based on this hypothetical claim: If death is the end of our existence, would our own 
death in those circumstances be a bad thing for us? 
 
 
3. Argument 1: Does all good and bad lie in sensation? 
 
Death is nothing to us. For all good and bad lie in sensation, whereas death is the 
absence of sensation.3 
 
 i. How should we understand ‘sensations’? 
 
Before assessing this argument, I want to start by clarify the meaning of the term 
‘sensation’ in this quote. In my view, the term ‘sensation’ is not a particularly helpful in 
expressing Epicurus’ argument. The term ‘sensation’ may suggest things like ‘tickles’, 
‘pains’, shivers’ etc. I take it that the point Epicurus is trying to make would be better 
made in the following way: 
It is our experiences (our awareness) that give life its quality (good and bad). Or, 
in a weaker sense, we might say that the possibility of having good and bad things 
happen to you is dependent on your ability to experience. We can equate experience 
with ‘the way things feel’, as long as this is taken in the broadest possible sense. (I will 
give examples of what this might involve below). In my view, this reading of the claim 
provides us with a fair representation of Epicurus’ argument. But, even if this is not 
what Epicurus means, it still makes for a better argument, and it also fits in with Nagel’s 
attempts to undermine this argument. So, I will be taking Epicurus’ claim to be that all 
good and bad ‘lie in’ experience and awareness. (There are probably even greater 
problems concerning how exactly ‘lie in’ should be interpreted. Hopefully, this issue 
will become clearer through the analysis of the truth of Epicurus’ premises).  
                                                 
3 Epicurus. From A. Long and D. Sedley (ed.) (1987) The Hellenistic Philosophers Vol 1.  
Cambridge University Press: London p. 149 
 8
As I said, I want to take experience and awareness in their broadest sense. So, I 
want to count the following as experiences: sense-experiences, emotions, feelings, 
bodily awareness, pleasures, pains, memories and thoughts. Most clearly, sense-
experience is one kind of experience that we have. Tasting a great cake, seeing a sunset, 
tasting some wine, listening to music, the feel of a hug and smelling a flower are all 
forms of sense-experience. But sense-experience is not the only form of experience or 
awareness we have. We also experience our own emotions and feelings. We can feel 
excited, nervous, tired, lonely, happy etc. These are all ways in which we might 
describe our experiences. Feelings of pleasure and pain play an important role in many 
of the discussions in this thesis. So, we might experience the pain of being punched in 
the face, or the pleasure of a great kiss. I don’t want to restrict emotions to just feelings 
of pleasure and pain, though certainly these are two things we can be aware of. In most 
cases, the emotions we feel will be quite complex, and won’t just involve having 
discrete events of feeling pleasure or pain. We might say that, if my partner leaves me, 
this is bad because of the way it makes me feel. But we mean much more than that it 
causes me a discrete emotion of pain. I might have feelings of regret, feelings of low 
self-esteem, feelings of betrayal etc. In other words, there may be any number of more 
or less persistent aspects to my feelings and emotions. 
So, sense-experiences and emotions are clear cases of things that we can 
experience. But they are not the only things we can experience, or be aware of. There is 
a sense in which having a thought is also an experience (is something we are aware of). 
Similarly, having a memory is also an experience.  
We also have experiences related to touch. For example, the feeling of a kiss, or 
a hug are things that we experience. We might think of these as forms of bodily 
sensations. So, in analysing Epicurus’ argument, I will be taking experiences to mean 
all sense-experience, all emotions, feelings and sensations, all thoughts all memories 
and all bodily awareness. 
This is then quite a broad reading of Epicurus’ claim. Reading Epicurus in this 
way is justified by the fact that, even with this broad reading of ‘sensations’ the 
argument remains valid. If we are assuming that death is the end of our existence and 
involves the state of non-existence, even on this broad reading of ‘sensations’ death will 
involve the complete loss of all of these forms of experience.  
Having got some grip on the claims Epicurus is making, here is the argument we 
are left with:  
 
Premise 1  : All good and bad (for us) lie in experiences. 
Premise 2  : Death is the absence of experience (for us) 
Conclusion: (Our own) death is nothing to us. 
 
This argument is valid. Therefore, in order to find out if the conclusion is true, 
we need to assess the truth of the premises. As I have said, I will be assuming that death 
is the end of our existence. If this is assumed, then premise 2 seems to follow. If you no 
longer exist, then you are no longer capable of experiencing anything. (As I said in 
section 2, I am not denying that your spirit, if there is such a thing, may carry on 
experiencing things after your death. The claim is that you – the person you are before 
your death – no longer exists, and so death is rightly thought of as involving the absence 
of experience for the person who has died). 
This then leaves us with premise 1. If this premise is true, then we will have the 
best possible reason for thinking that our own death is not a problem for us. Is it true 
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then that everything that is either good for us, or bad for us, is so in virtue of our 
experiences? 
 
 
ii. Central cases 
 
To assess this claim, I want to start by looking at some central cases. For many 
cases, it seems true that good and bad lie in experience. For example, food poisoning is 
usually considered a bad thing. It seems reasonable to think that what is bad about food 
poisoning is related to how unpleasant it feels to suffer from it. For example, you might 
suffer feelings of exhaustion and discomfort as well as occasional feelings of pain. So, 
food poisoning is thought to be bad in virtue of the fact that it involves all these 
negative experiences. 
Similarly, think of the experience of seeing a sunset. We might describe the 
experience itself as an aesthetically pleasing one. Not only this, the ‘sense-experience’ 
of seeing the sunset might be accompanied by other feelings. I might have a sense of 
peace or well-being, or feel stimulated in some sense. We might say that the possibility 
of having these ‘glorious feelings’ when seeing a sunset is dependent on our ability to 
have the sense-experience of the sunset. I can have this particular experience of peace 
only if I can see the sunset. So, someone who is blind will not be capable of having the 
sense-experience of seeing the sunset, and so cannot have the associated feelings about 
what they see. (Still, they will be capable of having plenty of positive experiences 
derived from the senses and experiences that they can have.)  
So, having a sense-experience is dependent on being open to the world. There 
are also associated experiences, like the feeling of peace at seeing a sunset, or the 
feeling of pain at being punched that (while not being sense-experiences themselves) 
also seem to be dependent on the ability to have sense-experiences. It looks then like 
there is some truth in Epicurus’ claim that valuing the world in one way rather than 
another is dependent on the ability to be aware (of oneself and the world.)  
 
 
 iii. Is being good identical to being an experience that feels good? 
 
As we saw with the clear-cut examples above, some things are thought to be 
good things simply in virtue of the fact that they feel good (for example, eating a cake, 
seeing a beautiful sunset etc.) This suggests what I will call the strong reading of 
premise 1: that only that which is pleasant is intrinsically good (similarly, only that 
which is unpleasant is intrinsically bad). In places, Nagel tends to equate Epicurus’ 
claim that all good and bad lie in experience with the strong claim that being good is 
simply being a positive immediate experience (and being bad is equivalent to being an 
immediate negative experience). Nagel does accept that, in many clear-cut cases, there 
is this strong relationship between being good and feeling good; “There certainly are 
goods and evils of a simple kind (including some pleasures and pains) which a person 
possesses at a given time simply in virtue of his condition at that time.”4 But, Nagel 
argues that this strong relationship doesn’t always hold. 
In fact, the claim that there is this strong relationship between being good and 
feeling good is implausible, and so Nagel is right that, if Epicurus’ argument relies on 
this strong reading, then we would have good reasons to dismiss it. That this strong 
                                                 
4 Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge p. 4/5 
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reading is implausible is clear from the ease with which we can come up with counter-
examples. For example, think of having a massage. You might value the massage for 
the positive feelings that follow from the massage. But, the massage itself may involve 
feeling quite a bit of pain. Still we might value this pain, but only insofar as it is the way 
to achieve more long term positive experiences in the future. What is clear from this 
example is that, if we want to know whether something bad is happening to someone, it 
is not enough to simply look at whether their immediate experiences are ‘pleasing’ ones.  
In some cases, things may look more complicated. For example, imagine 
someone who, at the moment they win the marathon at the Olympics feels absolutely 
terrible; she has cramp, fatigue, blisters, strained muscles etc. Of course, she will also 
feel great about having won an Olympic gold. After all, if she has worked for ten years 
to achieve the goal of winning an Olympic gold medal, she might (rightly) think that 
this is the most valuable moment of her life, regardless of the fact that she is currently 
undergoing a number of negative physical experiences. So, in this case, we do not want 
to say that winning the marathon is good simply because it makes her feel good (after 
all, she is suffering a number of negative experiences). It seems much better to say that 
she feels good because she thinks something good has happened to her. We might say 
that winning the marathon is the good thing that has happened to her, and her resulting 
pleasure is simply a rational response to the fact that she perceives winning the 
marathon as a good thing. In this way, the strong reading of Epicurus’ claim appears (in 
cases such as this) to get the relationship between being a being good thing and being 
pleasurable the wrong way round. In many cases, we do not simply take the fact that it 
feels good as a reason for saying that something good must be happening to us. Rather, 
in many cases it is the thought that something good is happening to us that leads us to 
feel good.  
So, it is clear that there isn’t a direct relationship between simple states of 
pleasure and the assessment of whether something good has happened to someone. 
These are not identical. Being good and bad isn’t simply feeling good and bad. (I will 
return to this issue in Chapter VII Part 2) 
 
 
 iv. Counter-examples: Can what you don’t know hurt you? 
 
In the examples above, of winning the marathon and having a painful massage, 
we have seen that it is too simplistic to assess whether something good is happening to 
someone by looking at their immediate experiences. But, it still seems possible to argue 
that, whether something good is happening to someone is related in some weaker sense 
to our experiences. So, for example, we might judge that the painful massage is a good 
thing by looking at the positive experiences of improved health that follow (which is 
itself a pleasant experience). So, while it is clear that the strong reading cannot be 
justified, perhaps there is a weaker reading of the claim that all good and bad ‘lie in’ 
experience that could be justified.  
Let’s turn to a more forceful argument from Nagel, one that seems to apply even 
to weaker readings of premise 1. Nagel attempts to test the claim that all good and bad 
are good and bad in virtue (in the fullness of time) of one’s experiences by trying to find 
counter-examples to this claim. Nagel attempts to refute the first premise by providing 
examples where he claims we can say that something good or bad is happening to 
someone even though they have no experience of it.  
It might be thought (even without adopting a strong reading) that one of the 
implications of Epicurus’ claim is that nothing can be good or bad for us unless we are, 
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in some sense aware of it. If Epicurus is right, an event we are unaware of (and so are 
having no experiences of) cannot be good or bad for us. This seems to imply that ‘what 
we don’t know can’t hurt us.’  
Here then are a few examples where it might be thought that what you don’t 
know can hurt you. Imagine your partner is sleeping with your best friend in secret. It 
might be thought that, despite the fact that you are unaware of what is happening, it is 
clearly still the case that something bad is happening to you. Similarly, imagine all the 
people you think are your ‘friends’ actually dislike you. Whenever you are not there, 
they mock you behind your back. Or, imagine you are away from your house, and your 
house burns down. In all of these cases, we would want to say that something bad is 
happening to you – and that it is a bad thing despite the fact that you do not have any 
experience of it.  
In cases such as these, if we think something bad has happened to us, it cannot 
be because of the ‘badness’ of our experience (as in such cases there is a complete 
absence of any kind of bad experience). Perhaps things will become clearer if we can 
say exactly what it is that is bad for the people in these examples. I want to start by 
focusing on the example of being cheated on. There are a number of reasons why we 
might think that something bad is happening to someone being cheated on, even if they 
have no experience of it. Imagine the person being cheated on is committed to their 
partner and their relationship. As such, he has put the relationship with this partner at 
the centre of his life (in the belief that there is mutual trust and respect between them.) 
He structures his life and his future around being with his partner. He cares deeply 
about his partner and his relationship, and believe that his partner feels the same about 
him.  
In being cheated on, he is now deceived in believing that there is mutual trust 
and respect between them.  In this sense, we might say that (even if one person in the 
relationship has no knowledge of what is happening) the relationship itself is being 
damaged. Given the fact that the (cuckolded) person clearly values the relationship 
(they have after all put it at the centre of their life) the relationship being damaged is a 
bad thing for them. We might think that, if he knew all the relevant facts, he would not 
wish to devote any time or energy to his partner, and to the relationship. In this sense, 
something is happening to him that he would never wish for. So, part of the damage is 
caused by the fact that the cuckolded person is unaware of what is actually happening. 
Because they are unaware of the true situation, they are making their decisions on the 
basis of faulty view of their relationships. After all, he will be devoting his life to a 
relationship that (were they to know the truth) he would not wish to devote his life to. In 
this sense, it seems that, because he lacks information relevant to his decisions, he is 
unable to make a truly free choice. 
 
 
 v. Nagel’s positive account 
 
I think this discussion can help us understand what Nagel means when he says 
“it is arbitrary to restrict the goods and evils that can befall a man to nonrelational 
properties ascribable to him at a particular time.”5 One of the points Nagel is making 
here is that it is wrong to think that being good is simply being a positive immediate 
experience. (In other words, the strong reading of Epicurus’ claim is unjustified.)  
                                                 
5 Ibid p. 6 
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Nagel appears to be implying that we should take more than just the state 
someone is in that particular instance into account if we want to know if something bad 
is happening to them. Nagel’s view is that “most good and ill fortune has as its subject a 
person identified by his history and possibilities, rather than merely by his categorical 
state of mind.”6 In other words, we decide whether something bad has happened to 
someone, in part, by relating what is happening now to what has happened in the past, 
and to their imagined future (their aims, hopes and dreams – and fears and worries etc.)  
If we return to the example of the person whose partner cheats on him behind his 
back, Nagel’s view should become clearer. In that example, we saw that we could say 
that something bad has happened to this person because something of value to them has 
been damaged. We can describe why and how this relationship is of value (why their 
relationship is something that really matters to them) by looking at the cuckolded 
person’s history and possibilities. Their relationship with their partner is something they 
have put time and effort into, something they have committed to. We have reason then 
to think that serious damage to the relationship is something that matters to them in 
virtue of the time, effort and commitment they have invested in it in the past.  
Similarly, we can understand how important the relationship is by thinking of 
the cuckolded person’s ‘imagined future’. Most people (see the section on ‘the 
unavoidability of seriousness’ II.3) have aims in their life. They have projects they are 
committed to, different futures they may see for themselves. So, another way in which 
we can assess whether something bad has happened to someone is by comparing what is 
actually happening to their aims, their hopes for the future, the things they are working 
for and the future they see for themselves. We can assess whether something good or 
bad is happening to someone by comparing it to ‘what they had hoped for’. So, with the 
man whose partner is cheating on him, if he has often told me that trust is the most 
important thing for him in a relationship, and he hopes to have a lasting relationship 
based on trust with his partner, I can know that something bad is happening to him if he 
is cheated on. The fact that he doesn’t know about the secret relationship is part of what 
makes the adultery bad. I can compare what is happening to what he would like to 
happen, or hope for. For example, I might think that, if his partner was cheating on him, 
he would rather know. I know that, in comparison with what he would want were he to 
know, something bad is happening to him. 
So, whether a bad thing is happening to someone can be decided by looking at 
the values of the person, and seeing how what has happened relates to their values, their 
hopes, their commitments. If they value their relationships (or their home, job, TV etc.) 
then any damage to these things can be thought a bad thing for them (even when they 
are not aware of it.) This seems to justify a claim Nagel makes that Epicurus’ claim gets 
things the wrong way round.  
 
For the natural view is that the discovery of betrayal makes us unhappy because 
it is bad to be betrayed – not that betrayal is bad because its discovery makes us 
unhappy.7 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Ibid p. 5 
7 Ibid p. 5 
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 vi. Have experiences been dispensed with? 
 
Let us accept that Nagel is correct in thinking that, part of the way in which we 
assess whether something bad has happened to someone is by looking at their past, and 
their aims and projects. Is there any way to defend premise 1 from Nagel’s counter-
examples?  
Imagine a friend falls into a coma that lasts ten years. While she is in the coma, 
her husband leaves her, and marries another woman. When this happens I think ‘what a 
terrible thing to have happened. She will be devastated if she regains consciousness’. 
What actually happens is that, once recovering from her coma, she is delighted that her 
husband has left her. She says that she realised that her husband didn’t mean that much 
to her. In such circumstances, it seems right to say that, when her husband left her, 
nothing bad did actually happen to her. In other words, the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of 
an event for someone must, at some stage, make reference to that person’s feelings on 
the matter were they to have some experience of it. (This may simply be another way of 
saying that what we are interested in is the relationship the event has to their values, 
projects etc.) 
This suggest that there may be a weaker reading of ‘lie in’ which would mean 
that in some sense, something being good or bad for us must be rooted in some 
experiential quality. I want to discuss one final example which attempts to decisively 
break this link. 
 
 
 vii. Missing out on experiences 
 
It seems reasonable for someone to say that missing an experience (i.e. the 
absence of an experience) was a bad thing for them. Imagine all my friends go to a 
concert that I can’t afford to go to. I might think that the experiences I had that night 
were not bad (maybe I spent the night playing the guitar, enjoying myself). When they 
come back and tell me it was the best concert they had ever seen and that I would have 
loved it if I had gone, what I regret is my lack of this experience. If it is true that the 
lack of an experience can be bad for us, then this seems to provide the clearest possible 
counter-example to Epicurus’ claim. More than that, this example seems directly related 
to the wider issue. If we accept that missing out on an experience can be a bad thing for 
someone, we can see why our own death might be bad for us – as it may well involve us 
missing out on experiences that (given our plans, projects and values) we would have 
highly valued. 
It might be said that missing the experience is bad because it causes feelings of 
regret. So, could I still say that missing a concert I would have loved is a bad thing for 
me, even if I had no knowledge of its existence? I am a huge music fan, and so it is 
probable that there have been countless numbers of concerts (by bands I’ve never even 
heard of) that I would have enjoyed greatly had I been there. (This is perhaps the closest 
we can come to saying something bad has happened entirely independent of someone’s 
experiences.) Even though I accept that this is probably true, this thought does not 
particularly concern me. Now that I have worked out that this must be true (in some 
abstract sense) I don’t now spend time regretting this fact, and I don’t have any real 
sense that my life has been harmed. But then, this fact doesn’t impact on my life in the 
way that (for example) betrayal does. Perhaps the important thing is not whether you 
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happen to regret something, but rather how directly the event impacts on the things that 
you value, and the aims and projects that you have.  
At the very least, if you miss out on experiences that you could have had, which 
(given your history, possibilities and values) you would have valued, it seems right to 
think that something bad has happened you. This is probably enough to decisively 
undermine premise 1 of Epicurus’ argument. 
 
 
 viii. Thinnest sense in which premise 1 is true 
 
Perhaps there is an even weaker sense in which good and bad might ‘lie in’ 
experience. I will be arguing in later chapters that, something can only matter (or be 
significant) for something which has awareness. (I defend this claim in IV.2.ii & iii). I 
will argue that being open to the world is a necessary condition of there being things 
that could count as good or bad for me. 
Think of the fact that nothing could be significant for a stone. A stone might 
matter to us (it might for example have a financial value) but it is not at all clear that 
anything can matter to the stone. For a start, the stone has (let us assume!) no awareness 
of the world. In these circumstances, it seems unclear how anything could be thought to 
be significant for the stone. On the face of it then, it seems that things are only 
significant to those things that have awareness. I have no wish to claim that things can 
only matter to human beings. For example, we might argue that, given their awareness 
of the world, things can matter to animals.8 Similarly, if they exist, there is no reason to 
think that things can’t be significant for deities, angels, alien life forms etc.9  
As it happens, even in this weak sense it is not absolutely clear that premise 1 
necessarily follows. Even if something can only be significant for something that has 
awareness, someone may want to argue that this is compatible with the thought that 
things can be significant for things that have been aware (even if they no longer exist). 
This is not something I want to discuss. Rather, I just want to suggest that the argument 
in this section does not, as it stands, conclusively prove premise 1. 
 
 
 ix. Conclusion: Argument 1 
 
Given my assumption about death being the end of our existence, the truth of 
Epicurus’ argument centred on the truth of premise 1. There are many clear-cut 
examples, which seem to support Epicurus’ claim that there is strong relationship 
between something being good for us, and the fact that it feels good. 
  I attempted to assess the truth of premise 1 by looking for counter-examples. 
Through this discussion it became clear that our assessment of whether something good 
or bad is happening to someone is not just based on how they happen to feel at that 
particular moment. Rather, in order to assess whether something good (or bad) is 
happening to them, we need to look at what is happening in their lives in relation to 
their plans, projects and aims. 
It is not absolutely clear that all these examples do conclusively show that there 
is no relationship at all between good and bad happening to us, and our awareness. But 
                                                 
8 I will be suggesting that there are specific reasons for thinking there is something different about the 
way things matter to human beings (see VII.2 and VIII.2.iii). 
9 The relationship between significance and awareness will be explored again in the next chapter (see 
II.5.i). But the issue will only be properly thrashed out in Chapter IV (see IV.2.ii) 
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there was one example that seems conclusive – missing an experience. If missing out on 
an experience can be bad for us, then all good and bad cannot lie in experience 
(however ‘lie in’ is interpreted.) So, my view is that Epicurus’ argument does not prove 
that our own death is neither good nor bad for us. If missing out on an experience can be 
bad for us, we can understand why our own death may be bad for us (given the fact that 
it will involve missing out on any number of experiences.) 
 
 
4. Argument 2: Can something be bad for anything that doesn’t exist? 
 
If there is going to be unhappiness and suffering, the person must himself exist 
at the same time, for the evil to be able to befall him.10 
 
Premise 1  : When we die, we no longer exist. 
Premise 2  : Nothing can be bad for something that no longer exists 
Conclusion: Death cannot be bad for us. 
 
It might seem that there is a real difficulty in saying that death is bad for the 
person who has died, if it is accepted that (once they are dead) they no longer exist. 
How can we claim that someone has suffered a misfortune when there is no one to be 
the subject of the misfortune? As Nagel says, “there seems to be no time when death, if 
it is a misfortune, can be ascribed to its unfortunate subject.”11 
  As with argument 1, argument 2 is valid. I am once again assuming the truth of 
premise 1 (for the reasons discussed in section 2). In order to assess this argument then, 
we need to decide whether premise 2 is true. There is undoubtedly something to the 
claim that nothing can be bad for something that no longer exists. For example, it seems 
that, while the current period of global warming could be bad for Polar Bears, it clearly 
cannot be a problem for dinosaurs or dodos. So, even if it is accepted that global 
warming is a bad thing (because dinosaurs no longer exist) the current period of global 
warming cannot have any kind of impact on them. In these circumstances, it’s difficult 
to see how it could be thought bad for them.   
This seems true for many, if not most examples. Think of how many things we 
might think of as (currently) bad that couldn’t possibly be said to be bad for dinosaurs. 
(Rising house prices, the invasion of Iraq etc.) Unfortunately, there is one potentially 
bad thing that is particularly relevant in the context of this argument. Whereas most 
things clearly cannot be bad for something that doesn’t exist, the answer to the question 
‘was the extinction of the dinosaurs bad for the dinosaurs?’ is not so clear. More than 
this, this question seems the most relevant to the issues we are examining – whether our 
own death can be bad for us, despite the fact that we no longer exist. 
Nagel attempts to refute premise 2. He gives an example of how something can 
be bad for a person who (in a sense) no longer exists. So, imagine a philosophy 
professor who, through a car accident, is reduced to the mental state of a one year old 
child.12 Nagel argues that this example can provide us with a counter-example to 
premise 2. 
                                                 
10 Lucretius. From A. Long and D. Sedley (ed.) (1987) The Hellenistic Philosophers Vol 1. Cambridge 
University Press: London p. 151 
11 Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge p. 4 
12 This example is actually used by Nagel in relation to argument 1 as well (it is an example of something 
bad happening to someone who is not aware of it). I have used it here because it is the most forceful 
argument Nagel has against argument 2. 
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Suppose [a philosophy professor] receives a brain injury that reduces him to the 
mental condition of a contented infant, and that such desires as remain to him 
can be satisfied by a custodian, so that he is free from care. Such a development 
would be widely regarded as a severe misfortune, not only for his friends and 
relations, or for society, but also, and primarily, for the person himself. This 
does not mean that a contented infant is unfortunate. The intelligent adult who 
has been reduced to this condition is the subject of the misfortune.13 
 
Imagine that the incapacitated professor was just about to finish a book which he 
felt was the culmination of his life’s work, or he was keenly anticipating the birth of 
first grandchild. Nagel’s claim is that we can then understand how something bad has 
happened to the professor by contrasting his previous life with the state that they are 
now in. 
 
If, instead of concentrating exclusively on the oversized baby before us, we 
consider the person he was, and the person he could be now, then his reduction 
to this state and the cancellation of his natural adult development constitute a 
perfectly intelligible catastrophe.14 
 
There is though something a bit problematic about Nagel’s example. We could 
after all run exactly the same example, but imagine instead that the professor dies. In 
other words, we have a clear parallel to the example of death (so what we say about the 
case of the incapacitated professor will be relevant to what we say about death). But, we 
might almost say that it is too close an analogy. This seems clear as Lucretius’ 
arguments against death being bad apply just as well to the example of the incapacitated 
professor: 
 
‘No more for you the welcome of a joyful home and a good wife. No more will 
your children run to snatch a first kiss, and move your heart with unspoken 
delight … Unhappy man’, they say … What they fail to add is: ‘Nor does any 
yearning for those things remain in you’.15 
 
In other words, as in cases of death, Lucretius will argue that, in ascribing a 
misfortune to the professor, you are ascribing a misfortune to someone who no longer 
exists. Nagel seems happy to accept this; ”there is some doubt, in fact, whether [the 
philosophy professor] can be said to exist any longer.”16 In a way, Nagel has simply set 
out an example that poses exactly the same problems as our original question. If we 
accept that something bad has happened to the incapacitated professor, we will also 
accept that the event of death is a bad thing for someone. But, by the same token, if we 
can say that because something bad cannot happen to someone who doesn’t exist, then 
this event is not bad for the incapacitated professor. There is nothing in Nagel’s 
discussion to help resolve this. At best, we might think that, if we find it plausible to say 
that the incapacitated professor has been harmed, we should similarly find it plausible to 
talk of people who have died being harmed. 
                                                 
13 Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge p. 5 
14 Ibid p. 6 
15 Lucretius. From A. Long and D. Sedley (ed.) (1987) The Hellenistic Philosophers Vol 1. Cambridge 
University Press: London p. 152 
16 Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge p. 6 
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So, we do not seem to have found any conclusive reasons for accepting premise 
2. Rather, we seem to have reached a standoff, where both sides argue that the other 
side misses something important. Nagel argues that Lucretius ignores the fact that the 
person prior to the injury has obviously lost out (something bad has happened to them.) 
On the other hand, Lucretius argues that Nagel is not taking into account the fact that 
the injured (or dead) person before us does not miss anything. The discussion in this 
section has not shown any reason for thinking that one of these perspectives must be 
accepted over the other. In these circumstances, there is enough doubt over premise 2 
for us to say that the second argument has not been proved.  
 
 
5. Argument 3: Is the time before we are born the same as the time after 
we die? 
 
Just as in the past we had no sensation of discomfort when the Carthaginians 
were converging to attack … so too, when we no longer exist following the 
severing of the soul and body … you can take it that nothing at all will be able to 
affect us.17 
 
Premise 1:  We are not concerned about our non-existence before we were born. 
 
Premise 2:  The time before we were born is the same state  
as the time after we die. 
Conclusion:  We should not be concerned about our own death. 
 
This argument suggests that, if we accept that the time before our birth and the 
time after our death are identical states, we have some kind of rational obligation to 
have the same attitude to both. I like this argument, but not because I think it’s true. 
Rather (if the assumption in section 2 is accepted) this argument provides a concrete 
sense of what the state of non-existence is like. The state of death is just like the kind of 
existence I had when the First World War was being fought, just like when Cleopatra 
ruled Egypt etc. This thought can help prevent something that can happen when people 
attempt to think about what non-existence would be like after their death. In attempting 
to understand the experience of not experiencing, they can suffer a kind of ‘vertigo’, 
where they imagine death as the experience of non-existence. 
 
Instead of completely stripping himself of life, he is unconsciously making some 
bit of him survive.18 
 
Still, we need to assess whether the argument is a good one. Let us start by 
assessing premise 1. There can certainly be events that happened before my birth that I 
am ‘concerned about’. For example, the birth of my mum might be thought of as event 
that concerns me. Pink Floyd recorded their first album before I was born. But this is 
still something I am interested in and value. This though is not what the first premise 
relates to. The first premise wants to point up the fact that people rarely spend time 
‘regretting’ the fact of their non-existence prior to their birth. Is this true? For example, 
                                                 
17 Lucretius. From A. Long and D. Sedley (ed.) (1987) The Hellenistic Philosophers Vol 1.  
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge p. 151 
18 Ibid p. 151 
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as a fan of early Pink Floyd, I might regret the fact that I will never see them live at the 
time when I would have enjoyed them most. Even with this example though, it is not at 
all clear that we have refuted the first premise. The reasons for this will become clear 
when I discuss premise 2. Let us leave premise 1 to one side. For the sake of the 
argument, I will assume it is true. 
Nagel attempts to refute premise 2. He argues that there is in fact an asymmetry 
between the time before you were born and the time after you die. 
 
the time after his death is time of which his death deprives him. It is time in 
which, had he not died then, he would be alive.19 
 
Nagel argues that, in contrast to this, being born at the time we are does not deny 
us time we could have lived as the person we are. After all, when my parents had a 
child at a different time, my sister was born (it wasn’t me again). As we could not have 
been the person we are now if we had been born earlier there is no sense in which we 
can say that I (the person I am now) have been deprived of anything by being born 
when I was. By contrast, there is a sense in which the time after a person’s death could 
be thought of as time they are deprived of as the person they were when alive. For 
example, perhaps if they had lived another couple of years, they could have (say) seen 
the birth of their grandchild as the person they were when alive. This means that while 
the time before birth and the time after death might be thought of as identical states, we 
are right to have a different attitude to them. 20  
Argument 3 assumes that we have some kind of rational obligation to have the 
same attitude to states that are identical. But there are plenty of other examples to show 
that this is not the case. Think for example of the pleasure of a kiss. It seems perfectly 
reasonable to have very different attitudes to events which are in fact (superficially) 
similar states. If a kiss leads to me cementing my relationship with someone I go on to 
spend the rest of my life with, I will rightly have a different attitude to this that a kiss 
which leads my partner to leave me (even though they might be described superficially 
as the same kind of state). So, we can be right to have different attitudes to the same 
states if they occur in different contexts. So, even if we accept that premise 2 is true 
(that the state before birth is identical to the state after death) this doesn’t justify the 
conclusion that our own death cannot be bad for us. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Throughout my discussion of the Greeks’ arguments, there are two intuitions 
that seem to pull us in opposite directions. On the one hand, once we die (given my 
assumption in section 2) we are no longer in a position to experience anything, so it is 
not clear how anything bad could happen to you. On the other hand, the fact that we no 
longer experience anything might itself be thought bad for us. 
We can sum up this conclusion in the following way. It may be true that death is 
a neutral state, but life isn’t a neutral state. Because of this, death involves the loss of 
(or missing out on) something of value. So, the fact that we no longer experience and 
                                                 
19 Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge p. 7  
20 It is possible to come up with bizarre examples that may show that it is conceivable that you could be 
the person you are, but be born earlier. (C.f. Robert Nozick’s proposal discussed in a footnote by Nagel. 
Ibid. p. 8) But, it is not at all clear what conclusions we should draw from the mere possibility of such 
wildly implausible scenarios. 
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the fact that we no longer exist, far from proving that death is not a problem for us 
actually helps us see what is bad about death. The fact that the state of death is identical 
to the state before birth (which we do not particularly think of as a bad thing) doesn’t 
undermine this conclusion. 
I’ve said as much as I can about the Greeks’ arguments. In the rest of this thesis, 
I will in part be concerned with assessing the positive part of Nagel’s claim. Let us 
accept for the moment that if life really is valuable, then missing out on life (i.e. death) 
can be seen as a bad thing for us. This means that, only by assessing whether life is 
valuable (and perhaps setting out why life is valuable) can we properly assess Nagel’s 
claim that our own death can be bad for us. (I will do this in Chapter VII Part 2). In a 
sense, the rest of this thesis is concerned with whether there really are things about life 
that are genuinely valuable, that genuinely matter. I will be using Nagel again in order 
to start exploring whether there are things that are genuinely valuable about human 
existence.  
The chapter that follows ‘Death’ in Mortal Questions is called ‘The Absurd’.21 
There, Nagel attempts to show that, while people (unavoidably) think that some things 
matter, we can never conclusively know whether anything does actually matter. This 
thesis is primarily interested in the issue of whether anything actually matters. If Nagel 
is right, we can never know if anything actually matters. So, Nagel’s arguments are 
genuinely threatening to my project. So, in the next chapter, I will be assessing Nagel’s 
arguments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge pp. 11-23  
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CHAPTER II 
 
IS LIFE ABSURD? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, I argued that if death is bad, it is because it brings to an end a 
potentially valuable life. In this chapter, I want to look at another argument from Nagel 
which attempts to justify the claim that life is absurd. One aspect of Nagel’s claim (the 
inescapability of doubt) is that we simply cannot know if (or why) life is meaningful or 
valuable. So, according to Nagel, any claims we make about an aspect of our life 
mattering, being valuable or being meaningful are fundamentally unjustifiable. This 
claim appears to be in tension with Nagel’s claim that our own death is bad for us 
because it brings to an end something of value – life. If Nagel is right about the 
inescapability of doubt, it seems that we are not entitled to make any claims about life 
being valuable. In saying death is bad because life is valuable, Nagel will be going 
beyond what he himself believes he can justifiably say.  
My thesis is an attempt to assess whether anything genuinely matters. I wish to 
argue that there are some things that genuinely matter to us. If Nagel’s arguments in 
‘The Absurd’ are right, we will have to accept that (while there are things that we think 
matter) we are unable to justify any beliefs about things mattering. I wish to resist this 
conclusion. In order to do this, I will be assessing Nagel’s arguments. I hope to show 
that there is nothing in Nagel’s arguments to lead us to think that the search for things 
that genuinely matter is futile. 
So, in this chapter, I will be outlining Nagel’s claim that life is absurd. I will 
quickly set out the structure of Nagel’s argument. This is given in the next section. I 
will then outline and assess the two claims that make up Nagel’s argument for the claim 
that life is absurd. Having assessed these claims, I will be in a better position to assess 
whether Nagel is right in saying that it is impossible to be justified in claiming that 
something genuinely matters. 
 
 
2. Nagel’s argument for the absurdity of life 
 
Nagel defines absurdity as the clash between pretension and reality.22 Nagel 
argues that there is a universal sense in which human life is absurd – indeed is by its 
very nature absurd. He describes a clash between two opposed viewpoints human 
beings (can) adopt. He labels these two viewpoints ‘the unavoidability of seriousness’ 
(our pretensions) and ‘the inescapability of doubt’ (reality). He claims that it is the clash 
between these two viewpoints that leads to a kind of universal absurdity.  
In terms of my overall thesis, the unavoidability of seriousness (if true) would 
show that human beings always think some things matter (are valuable). But the 
inescapability of doubt, if true, would show that we could never know that anything 
really does matter. This leaves us in a seemingly contradictory position when it comes 
to the question ‘does anything matter?’ It is because of this contradiction that Nagel 
describes human life as necessarily absurd. 
                                                 
22 Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. p. 13 
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Nagel’s claim that life is absurd relies on these two claims about human 
existence both being true. So, I will outline and assessing Nagel’s arguments for the 
unavoidability of seriousness and the inescapability of doubt. In order to properly assess 
these claims, I have attempted to present the claims in as strong a form as possible 
before beginning my assessment. This has involved including much material of my 
own. My aim is to draw out as clearly as possible what is true in Nagel’s account before 
attempting my assessment.  
 
 
3. The unavoidability of seriousness 
 
Nagel wants to claim that human beings necessarily think some things matter. 
The unavoidability of seriousness is not just a claim about how things happen to be. 
Nagel takes it that he is describing an unavoidable part of human existence – namely 
that human beings cannot help but think that (at least some of) their choices matter. 
As I discussed in the last chapter (I.3.v) most human lives are full of plans, 
projects and aims. Some of these aims are long term ones. In my case, these might be 
things like writing this PhD, improving my Tai Chi, being a good friend and eating 
more healthily. Some of the aims I might pursue are more short term ones, things like 
paying the gas bill, buying tickets for a gig, preparing for a seminar, buying some food, 
mixing a great drum & bass set and entertaining my niece. 
So, the world appears to me (except in exceptional circumstances) as full of ‘live 
possibilities’. I am faced with a world in which there are a number of options open to 
me - there are any number of things I could choose to do at this particular moment. The 
choices we are faced with concern not only what aims to pursue (e.g. writing my PhD) 
but also concern what means we should use to achieve them (e.g. which chapter of my 
thesis should I work on now?) 
We might say that there is a sense in which many sentient creatures are faced 
with choices. With very basic forms of life (e.g. an ant) this might not be clear. We 
might think that a purely instinctive creature is never faced with ‘choices’. (For more on 
this, see VIII.2.iii) With more complex creatures, it seems easier to think of them being 
faced with a choice. A cat might enter a room full of familiar people, and be faced with 
the choice of which lap to sit on. Perhaps though, while there is a sense in which a cat 
can be faced with choices, there is something distinctive about the process by which 
human beings make choices. For a start, humans are able to reflect on the choices facing 
them. We can weigh (possible) consequences and ask whether what we are doing is 
worthwhile, whether it matters. While some of our decisions can be made impulsively, 
not all decisions are impulsive. (There may of course be examples of people who do 
always act impulsively. I will be examining this issue below). Nagel is right that people 
in general do take time to think about their choices, contemplate their options, think 
about the possible consequences of their actions etc. 
Nagel links this to the fact that we are self-consciousness. (As we will see, he 
also links the inescapability of doubt to the fact that we are self-consciousness). 
Because we are self-conscious, we can take our own (present and future) actions and 
choices as the object of contemplation. Because of this (in a way that might be said to 
be distinctively human) we can (and usually do) devote large amounts of our time and 
energy reflecting on the choices that we are faced with. 
To spend time and energy on the process of making choices only makes sense if 
we think that in some sense it matters which choice we make. This comes out most 
clearly when someone is faced with a dilemma. Imagine I am in a position where I am 
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forced to make a choice between a job I love and the needs of my family. Perhaps 
circumstances have reached a stage where it becomes necessary to give one of these 
things priority over the other. In making the choice, I might spend hours thinking about 
which future I would most value, what kind of life I would find most satisfying etc. The 
reason why this dilemma is pressing for me is that I am forced to choose between two 
things that both matter to me. We might say, only if some things do matter to me will it 
make sense to spend time deciding which aspect of my life matters most to me. 
It is true then that we devote much of our time and energy to making choices, 
and working to achieve the aims and plans we set ourselves. We also spend an 
enormous amount of time and energy thinking about ourselves and the choices open to 
us regarding our health, our sex-lives, our self-knowledge, our relationships, our status, 
our wealth etc. As Nagel says: “Leading a human life is a full-time occupation, to which 
everyone devotes decades of intense concern.”23 It seems right to say that the amount of 
energy we give to our choices is directly related to how much we think they matter. 
Nagel’s claim that humans are unavoidably serious (that we think our choices 
and our lives matter) is not supposed to be a description of an intellectual state we are 
in. Nagel’s claim is not that, if you ask people they would say that they believe that their 
lives matter. Rather, if we look at the way in which people make their choices (and the 
amount of time and energy they devote to them) it reveals a practical attitude towards 
their choices and their lives. Humans show that their lives and choices matter to them 
by how they act. This is why seriousness is unavoidable. 
 
 
4. Is seriousness unavoidable? 
 
So, it seems that we are serious to the extent that we put effort into considering 
and making choices, and to the extent that we put effort into pursuing the aims that we 
have chosen. In order to test Nagel’s claim that this kind of seriousness is unavoidable, I 
will see if we can make sense of a human being failing to have this kind of seriousness. 
I’m going to outline a number of possible scenarios of ways in which people could live 
so as to avoid seriousness. It quickly becomes clear that the first three scenarios – 
making all choices by tossing a coin, seeing the self as ‘illusory’ and acting 
compulsively – are not ways of living that avoid seriousness. The final two scenarios – 
living as a slave and suffering extreme depression – do seem to be ways in which we 
could avoid seriousness. Discussing these scenarios will help us see whether seriousness 
is avoidable, and whether we have any reason to want to avoid being serious. 
Imagine that I decide that from now on, whenever I am faced by a choice, I will 
toss a coin (Heads, I’ll write my PhD, tails I’ll get a well paid job). I do this for all my 
choices. In these circumstances, have I avoided seriousness? At the very least, I will 
have to make an effort to decide which choices are going to be decided by the coin toss. 
I am going to go through the effort of tossing the coin, and will take it seriously enough 
to follow whatever the coin decides. So, it is not clear that I have avoided seriousness in 
Nagel’s sense. We may perhaps be tempted to say that, if I act in this way, I am failing 
to treat my decisions with sufficient (or appropriate) levity. This perhaps illustrates how 
‘thin’ Nagel’s claim that humans are unavoidably serious is. 
There are a number of spiritual traditions that focus on finding ways of seeing 
the world as illusion. It is thought that, through training, we can reach a position where 
we take neither ourselves, nor the world ‘seriously’. It is usually thought that practices 
                                                 
23 Ibid p. 15 
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like meditation can help you stop thinking of the self (and what it ‘wants’) as of any 
particular importance and allows you to experience the world as though it doesn’t 
matter (it’s all illusion). It might then look as though these kinds of practices and 
philosophies are precisely aimed at avoiding the seriousness that Nagel claims is 
unavoidable. Having said that, attaining this ‘enlightened’ position requires both 
strenuous effort and sustained discipline. It is difficult to see how anyone who spends 
twenty years attempting to attain this form of enlightenment, who devotes their life to 
such disciplined training, could honestly claim to have avoided seriousness. 
Perhaps someone suffering from a compulsive disorder could be thought to 
avoid seriousness. In fact, anyone who acts totally compulsively might perhaps be 
thought to be avoiding seriousness – as they are not ‘reflecting’ on their choices. In fact, 
the majority, if not all compulsive disorders don’t ‘avoid seriousness’. People who have 
a compulsive need to (say) wash their hands twenty times if they touch a door handle 
seem to attach great importance to performing these actions. They might say that they 
have to wash their hands because of the vast number of germs contained on a door 
handle. Or, perhaps they are unable to explain why doing these actions matters. ‘If these 
table mats aren’t at right angles to the table, it just bugs me.’ Still, the actions are felt as 
necessary, even vital (not doing them causes them great upset and stress). Once again 
then, these are not the actions of someone who thinks that nothing matters. 
Now I want discuss two examples that seem more promising ways in which 
people could avoid seriousness. I have accepted that we are serious to the extent that we 
put effort into considering and making choices, and to the extent that we put effort into 
pursuing the aims that we have chosen. On this basis, it may look as though someone 
who is turned into a slave might fail to be serious. In such cases, it is not clear that they 
are making any choices. (At least, they are not choosing for themselves). More 
importantly, they don’t get to put effort into pursuing aims that they have chosen. 
Rather, they put their energy into pursuing the choices of their master. Even if they 
spend time choosing what to do, their choice is made on the basis of what their master 
wants (or thinks is important) rather than what they think is important. A slave might be 
concerned with doing what their master thinks matters (insofar as it is important to them 
to not be punished). But this alone doesn’t show that they think what their master thinks 
matters really does matter. 
Still, there are ways in which a slave might still be serious. They may spend 
much of their time thinking about what they would do if they were free, thinking about 
whether it is worth trying to escape etc. (We might say that the amount of time they 
spend contemplating these things is an indication of the fact that the slave thinks they 
matter). Also, they might be serious in pursuing their master’s wishes (insofar as they 
believe that pursuing their master’s wishes is in their own interest). What we can say is 
that (if they do not try to escape) they will never show, through their efforts in pursuing 
their own chosen goals, that they really do matter to them. So, there are certain kinds of 
seriousness that a slave does ‘avoid’. Perhaps the best way for a slave to avoid 
seriousness is to have no thoughts about what they want, and to have no thoughts about 
trying to escape. It would also help if they were able to obey their master not out of their 
own self-interest, but unquestioningly, or uncritically. It seems possible in such 
circumstances to say that a slave can avoid seriousness. (Although, even here we might 
wonder if their absolute obedience to their master is itself a form of seriousness.) 
My final example, someone suffering extreme depression, is perhaps the clearest 
example I can come up with of someone who doesn’t (practically) take their lives 
seriously. When suffering depression, someone may come to believe that their life no 
longer matters. Perhaps they consider suicide as a real option. (Although contemplating 
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suicide may itself be an indication of seriousness.) In terms of Nagel’s argument, the 
important question is not whether they think their actions matter (they clearly don’t) but 
is rather ‘do they act as though none of their choices matter?’  
We might say in this case that we do have good reasons for saying that they 
don’t act as though their choices matter. We can say that their lack of action shows that 
they do not practically reveal the fact that there are things that matter to them. Perhaps 
they wake up every morning, but can’t see the point of getting up. ‘Why bother?’ It 
might be thought that, by not getting up they must be showing that they think it matters. 
But, this doesn’t seem to be the case in this example. The condition of extreme 
depression seems to involve the paralysing of one’s motivation to make choices. It 
could be described as the inability to experience anything as mattering. 
There is still a sense in which such people may be thought serious. We might 
have good reasons for saying that the fact that they are depressed is something that does 
matter to them (it is not experienced as a neutral state). For example, insofar as they 
contemplate suicide, or are willing to embark on the arduous process of therapy, we 
should say that they are serious with respect to their depression. 
As we have seen, there are certainly aspects of extreme depression and certain 
forms of slavery which suggest that people in such circumstances avoid seriousness in 
certain respects. But, we might say that such examples are (hopefully) rare. We can also 
say that, at least on the surface, these kinds of existence are not ones most of us would 
seek. In fact, we might think that neither slavery nor depression can be freely chosen. In 
this respect, we might say that we have reasons for wanting to be unavoidably serious, 
and (except in the most extreme cases) we are. I will be accepting Nagel’s claim that 
humans are unavoidably serious. The level of attention that we devote to our choices 
(and the time and energy we put into pursuing these choices) is an indication of the fact 
that we think some things matter.  
 
 
5. Inescapability of doubt 
 
The unavoidability of seriousness is the claim that people necessarily think that 
some things matter. The fact that everyone thinks at least some things matter is not a 
surprising conclusion. Still, it is still an open question whether people are right to think 
that the particular things that matter to them really matter. The inescapability of doubt is 
Nagel’s claim that we can never conclusively prove that we are right to think any 
particular thing does matter. Just to make this clear, given the fact that seriousness is 
unavoidable, we cannot help but live as though some things really do matter. But, if 
doubt is inescapable, we can never know that anything really does matter. This 
contradictory attitude to whether anything matters is what leads Nagel to describe our 
situation as absurd. 
Nagel has (broadly speaking) two arguments for the inescapability of doubt. 
(The distinction I have made between these two arguments is not one Nagel makes). 
The first argument is based on a particular kind of experience we are capable of having 
(what I will call the special experience argument). The second argument is based on a 
claim about the limits on what we can know (what I will call his epistemological 
argument). I have divided Nagel’s argument in this way, because, while Nagel’s 
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arguments are not particularly convincing, we will come across more convincing forms 
of these arguments later in this thesis.24 
 
 
i. The special experience argument 
 
Nagel introduces the ‘special experience’ argument in the following way: 
 
Humans have the special capacity to step back and survey themselves, and the 
lives to which they are committed, with that detached amazement which comes 
from watching an ant struggle up a heap of sand.25 
 
According to Nagel, we are all capable of stepping back and viewing our lives 
and our concerns ‘from a larger perspective’, from outside. Perhaps I am absorbed in 
making a choice. I am trying to work out which T-shirt to wear today. Suddenly, I 
‘rethink’ my situation. I see my see myself ‘from outside’ and suddenly see how, in the 
scheme of things, I am struggling over something ‘pathetic’. As Nagel says, from our  
new perspective, “the view is at once sobering and comic.”26 
Again, as with the unavoidability of seriousness, Nagel links this special kind of 
experience with self-consciousness27. When describing the unavoidability of 
seriousness, Nagel’s argued that it is because we are self-conscious that we have the 
capacity to take our own actions and experiences as the objects of thought. (And it is 
this that leads to our seriousness). So, we are capable of stepping back and assessing, or 
contemplating our actions. But this ability to step back (that comes with self-
consciousness) also brings with it the capacity to step back even further. It brings with it 
the ability to adopt a ‘wholly distanced’ perspective (to have the special experience). It 
gives us the ability to see things from a perspective outside of all possible concerns.  
So, the special experience that Nagel is interested in is one where we take a 
wholly distanced (what Nagel calls a sub specie aeternitatis) perspective on ourselves 
and the world. Nagel says that when we adopt this perspective, we can see our lives as 
though they didn’t matter, as though our current concerns are “sobering and comic.”28 
Because of this, he argues, doubts about whether anything really matters are 
inescapable. 
  
 
ii. Does the special experience argument justify the inescapability of doubt? 
 
In this section, I will be arguing that the special experience argument doesn’t 
provide us with good reasons for thinking that doubt is inescapable. Experiencing our 
life from ‘outside’ – from a perspective where things don’t matter - is a rare experience 
for most people. There may even be some people who never have this kind of 
experience. So there seems to be little reason to think that all human beings must 
(necessarily) take this kind of perspective on their lives.  
                                                 
24 For a stronger version of the special experience argument, based on the fact that nothing could 
objectively matter, see IV.2. For a more convincing version of the epistemological argument, see V.4.i. 
25 Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. p. 15 
26 Ibid p. 15 
27 I also argue that there is a relationship between the things that genuinely matter and the fact that we are 
self-conscious. My reasons are different from Nagel’s. I discuss this relationship in VII.2. 
28 Ibid p. 15 
 26
On the other hand, it is certainly true that self-consciousness is an inescapable 
part of human existence. So, perhaps Nagel’s thought is that self-consciousness, by its 
very nature, always brings with it the possibility of stepping back far enough to see our 
lives or our concerns as potentially meaningless.  
Because human beings are unavoidably serious, we experience aspects of the 
world as mattering. Yet, after adopting the distanced perspective, I am looking at the 
same world as the one that I thought mattered, except now this same world doesn’t 
seem to have anything in it that matters. Perhaps this might lead us to doubt whether the 
world really does contain anything that matters.  
By itself, this is not enough to motivate serious doubts about whether anything 
matters. In order to see this, imagine I am very poor, but like to pretend that I am 
incredibly rich (but I’m living my life as though I was barely getting by financially). 
Even though I really am poor, I can consistently describe the same facts of my life on 
the one hand, as though I am rich (but pretending to be poor) and on the other hand, as 
though I really am poor. The fact that I can consistently view the facts about my life in 
both ways doesn’t yet show that there is a real doubt as to whether I am really rich or 
poor. Unless we have some reason to think that the alternative description of the facts 
has some real significance (describes reality correctly) it is not clear that we have to 
take this possible perspective seriously. In Chapter IV, I will explore a stronger version 
of Nagel’s special experience argument. This argument does at least provide us with 
some reason to take the special experience seriously (see IV.2). As it stands though, 
Nagel’s discussion of the special experience has not given us any reason to think that 
doubts about what genuinely matters are inescapable.  
To sum up, self-consciousness is a necessary feature of a fully human life. Self-
consciousness brings with it the potential to have experiences where you step back and 
view your actions from a perspective where they don’t matter. Still, there are two things 
to be said about this. Firstly, I don’t know how common this experience is, but I 
wouldn’t say that it was inescapable. (Perhaps some people are more prone to it than 
others). Secondly, there is (so far) no argument from Nagel why we should think this 
detached perspective has any kind of priority when it comes to showing how much 
meaning there is in the world. So, I want to turn to a more central argument Nagel 
outlines to show that doubt is inescapable. I call this the epistemological argument. 
  
  
iii. The epistemological argument 
 
Nagel’s second argument for the claim that doubt is inescapable centres on a 
problem he identifies with any attempt to justify why any particular thing matters. Just 
to be clear, the epistemological argument is not an argument that attempts to show that 
the world and human life really has no meaning. By calling it the epistemological 
argument, I have tried to highlight the way in which the argument is supposed to show 
the unjustifiable nature of the claims we might attempt to make about what matters. So, 
it is an argument that attempts to show the limits of what we can know about what 
matters. The argument does not make any claim about whether anything genuinely 
matters. 
 According to Nagel29, if we try to justify why some particular thing we believe 
matters we seem to be faced with a dilemma if anyone challenges us. Imagine I say to a 
friend that my PhD matters (to me). My friend asks me to justify this claim. They ask 
                                                 
29 Ibid p. 15 
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me ‘why does this matter’? I give them an answer. I say that getting my PhD might help 
me get work teaching philosophy. Nagel says that at this stage, my friend is just as 
entitled to ask the same question about the answer I have given. So, they can ask why 
does getting work teaching philosophy matter? 
Nagel says that at this stage I am faced with a dilemma. I have two choices when 
it comes to my ‘curious friend’. One the one hand, I could keep answering his questions 
as to why the previous answers I have given matter. The problem with this is that it 
seems my friend’s line of questioning could carry on infinitely. On the other hand, I 
could decide to stop at a particular answer, and say – this answer just does matter. Nagel 
claims that if we take the first route, we never get to a final end answer to why 
something matters; we just keep answering questions forever (at no point do I seem to 
give my friend a definitive answer.) If we take the second route, we seem to be saying 
that we believe that something matters, but that we are unwilling or incapable of saying 
why it matters – we simply stop somewhere arbitrary and say that this just does matter, 
but we don’t provide any reason for thinking it really does matter. 
  
We step back to find that the whole system of justification and criticism, which 
controls our choices and supports our claims to rationality, rests on responses 
and habits that we never question, that we should not know how to defend 
without circularity, and to which we shall continue to adhere to even after they 
are called into question.30 
 
Let’s go back to my attempts to say why my PhD matters. My curious friend 
asks me why it matters. I might answer that I am doing it to gain the qualification 
(though this is only part of the answer). My friend then asks, why does getting a PhD 
qualification matter? I could answer this by saying that getting a PhD will help me get 
work teaching philosophy. My friend then asks why does teaching philosophy matter? I 
respond by saying that through teaching philosophy, I can help people develop and 
improve their ability to think critically. My friend then asks why does it matter whether 
people develop their critical thinking? My answer is that this skill will help improve 
their lives. My friend asks why does it matter if they improve their lives? I say that 
improving their lives may help them be happier. My curious friend asks why does it 
matter if they are happier? … It seems that this kind of questioning could go on 
indefinitely. In the end, I will end up having to stop at one particular answer. If I try to 
justify why that particular answer matters, my curious friend will be able to start up his 
line of questioning again. So, it seems that, in the end, I will be forced to say of one 
particular answer ‘It just does matter’, but without providing any reason for thinking 
that it really does matter. 
 
Even if someone wished to supply a further justification for pursuing all the 
things in life that are commonly regarded as self-justifying, that justification 
would have to end somewhere too. If nothing can justify unless it is justified in 
terms of something outside itself, which is also justified, then an infinite regress 
results, and no chain of justification can be complete.31 
 
Nagel says that reflection on the epistemological argument forces us to realise 
that we have no justifiable reason for valuing the things we value. Either, our attempts 
                                                 
30  Ibid p. 15 
31 Ibid p. 12 
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to justify valuing something go on forever (and so we never give any definitive answer 
to why it is valuable). Or, we find that we are choosing to accept the value of certain 
things without being able to give any good reason for making this choice. 
It might be argued that we are having problems satisfying my ‘curious friend’ 
because the examples discussed so far are too small scale, too petty. For example, 
perhaps if I am involved in some ‘grand’ scheme, I might think that such projects would 
be immune from the epistemological argument. Perhaps if I am part of a larger group, 
with a larger more grand purpose, I might think that I am part of something that 
provides a reasonable answer to my curious friend. Imagine I think of myself as a part 
of God’s plan. Or I might think my actions matter because of the part they play in 
bringing about a workers’ revolution. I might be working in Africa with Aids patients. It 
might be thought in these cases that my actions just do matter in virtue of their 
relationship with this ‘grand’ scheme. 
As Nagel says32, it is difficult to see how this response avoids the basic problem 
posed by the epistemological argument. Even if we are a part of something much larger, 
this larger enterprise is always going to be open to questioning in exactly the same way. 
If I say that being part of God’s plan means that my life really does matter, my curious 
friend can ask why does God’s plan matter? I might say that this matters because I am a 
part of a universe that is a drama with a happy ending. Again, my curious friend will ask 
why this matters? I might say this matters because then, any act of mine becomes a 
contribution to the perfect development of the universe. So, my curious friend asks why 
this matters? Once again, it seems that we will reach a stage where we are forced into 
saying ‘It just does matter, but I can’t say why.’ 
 
 
iv. Does the epistemological argument justify the inescapability of doubt? 
 
I want to start with the biggest problem I have with the epistemological 
argument. I will be arguing that the implications of the epistemological argument are far 
too strong. If we accept the epistemological argument, we have to accept that there can 
be no such thing as a reasonable justification for anything at all. 
As will become clear, the problems with justifying claims that Nagel identifies 
are not problems specifically to do with claims about values or claims about what 
matters. Nagel presents his arguments as though they were special difficulties with 
judgements related to values33. But, the problem Nagel brings up is one that relates to 
all forms of justification. In trying to give reasons why particular activities are valuable, 
Nagel argues that we must either keep giving reasons to infinity (and as such, never 
give an answer) or simply stop somewhere (without being able to give a proper reason 
why the place where you stop should be thought of as valuable.) But this account of 
giving a good reason seems to rule out the possibility of ever being able to give a 
reasonable justification for anything. After all, there is no alternative to either stopping 
at a particular reason, or carrying on forever with any possible attempt to justify 
anything. But, if stopping at a particular reason could never be reasonable, then there 
could be no such thing as ever giving a good reason for anything – not only with claims 
concerning what matters, but every conceivable claim we make. So, this is how strong 
                                                 
32 Ibid p. 15 
33 In this respect, Nagel’s argument has parallels to Moore’s open question argument (Cf. Moore, G.E. 
(1903) Principia Ethica. Cambridge University Press: London). 
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the epistemological argument is. If we accept it, we must accept that nothing would or 
could ever be a reasonable justification. 
In order to illustrate this, just think of the number of different forms of 
justification that are also prey to the epistemological argument. For example, my 
curious friend could do the same thing with someone trying to give a mathematical 
justification, or someone trying to justify some fact about the world, or someone 
justifying a case in court or indeed someone trying to justify a philosophical position. 
I want to look at one example in detail. Imagine I am interested in whether the 
atom exists. I might ask a scientist, why should I believe in the existence of the atom? 
She might tell me that there are thousands of experiments that prove the existence of 
atoms. I might then ask why should I take these experiments as good evidence for the 
existence of atoms? She might reply that the experiments were carried out in a scientific 
manner. I might then ask why being carried out in a scientific manner justifies their 
truth? … and so on. It seems that the scientist is forced to either carry on answering my 
questions forever (and so never give me an answer) or to just stop somewhere (without 
saying why this particular answer justifies their claims).  
Even though the claim that atoms exist is prey to the epistemological argument, 
we would be reluctant to say that the claim that atoms exist is wholly unjustified. If 
Nagel accepts the claim that atoms exist is justified (even though any attempt to justify 
it will be prey to the epistemological argument) it seems that it will remain an open 
question as to whether we can be a good justification for claiming that some things 
matter. Perhaps though, Nagel might ‘bite the bullet’, and accept that any claim that is 
prey to the epistemological argument is actually unjustified (and so the claim that atoms 
exist isn’t actually justified).  
This just causes deeper problems for Nagel. For, it seems that the 
epistemological argument leads to a reductio ad absurdum. Imagine we ask Nagel to 
justify the epistemological argument itself to my curious friend. When Nagel attempts 
to do this, he is surely going to find that his justifications for his claim will have to end 
somewhere (or Nagel’s justifications will have to keep going to infinity – and he will 
never give us a definitive answer).  
Think of how Nagel might attempt to answer my curious friend’s question ‘why 
are we justified in accepting the epistemological argument?’ Nagel might say that our 
judgements that anything matters are faced by the dilemma (stop or carry on forever). 
My curious friend might ask Nagel ‘why does the fact that we are faced with a dilemma 
when we try to justify the claim that something matters mean that there can be no such 
thing as a good justification for these kinds of claims?’ Nagel’s answer might be that 
stopping somewhere and carrying on forever are both unsatisfactory as far as a 
justification goes. Imagine my curious friend is particularly interested in why stopping 
at a particular answer is always unsatisfactory. (This is the claim I think we should be 
interested in, given the fact that no-one does carry on giving justifications forever). So, 
my curious friend asks Nagel why stopping at a particular answer can never be 
reasonable? Nagel’s answer is that, because we just stop somewhere, we do provide any 
justification for thinking that this is a reasonable place to stop – and so the place where 
we stop are arbitrary and contingent. I hope it is clear that there is no reason why my 
curious friend can’t carry on with this questioning indefinitely. It seems clear that if my 
curious friend keeps pressing Nagel about the epistemological argument, he will either 
have to just stop somewhere (without justifying the place where he stops) or he can 
keep answering my curious friend’s questions (and so fail to provide any definitive 
justification). It looks as though, if we accept that the epistemological argument is true, 
then we would also have to accept that the epistemological argument itself is wholly 
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unjustified. In other words, the epistemological argument leads to a clear reductio ad 
absurdum.  
This (obviously) suggests that there must be something wrong with the 
epistemological argument. In particular (given the thought that, as a matter of fact, 
people don’t try to give justifications forever) if there are possible ways of justifying 
claims, there must be occasions where stopping at a particular answer is reasonable. 
Nagel’s claim is that if we refuse to answer one of my ‘curious friend’s’ further 
questions, we must be choosing to believe something without having any grounds for 
our belief. In other words, my view that something matters is arbitrary.  
A large part of this thesis is concerned with exploring whether the things that 
matter to us are arbitrary. Let us assume that we are going to have to stop somewhere in 
our attempts to defend why something matters. Given the fact that we never do continue 
giving answers to infinity, this seems a reasonable assumption. If we return to the 
example of the scientist attempting to prove the existence of the atom, we might think 
that many of the answers they gave to my curious friend were perfectly good 
justifications. The scientist surely has better justifications for her view than, say 
someone who believes that atoms don’t exist because he’s never seen one. If we think 
that there is a difference between a reasonable, rather than unreasonable justification, 
the distinction cannot be solely based on whether the justification stops somewhere. The 
question we need to be asking is whether our justifications end anywhere good. 
As it is, my curious friend’s questioning method doesn’t seem to be a 
particularly good way of exploring why we think something genuinely matters. I used 
the example earlier of my curious friend asking me to justify my claim that my PhD 
matters. I left the questioning at a point where my last answer to my curious friend was 
that developing my student’s critical skills could help make my students happy. This 
makes it seem as though, in order to justify why my PhD matters I need to prove that 
my student’s happiness matters. The strange thing is that my student’s happiness really 
isn’t any part of my motivation for writing my PhD. In a similar way, the scientist’s 
claim about the existence of the atom was not a claim about the reliability of scientific 
method. 
Perhaps one of the reasons for this is that my curious friend’s questioning will 
miss something if each of my curious friend’s questions has a number of answers. For 
example, when my curious friend asked me why my PhD mattered, I said that it would 
help me get a qualification. But this is only part of the answer. I am also doing it in 
order to develop my own skills. There is also a sense in which I am doing it for its own 
sake. My curious friend’s questioning method will be unable accommodate all these 
different answers to a single question. 
Another reason why continuing to answer my curious friend’s questions seems 
to take us away from our real justifications is that we have often given our actual 
justification to the first question. The scientist believes in the existence of the atom 
because they have seen the experiments that prove it. That is the genuine justification 
for their belief. So, in providing a good justification, what is important is not that we are 
able to keep answering my curious friend. In many cases (e.g. my daughter’s life 
support machine) I might feel that my first answer is the real answer.  
So, think for example of someone faced with a very serious dilemma. Imagine I 
am faced with a decision as to whether I should turn off my daughter’s life support 
machine. My curious friend asks me why this matters. I say that my choice involves the 
life of my own daughter. If my curious friend then asks me why this matters, I might 
feel at a loss as to what to say to them. But, at the same time, I don’t feel that this is 
because my view that it matters is arbitrary. Rather, I might think that someone who 
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doesn’t understand why my daughter’s life would matter to me must be missing 
something. Nagel says something pretty similar himself. 
 
What seems to us to confer meaning, justification, significance does so in virtue 
of the fact that we need no more reasons after a certain point. 34 [my italics] 
 
There is in fact a hidden assumption in Nagel’s argument. This assumption is 
that all reasonable justifications need to be other claims (in language). Yet, in a way, the 
inescapability of doubt should make it clear (if there can be such a thing as reasonable 
justifications for things – in maths, science, philosophy etc.) that justifications cannot be 
purely grounded in linguistic claims. 
Nagel does perhaps provide us with a way of getting out of all this. The 
unavoidability of seriousness made clear that people show that things matter to them, 
not principally through what claims they make (what their stated beliefs happen to be) 
but through their actions. As Nagel himself says: 
 
What sustains us, in belief as in action, is not reason or justification, but 
something more basic than these – for we go on in the same way even after we 
are convinced that the reasons have given out.35 
 
So, I think we have good reasons for thinking that we show what matters to us 
not only through the claims we make, or the answers we can give to questions about 
such claims. We back up our choices and our aims with much more than words. We 
back up our belief that something matters with actions. (This is explored in more depth 
in chapter VI.8.iii. At this stage, this is just a suggestion.) At the very least, we must 
believe that if there is ever to be such a thing as a good justification in any field, there 
must be some way to ground justifications other than merely another claim to be 
questioned.  
It should be clear then that our concern should be not whether we can keep 
answering my curious friend, but whether the answers we give him are good answers. 
There is still a live question here (a question that will remain with us until Chapter VII). 
We can accept that people do think things matter (the unavoidability of seriousness). 
But it remains a live question whether they are right in thinking such things matter.  
As will become clear, the fact that someone thinks something matters does not 
guarantee that it really does matter. After all, people sometimes reach a point where 
they revise their views, and come to believe that something they thought mattered 
doesn’t really matter. (E.g. ‘I thought my job was all that mattered to me until I realised 
the effect of being a workaholic had on my family…’) At the very least then, we need to 
find a way of distinguish things that actually matter from things that we mistakenly 
believe matter. Having said that, there is nothing in the argument for the inescapability 
of doubt to make us think that there couldn’t be a good justification for thinking that 
something genuinely matters.  
Nagel’s account of giving a good reason seems to rule out the possibility of ever 
being able to give a reasonable justification for anything. In all cases, there is no 
alternative to either stopping at a particular reason, or carrying on forever. If stopping at 
a particular reason could never count as giving a good reason, then there could be no 
such thing as ever giving a good reason for anything – not only with questions 
                                                 
34  Ibid p. 17 
35 Ibid p. 20 
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concerning the meaning of life, but every conceivable reason. In other words, 
everything would be unreasonable. What the discussion of the epistemological 
argument has suggested is that the question we ought to be asking is not; do our reasons 
come to an end? After all, we can assume that they must. Instead, our question should 
be; do our reasons for undertaking activities end anywhere good? 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that we should accept Nagel’s claim that 
seriousness is unavoidable. But, I have argued that neither the special experience 
argument nor the epistemological argument (as they stand) justifies the claim that we 
cannot know whether anything genuinely matters.  
My intention is to discover whether anything genuinely matters. Perhaps it 
might be thought that the unavoidability of seriousness alone might show that some 
things genuinely matter (after all, they matter to us). By itself, the fact that everyone 
thinks that some things do matter doesn’t prove that anything genuinely matters. It 
might even lead you to think that Nagel is right that our claims about what matters are 
arbitrary. If something matters simply in virtue of the fact that someone thinks it matters 
(if all answers to my curious friend’s questions are as good as each other) then it looks 
like there is no (rational) way to choose between different claims about what matters.  
I will be arguing (in chapters VI-VIII) that we have reasons for thinking that 
some things in particular genuinely matter (e.g. our needs, our happiness and our 
relationships with other people). In saying this, I will be saying that these things matter 
more than some other things (e.g. pleasure, power and status, for their own sakes). In 
order to show this, we need more than just the unavoidability of seriousness.  
In Chapter IV, I will looking at arguments that attempt to prove that nothing 
genuinely matters (in which case all answers to my curious friend’s questions will be 
equally bad). If this turns out to be true, we would also have good reasons to think that 
our claims about what matters are arbitrary. After all, if nothing genuinely matters, then 
it seems irrelevant what we choose to value. They will all be mistakes.  
If we assume for a moment that our claims about what matters are not arbitrary 
(if some claims about what matters are more justified than others) it seems that we will 
still be required to give some kind of answer to some of my curious friend’s questions. 
After all, if there is a distinction between those things that genuinely matter and those 
things we only happen to think matter, my curious friend seems entitled to ask me for 
my reasons for thinking that my claim that something matters is of the first kind (i.e. 
genuinely matters).  
Before exploring these issues, in the next chapter I will attempt to provide a 
‘straight’ answer to Nagel’s inescapability of doubt. I will explore the way in which  (at 
least in some contexts) there are cases which seem to be perfectly reasonable answers to 
my curious friend’s questions. I will try to show that there are (or can be) reasonable 
ways in which we can as assess different places to ‘stop’ in answering my ‘curious 
friend’. My main aim is to show that some answers to my curious friend (on the face of 
it) are better than others. It is not clear that this attempt is totally successful (as it also 
highlights the fact that there are still some threats to the idea that anything genuinely 
matters that need to be dealt with.) But the discussion does help bring forward the value 
(or lack of value) of different kinds of activities, which become important later in the 
thesis (see Chapters VI - VIII).   
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CHAPTER III 
 
IS WORK MEANINGLESS? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Nagel’s account of the epistemological argument set out a potential problem 
with our attempts to justify why anything matters: In trying to give reasons why 
particular activities matter, Nagel argues that we must either keep giving reasons to 
infinity (and as such, never give an answer) or simply stop somewhere (without giving 
any proper reason why the place where you stop actually matters.) In the last chapter, I 
argued that, if we accept that stopping at a particular reason could never count as giving 
a good reason, then there could be no such thing as ever giving a good reason for 
anything – not only with questions concerning the meaning of life, but every 
conceivable reason. In other words, nothing could be reasonable.  
One implication of the inescapability of doubt is that all answers to the question 
‘why does this matter’ are as good as any other (it is arbitrary where we stop). The 
thought is that all answers to the question are in a similar position. At some point, the 
attempt to defend them will have to end in an unjustified ‘opinion’, where we 
dogmatically assert as fact that something just does matter, despite not giving any 
reason for our view. 
In this chapter, I want to explore a number of different examples of different 
kinds of activities. I hope this will illustrate the fact that all attempts to justify why 
something matters are not equally arbitrary. I will attempt to show (at least in some 
contexts) that there are rational considerations that apply to our claims that something 
matters.  
In order to do this, I want to discuss a paper called ‘On the Meaning of Life’36 
by Moritz Schlick. In this paper, Schlick discusses the concepts of work and play 
(which he defines in very specific ways). Schlick’s discussion of work seems to show 
that we can have good reasons for thinking that certain kinds of activities really don’t 
matter. The discussion of play also shows that there seem to be answers to why 
something matters that provide my curious friend with no opportunity for further 
questioning. (In such cases, we might think that stopping at a particular answer appears 
to be perfectly reasonable). 
So, I will be using Schlick’s arguments to examine whether we do in fact have 
‘reasonable’ ways of assessing the reasons people have for engaging in activities. It then 
becomes possible for us (at least in extreme cases) to show that some activities can fail 
to provide any meaning, while other activities can be shown to be meaningful. If this is 
right, then Nagel is wrong to say that we simply cannot know whether any of the 
reasons we have for engaging in activities are good ones. At the very least, this will 
show that attempts to justify why something matters can (in extreme cases) actually be 
‘reasonably’ assessed. (In other words, Nagel is wrong to say that our decision that 
something matters is purely arbitrary). 
 
 
                                                 
36 Schlick, M. (1987) ‘On the Meaning of Life’. From Hanfling (ed.) Life and Meaning. 
Blackwell:Oxford 
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2. Work and play 
 
In order to outline and assess Schlick’s claims, we need to have a clear 
understanding of how he defines work and play. Schlick defines work as any activity 
undertaken solely in order to realise some purpose (distinct from the activity).37 The 
first thing to say about this definition is that by ‘work’, Schlick does not specifically 
mean economic work. So, we do not judge whether an activity is work by looking at 
whether an activity leads to financial gain. Any activity undertaken solely for financial 
gain would be an example of work. But, an activity that is not solely undertaken for 
financial gain, but which does in fact lead to financial gain wouldn’t be work in 
Schlick’s sense. 
Work for financial gain (what I will call economic work) is something I am 
interested in. After all, a large amount of the time and energy of people in our society is 
spent on economic work. (In part, I hope this chapter will eventually provide a way of 
assessing the relative costs and benefits of different kinds of economic work. This will 
be done in the Conclusion.4) 
Under Schlick’s definition, if I view an activity as work, I believe that the 
activity itself has absolutely no intrinsic value – the activity only has an instrumental 
value. Because the expected outcome is the sole reason for me engaging in the activity, 
I would have no reason for engaging in an activity I view as work if it were not for the 
expected outcome. 
As I said, by Schlick’s definition, the result that work aims for need not be 
purely financial. There are other instrumental reasons that might lead us to engage in 
activities that we view as having no intrinsic value as activities. For example, I might 
spend my time inoculating children in Africa, even though I might find this activity (‘in 
itself’) repetitive and boring. Or, I might spend my time filling envelops; sending out 
information on a political cause I believe has value. In each case, the activity as such 
isn’t valued by me, but I engage in these activities because I value the results. I 
inoculate the children because it can save their lives; I fill the envelopes because I am 
committed to the cause etc. Of course, I can also work for selfish reasons. I might do 
something I believe has no intrinsic value in order to gain things like money, fame or 
status. 
By contrast, Schlick defines play as activities that are performed purely for their 
own sake38. So, for example, I love playing the guitar. I have no wish to become famous 
from doing this. I’m not looking to impress other people. I’ve never earned money from 
it (in fact it has consistently cost me money). I just do it for its own sake. I take pleasure 
in the activity itself. I would say that, playing the guitar is its own reward. 
By Schlick’s definition, work and play are perhaps two extremes. It would seem 
that most activities would not fall under either work or play, but rather are undertaken 
for a mixture of motives. I will return to this thought below. 
 
 
3. Examples of work and play 
 
I want now to set out a few concrete examples of work and play. As Schlick 
defines it, work is any activity that is wholly unsatisfying in itself (which is only done 
                                                 
37 Ibid p. 62 
38 Ibid p. 63 
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for some resulting goal). So, for example, cleaning my toilet would count as work. In 
my case, this is an activity I do for purely instrumental reasons (having a clean toilet 
that doesn’t smell). It is not an activity that I find enjoyable ‘for its own sake’. Another 
example of work would be mechanical, repetitive factory work. I once worked in a coat 
hanger factory, where my job was to wait for the machine to produce a box worth of 
coat hangers. When there were enough coat hangers, I packed them in a box. There was 
nothing valuable about the activity itself. (I certainly found nothing valuable about the 
activity). I only engaged in the activity for the sake of the wage.   
Another example of work might be unpleasant activities performed for some 
altruistic end – for example, I might spend my time digging wells in order to help 
supply African villages with water. Digging is an activity that I do not think of as 
having any intrinsic value. I dig in order to help those without water. I wouldn’t be 
interested in digging if I didn’t think it would make some difference to people’s lives. 
Now I want to set out a few examples of play – activities undertaken solely for 
their own sake. I used the example above of playing a musical instrument. You can play 
the guitar in order to become rich and famous. But if you play an instrument purely for 
the sheer pleasure of playing, then this is an example of play. Personally, I love playing 
a game called hackysack. (A game where a group of people try to stop a beanbag hitting 
the floor using anything but their hands.) This is a game I get great pleasure from 
playing (it is physical, co-operative, social, spontaneous etc.) I play hackysack for the 
love of playing hackysack. 
Schlick’s discussion of play tends to focus on artistic creative activities. “The 
brightest example [of play] is to be seen in the creation of the artist.”39 If you go out to 
beautiful scenic spots in order to simply enjoy painting, then this is an example of play. 
Schlick also talks about craftsmanship. For example, making a table by hand, if 
undertaken for the sake of the activity itself, can count as play. 
There are some further examples that may look like they count as play. We 
certainly don’t do crosswords, play patience or play computer games in order to achieve 
some further goal. These seem to be activities that are usually done for their own sake. 
Schlick makes no mention of these kinds of activities. Later in this chapter, I will argue 
that Schlick has good reasons for not focusing on these forms of play. While these 
activities are done for their own sake, the solitary, unproductive nature of these kinds of 
activities may cause problems if someone makes them the centre of their life (see 
Section 8). 
A key point to bear in mind is that the difference between work and play is not 
decided by looking carefully at the activity (although, some activities will be more 
capable of being done in the spirit of play). What makes something work rather than 
play is the motivation behind the activity. If we want to see whether people are 
engaging in work or play, we need to understand why they are doing the activity. So, 
the same activity can be work or play, depending on the motivation. If I write my PhD 
solely for the qualification, then this would be work. If I simply write my PhD for its 
own sake, just because I find it an enjoyable thing to do (even if I didn’t receive the 
qualification I would still think it was a valuable way of spending my time) then this 
would be play. As it happens, perhaps my motivation is actually a mix of the two 
motivations, and so is neither work nor play (as defined by Schlick). 
In many (if not most) cases, the distinction between the activity as such and the 
results of the activity are not so simply separated. For example, I am passionate about 
teaching philosophy, and would say that I find the activity satisfying in itself. But, I 
                                                 
39 Ibid p. 64 
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know I would not find it as satisfying if certain results – i.e. helping people develop 
skills – didn’t follow from it. Similarly, I love hackysack (for its own sake). But part of 
what I enjoy is the co-operative relationships it develops. If I played hackysack with a 
group of people, but no–one enjoyed it or there was no sense of a ‘shared enterprise’, 
this would diminish my interest. If no-one ever enjoyed it, I’m not sure I’d still love it. 
Similarly, part of a painter’s intention when painting might be to communicate 
something to others. Part of their enjoyment of painting comes from this ability to 
communicate to others through this medium. 
It can start to look as though (if these examples can’t be play because they are in 
some way concerned with their being some kind of outcome) play, as defined by 
Schlick, must be something wholly self-indulgent and unproductive. In fact, there is no 
contradiction between loving an activity for its own sake, and being concerned with 
possible or likely outcomes. Focusing on the fact that the distinction between work and 
play is concerned with motivation should illustrate this.  
When an activity (such as teaching philosophy) is done well (with skill) the 
outcome of developing people’s abilities is an inherent part of the activity. (It is 
something that is an inherent part of doing the activity well). So, I am motivated to 
teach purely out of my enjoyment of the activity. But, part of what makes an activity, 
such as teaching, enjoyable ‘in itself’ is the way it can help develop other people’s 
skills. So long as I am motivated by my pure love of the activity, the activity will be 
play, even if part of what makes the activity satisfying is the fact that it has certain 
outcomes for other people. 
In a similar way, because the distinction between work and play is based on 
motivation, there is no problem with thinking that activities that you do for their own 
sake might lead to instrumental goods. I might paint purely for the pleasure of it. The 
fact that I might sell a painting done in the spirit of play for a vast sum of money 
doesn’t prevent the activity being play. 
Perhaps in other (possibly most) cases, our motivations for engaging in an 
activity are a mixture of work and play. When it comes to teaching, there are many 
aspects of the job that I find satisfying (e.g. contact with the students). At the same time 
though, I find large parts of the job boring and repetitive (e.g. paperwork, marking 
essays etc.) So, some parts of my job are done for their own sake, while others are done 
for money, or because they are things I have to do in order to allow me to do something 
I find satisfying. So, as Schlick defines them, it is clear that work and play are two 
extremes of motivation for engaging in activities. As long as this is kept in mind, I think 
we can still learn something from looking at these extremes. Firstly, I want to look at 
the way in which a life devoted entirely to work has the potential to be a meaningless 
existence. I will then go on to look at how activities done in the spirit of play may 
provide a reasonable answer to my curious friend, and so help us escape Nagel’s 
inescapability of doubt. 
 
 
4. Limits on the ‘meaning’ of work 
 
At its most extreme, we can say that an absurdity or circularity seems to follow 
for anyone who undertakes work simply in order to maintain their life. As I said in the 
last section, work activities can only receive their value from their goals. They are 
activities in which we see no intrinsic value. So, if we take away the instrumental good, 
the activity we are left with is one which we accept has no value. (If it does, it isn’t 
work as defined.) If I work simply in order to maintain a life of work, it appears difficult 
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to see how such a life could have any value (by my own lights). To illustrate this, think 
of how a discussion between such a worker and my curious friend would go. My 
curious friend asks the worker ‘Why do you work?’ The worker can reply ‘I work in 
order to maintain my life’. So, my curious friend will then ask ‘What is valuable about 
your life?’ Given the fact that the life of the worker consists of activities that they do not 
value (they are, after all, only doing it for the sake of the money) the worker looks like 
they are in a difficult position. It is not clear how they could point to any positive 
content of their lives. After all, they themselves cannot see any value in their life. 
Of course, people who work at jobs that provide no intrinsic satisfaction rarely 
work simply in order to maintain their own life. They might work in order to support the 
life of their family, or they might work in order to support a lifestyle that they value. 
Still, at some point, a person who works will need to be able to point to some positive 
content that their life has. Even if the worker is working to support another life (e.g. a 
child) if they know that they are just raising their child in order for them to have a life of 
valueless activities merely in order to survive, then my curious friend’s questions will 
again be extremely uncomfortable.  
Working just in order to survive is a very extreme case. No one (although, 
perhaps people in slavery may be one example) spends their whole life just working. 
Still, my curious friend’s questions seem pressing for anyone who devotes a large 
amount of time to activities with no intrinsic value in order to achieve some other goal. 
In order to provide my curious friend with a reasonable answer, a person who spends 
their life working firstly needs to achieve the goal that motivated them to engage in the 
activity. (Given the fact that you are only doing the activity in order to get paid, if your 
employer refuses to pay you, again by your own lights, the activity will have been 
worthless). Secondly, the goals that motivate the worker to devote large amounts of 
their time to worthless activities need to be valuable goals. After all, something valuable 
will be needed to justify the time spent on the ‘worthless’ activity. I will be examining 
how we might begin to assess what ends might themselves be valuable after discussing 
play. What we can say at this stage is that engaging in worthless activities solely in 
order to maintain a life full of worthless activities would be a life that fails to have any 
meaning. There seem good reasons to talk of the absurdity of such a life.  
So, in order to justify time spent on work (activities that have no intrinsic value) 
someone would need to provide a satisfactory answer to two further questions; did I (or 
was I likely to) achieve the result that motivated me to engage in the activity? And, is 
the result aimed at by this activity itself valuable? These questions need to have a 
satisfactory answer, as the activity itself (by their own estimation) isn’t valuable. In 
order to make this clearer I will now contrast it with the situation of someone doing 
activities in the spirit of play.  
 
 
5. Play and the epistemological argument 
 
Schlick defines play as activities performed for their own sake. They are 
engaged in because the activity itself (or engaging in that activity) is considered to be 
valuable. (The sole motivation for engaging in the activity is that the activity is seen as 
‘good in-itself’). My own examples would be doing tai chi, dancing, mixing drum & 
bass on my decks, playing hackysack, playing guitar, and spending time with others. 
Unlike examples of work, I do not view these activities as being valuable because they 
help me achieve some goal or purpose. They are activities that I think of as good in-
themselves. 
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 Imagine two people who spend large amounts of their time playing the guitar. 
One (let’s call him Anil) devotes lots of time to playing the guitar because they want to 
be famous. The other (let’s call him Dave) plays the guitar purely for the sheer pleasure 
of playing the guitar.  
As we saw in the last section, we can say that Anil may or may not be right that 
his activity is worthwhile. If my curious friend asks Anil why playing the guitar matters, 
Anil will reply that it matters because it will help him become famous. Anil’s response 
to my curious friend would be reasonable only if two conditions are met. Only if Anil 
actually becomes famous (or has a reasonable expectation of becoming famous) due to 
his practice, will his activity have been worthwhile. Also, only if becoming famous is 
itself actually something of value will his activity be seen as worthwhile. In other 
words, my curious friend’s further question ‘why is becoming famous worthwhile?’ will 
be pressing for Anil. 
What kind of position is Dave in? If he plays the guitar for its own sake, then 
nothing else needs to follow in order to say that, by his own lights, his activity was 
worthwhile. If my curious friend were to ask him why playing the guitar was a valuable 
activity, he seems entitled to say ‘it just is.’ Any further questions my curious friend 
might come up with just don’t seem pressing. We might say that the value of the 
activity is contained within itself. And so to respond to the question ‘why is playing the 
guitar valuable?’ by saying ‘It just is’ seems, in this case, perfectly reasonable. 
All this is perhaps a little bit too neat. I wonder if my curious friend might be 
able to come up with a further question that stands in need of justification when it 
comes to Dave. My ‘curious friend’ might ask why does Dave thinking it is a 
worthwhile way to spend his time prove that it really is worthwhile? As I mentioned in 
the last chapter, just because someone thinks something matters to them, this doesn’t yet 
prove that it really does matter. There may also be concerns that being truly valuable 
(meaningful) requires something more ‘profound’ than these everyday examples. It 
might be thought that in order to show that something matters, we need to show that it 
matters ‘in the scheme of things’. (I will return to this at the end of this chapter, but this 
issue will not be properly thrashed out until Chapters IV, V and VI.) 
Before turning to that, I want to look at the kinds of activities that lend 
themselves to play, and ask what is it that makes these kinds of activities satisfying ‘in 
themselves’, and look at what instrumental goods might tend to follow from such 
activities. This will involve attempting to justify Schlick’s focus on certain kinds of play 
– namely creative activities. At the same time I will be attempting to moderate some of 
Schlick’s more excessive claims about the centrality of play in our lives. 
  
 
6. Play as artistic creative activity 
 
In this section, I want to take a closer look at the types of activities Schlick 
focuses on when he discusses play. In doing this, I hope to say something about the 
kinds of activities that lend themselves to play. I also want to explore what benefits 
might follow from the kinds of activities most suited to play. (This discussion will 
become relevant in Chapters VI, VII and VIII). As I discussed above, there is no 
problem in thinking that activities engaged in for their own sake might lead to positive 
outcomes. Something might be produced, or some benefits for the person doing the 
activity might follow. I want to explore what these might be. 
When Schlick discusses examples of play, he tends to focus on creative 
activities. “The brightest example [of play] … is to be seen in the creation of the 
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artist.”40 There are three activities that Schlick specifically discusses when talking of 
activities done in the spirit of play; artistic activity (e.g. painting), craftsmanship (e.g. 
making furniture) and thinking (e.g. scientific investigation).  
Schlick describes how each of the activities can be ‘intrinsically’ pleasurable. 
“[The artist’s] activity … is itself pleasure.”41 “Every true craftsman can experience … 
the joy in sheer creation.”42 “Knowing, too, is a pure play of the spirit … he rejoices to 
measure his powers against the riddles which reality propounds to him.”43 The fact that 
engaging in these kinds of activity is a pleasure is part of what makes the activity 
valuable in itself (play). 
Not only are the activities Schlick focuses on are also ones which are 
pleasurable to do, they also produce something concrete. In the examples Schlick 
discusses, we can say that a painting, a table, or a new theory are produced. More than 
this, Schlick suggests that things produced in the spirit of play are themselves things of 
real value. In the case of a painter, “[his] activity, his shaping of his work by inspiration, 
is itself pleasure, and it is half by accident that enduring values arise from it.”44[my 
italics] In the case of a craftsman, producing objects in the spirit of play “makes the 
product into a work of art.”45 In the case of the scientist, they can produce theories, and 
“benefits … accrue from this.”46 
The creative activities Schlick discusses have other things in common. One of 
the central things is that these activities require a great deal of skill to do well. (They are 
activities we could describe loosely as ‘arts’. There is an art to doing them well). This is 
surely part of the source of the pleasure of these kinds of activities. Humans seem to 
take great pleasure from employing a skill well. Doing something highly technical 
skilfully is something that gives people satisfaction. For example, in the past I have 
gained a great deal of satisfaction from explaining (e.g.) Sartre’s account of 
consciousness clearly to students. It takes a great deal of skill, knowledge and ability 
etc. to do this well, and I get a great deal of satisfaction out of communicating such 
complex ideas clearly. (In the next section, I will be contrasting activities that involve 
deploying skills with the kinds of mind numbingly, boring and repetitive activities that 
can only be done as work – see next section).  
So, the kind of activities Schlick focuses on are ones that involve the 
deployment of skills. One of the facts about skilful activities of this kind is that, if you 
spend any sustained period of time doing these activities, you will tend to improve your 
ability to do the activity skilfully. A sustained period of playing the guitar will tend to 
improve one’s ability to play the guitar. The same is true with painting, craftsmanship, 
and scientific enquiry. So, it seems that creative activities involve not only the 
deployment of skills, but also (simply by engaging in these kinds of activities) the 
development and improvement of these same skills.  
By gaining and improving ‘creative’ skills, we thereby improve our ability to 
create things. The things we produce improve in quality as our skills improve. In this 
sense, play can help us develop the skills necessary to look after ourselves – to meet our 
needs, improve our health etc. (see the next section). In particular, children seem to use 
                                                 
40 Ibid p.64 
41 Ibid p. 64 
42 Ibid p. 65 
43 Ibid p. 64/5 
44 Ibid p. 64 
45 Ibid p. 65 
46 Ibid p. 64/5 
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play as the primary way of developing the skills that will enable them to eventually 
become self-sufficient. (This will be discussed in detail in VIII.2.iii). 
Developing creative skills doesn’t just improve our ability to take care of 
ourselves. It also helps us to express ourselves. Creative skills are (at least in part) skills 
through which we can express ourselves. So, through engaging in creative activities, we 
can improve our ability to express ourselves musically (guitar) or improve our ability to 
express our thoughts (philosophy) or improve our ability to express ourselves creatively 
(painter). So, doing these kinds of activities involves developing one’s ability to express 
your self. This also provides you with the opportunity to improve your self-awareness. 
By making yourself present in the world, by creating something concrete, you open 
yourself up to the insights of others, and to yourself. (The importance of developing our 
self-awareness will be discussed in VI.8 and VIII.6). 
Also, when we engage in creative activities, we actively relate to and affect the 
world. We become an active part of the world. We affect the world and make a 
difference to it. We have an impact on the world, and develop an active relationship to 
the world. (The importance of our activities having an impact on the world will be 
particularly important in VI.3 and VII. Part 2). 
We might say that creative play respects the uniqueness of human beings. It is 
not compulsive, mechanical behaviour. Engaging in play is the free activity of the self. 
Because each individual has different potentialities and life experiences, this means that 
human selves are as varied in (creative) potential as they are physically. Creative 
activities allow human beings to express themselves, it allows individuality to be 
present. The creative activities that Schlick discusses are highly skilled, and this allows 
a structure within which free expression is possible (almost inevitable). No two PhD’s 
are identical (unless they are plagiarised). No two paintings are identical. The fact that 
an activity involves the application of skills implies that the activity allows for a certain 
level of flexibility in how they are done (allows for creativity). The painter has many 
choices to make - the subject to be painted, the selection of tools, the choice of which 
techniques to use on which occasion, the paints to be used, the impression aimed at etc. 
Similarly, the craftsman may have the choice between different designs, or making their 
own designs, as well as the choice of tools and materials. The scientist, if she is to make 
any real breakthroughs, will have to design new experiments and attempt to find new 
solutions to particular problems.  
Compare creative skills with the kinds of skills required to work on an assembly 
line in a factory47. If I spend my time at work repeatedly filling boxes with coat 
hangers, there is no real sophisticated, stimulating use of skills. I certainly don’t 
(transferable) skills that might increase my abilities (including my ability to 
communicate or express myself, or to look after myself). The machine that produces the 
coat hangers goes at a mechanical pace, and so in this job, I am forced to go at a 
similarly mechanical pace. My work is defined by the rhythm of the machine. So, this 
kind of work doesn’t allow much (if any) room for spontaneity and creativity. 
develop 
                                                
Think of how different the activities of a craftsman making a table are from a 
factory worker working on an assembly line that produces tables. The activities of the 
second have a mechanical character that the first does not. The first allows for 
creativity, relating with care and attention to the world (in many cases, demands it). The 
 
47 Working on an assembly line is not the only form of mechanical work. There is a different form of 
mechanised work in e.g. call centre work. There is a set level of ‘enthusiasm’ you need to display. (One 
might almost say a mechanisation of the emotions.) Apart from that, all you need are the skills required to 
read a script out. 
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second does not tend to rely on employing sophisticated skills. In the case of the 
craftsman, they will be producing something unique. In the case of the worker on an 
assembly line, their ability to affect the quality and nature of what they produce is 
extremely limited. In other words, unlike the assembly line worker, the craftsman is 
able to express themselves in their activity. 
All of this suggests that, not only are certain kinds of skilful creative activities 
more enjoyable and pleasurable to do, they also have important instrumental 
consequences that mechanical, repetitive activities don’t have. So, it might look as 
though activities of play are in a win-win situation. Not only are they thought valuable 
in themselves. They also seem to have valuable consequences. This leads Schlick to 
make some very strong claims for the centrality play ought to have in human life. 
 
 
7. Bringing some balance to Schlick’s claims 
 
In a number of places, Schlick suggests that play is the only possible way in 
which activities can be said to have meaning. “What is not worth doing for its own sake, 
don’t do for anything else’s sake!”48 If this is true, there could never be any good reason 
for engaging in an activity other than the fact that you find it valuable in itself. As we 
have seen, there is some truth to the idea that a person who works simply in order to 
sustain their life of work is in danger, by his own standards, of having nothing of 
meaning or value in their lives. But, this alone doesn’t come close to justifying the 
claim that the only good reason we can have for engaging in activities is that they are 
thought valuable ‘in themselves’. 
I want to look at a defence Schlick gives for his view that only play can be 
meaningful. He says, “If life has a meaning, it must lie in the present, for only the 
present is real.”49 So, by focusing on results, on achieving goals, “man misses the only 
satisfaction that can give him real happiness – the experience of the activity of the 
present moment.”50 
There may be much in favour of valuing “the experience of the activity of the 
present moment.”51 But, Schlick’s argument doesn’t justify aiming to make all our 
activities play. For a start, even if we accept Schlick’s view that only the present is real, 
this doesn’t rule out the possibility that real meaning (significance or value) might come 
in some future present – not the present present. Schlick is right that there must be some 
present at which the meaning is ‘delivered’. But, this needn’t lead to the view that our 
actions ought only to be focused on maximising the value of the experience of the 
activity of present moment. Still, you might think that the results of your work need to 
be valuable enough to justify the sacrifice of the time (all those ‘present’ moments) 
spent on work. You have, after all devoted time to unsatisfying activities for the sake of 
the future result aimed at. Having said all this, Schlick’s argument doesn’t prove that 
nothing could outweigh the sacrifice of time to unsatisfying activities.  
 There are other reasons for thinking that there are things other than ‘satisfying 
moments’ that are truly valuable to us. For example (as I will argue in Chapter VII. Part 
1) we might think that meeting our own needs is something that genuinely matters to us. 
After all, if you fail to meet your vital needs, you will die. We might think, especially if 
your life contains many inherently valuable moments, you will have good reasons for 
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50 Fromm, E. (2001) The Fear of Freedom. Routledge: London. P. 226 
51 Ibid p. 226 
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wanting to sustain your life. In these circumstances, if we have to choose between play 
and meeting our vital needs, we ought to choose to meet our needs. This seems to be 
true, even if it involves engaging in activities we do not see as inherently valuable (i.e. 
work). So, working (on occasion) in order to meet your needs looks entirely reasonable. 
Sometimes, it will be better to do something for something else’s sake (in order to meet 
your needs) rather than do something for its own sake.  
 
 
8. Play and self-sufficiency 
 
It seems that, in order to be able to have a life full of creative play (and so full of 
this kind of valuable content) you need to meet your basic needs. You need food, water, 
clothes, shelter etc. In these circumstances there will be occasions when you have to do 
things not for their own sake, but for the sake of meeting your needs. 
It is possible have our needs met without meeting them ourselves. Other people 
can meet our needs. We might think that the best life we could aim for is a life full of 
play, where other people meet all our needs. For example, Schlick expresses his 
admiration for life in Ancient Greece, because “the Greeks … released those perpetually 
happy beings from the fetters of every aim, every duty, every care.”52 And so, “all their 
activities are turned into joyous play, all their working days become holidays.”53 Of 
course, the Greeks had certain ‘advantages’ in achieving a life of play. They were in 
part able to achieve a life of play because they were able to take advantage of 
institutional slavery. 
You can have your needs met without resorting to enslaving people. Perhaps you 
might have another person who willingly takes care of your needs (say a relative or a 
partner). In both cases, there seems to be a cost. If you enslave others, you rob them of 
their life, freedom and happiness (and on the face of it, it seems wrong to damage other 
people simply so we can play more). But even if people freely take care of all your 
needs then there is a sense in which you are not free, but are dependent. Again, if it is 
thought that your own freedom, or avoiding enslaving other people matters, then some 
work (or even drudgery) may be unavoidable.54 
When it comes to achieving self-sufficiency, some forms of play are in a better 
position than others. As I said, Schlick tends to stress creative activities as examples of 
play. If self-sufficiency is important, then Schlick is right to have this focus. In section 
6, I discussed the way in which creative activities could lead to a number of positive 
outcomes. One of these is that such activities are productive (something is created).  
Because of this, there need be no necessary opposition between certain kinds of 
play, and gaining self-sufficiency. As Schlick says, there is “no irreconcilable 
opposition between play in the philosophical sense and work in the economic sense.”55 
If this is true, then perhaps we can have a life full of playful activities, while also 
meeting all of our vital needs.  
Still, it might be thought that there are some examples of play that are 
irreconcilable with meeting your vital needs. Schlick defined play as any activity 
                                                 
52 Ibid p. 63 
53 Ibid p. 63 
54 I have not had the time or space to put together an argument to the effect that our own freedom 
genuinely matters to us. With the issue of slavery, my hope is that most people would see enslaving other 
people as an unappealing option, especially if it is thought that the quality of our relationships with other 
people genuinely matters (as I argue in Chapter VIII). 
55 Ibid p. 64 
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engaged in for its own sake. There are non-creative activities that would count as play 
on this definition. Activities such as playing patience, doing crosswords or watching 
television look like they (usually) count as play. People enjoy doing these things, and 
are not usually doing so in order to achieve some further goal. But, if these kinds of 
‘solitary’ and unproductive activities dominate someone’s life, it is difficult to see how 
such a life could be self-sufficient. In cases like this, there may be an irreconcilable 
opposition between non-creative play and work in the economic sense.  
If self-sufficiency is important, then spending a large amount of your time 
engaged in non-creative play (which has no positive consequences) looks potentially 
problematic. After all, the activity doesn’t produce anything, it doesn’t improve your 
health or your ability to care for yourself. Nor does it help build any kind of 
relationships. It is difficult to see how you might justify playing patience for its own 
sake when you are starving to death. In such circumstances, it is surely better to prepare 
some food to eat (even if you find this unsatisfying). Even if playing patience is 
valuable, if you don’t eat, you will die, and you will no longer be able to play patience 
anyway. 
There may be some benefits that follow even from non-creative play. Such 
activities may be relaxing or absorbing. Or they may help develop some skills 
(crosswords; might improve your vocabulary, or ‘exercise’ your lateral thinking etc.) 
Still it looks like a life that is too devoted to these kinds of activities may have trouble 
being sustainable. 
It is not just sustainability that will be a problem. There may be good reasons for 
thinking that it is important that our activities have some point, or some further 
consequences beyond our own ‘mere’ pleasure. In Chapter VI, I argue56 that it matters 
to us that our actions have an effect on the world (they make some kind of significant 
difference). In this context, solitary, unproductive activities look problematic. 
In Chapter VI and VII, I also argue that part of what makes a life meaningful 
and satisfying is that it hangs together in some sense. There I will argue that, while the 
presence of play (inherently valuable moments) in our lives is important, on its own, it 
is not enough to guarantee a satisfying life.  
There is another issue that Schlick does not discuss. It might be thought that on 
occasions we are motivated to engage in work because we think the outcomes of the 
activity is itself valuable. After all, play is not in fact the only thing that people are 
interested in, or value. In the next section, I will be outlining a few of the things that 
might motivate people to work (other than mere survival). On the face of it, it looks as 
though people can have good reasons for engaging in certain kinds of work. At this 
stage, it is not my aim to provide definitive conclusions regarding whether any of these 
things really do matter – I simply want to set out what the possible options are, and 
perhaps suggest that it is not obvious that there couldn’t be good motivations for 
working.  
 
 
9. Work with worthwhile goals 
 
As we saw in section 5, when attempting to answer my curious friend’s 
questions, it seems easier to justify the value of activities undertaken in the spirit of play 
than those done in the spirit of work. Still, Schlick has not really given us any reason to 
                                                 
56 In fact, I argue in Chapter VI that making a difference to the world and the people around us is part of 
what we mean in talking of a life being experienced as meaningful. I actually justify the claim that 
experiencing our life as meaningful genuinely matters in Chapter VII. 
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think that engaging in inherently satisfactory activities can be the only way in which 
activities can be valuable. 
As I said in section 5, my curious friend’s ‘further questions’ will be pressing for 
someone who engages in work (in the philosophical sense). Remember, given the fact 
that the activity is valueless, to justify the view that their work activity matters, they will 
need to achieve (or have a reasonable expectation of achieving) their goals, and have 
goals that are themselves worthwhile. But, this doesn’t rule out the possibility that 
people might pursue goals that are themselves worthwhile.  
In particular, I am interested in the kinds of activities why involve consequences 
which you care about a great deal. In Chapter VI, I introduce the idea of our ‘ultimate 
concerns’, the things that matter most to us. When we are motivated by (one of our) 
ultimate concerns, we might engage in activities, not for its own sake (play) but because 
it leads to results that we value. (For much more about ultimate concerns see Chapters 
VI and VII). 
 There are any number of things that may lead people to value work. We might 
engage in work because we care about other people, our own status or our own creative 
satisfaction. There are plenty of examples of work activities that people engage in (at 
least in part) because of their commitment to the health (or needs) of other people. 
Think, for example, of a surgeon. Perhaps they are employed to do large amounts of 
routine surgery – which involves little challenge or stimulation in itself. (In other words, 
they do not see such activity as play). Such a person may value their work enormously, 
not only because it pays the bills, but also because improving the health and happiness 
of other people is something that they care about. Of course, if they are trying to satisfy 
my curious friend, they need to show, firstly, that they have a reasonable expectation of 
improving the health and happiness of their patients through their activity. Secondly (we 
might think) they need to show that the health and happiness of other people matters. 
We haven’t yet seen any reason from Schlick for thinking this couldn’t be valuable – 
though there is much more that needs to be said before I can do this.  
We might include a surgeon as an example of work directed at meeting the 
needs of other people. Another example would be someone helping the sufferers of 
Aids in Africa. Other kinds of work seem aimed at the development of other people. For 
example, someone may find teaching stimulating and rewarding in virtue of their 
commitment to helping children develop their abilities. 
Also, people may be motivated by the concrete results of their work. They might 
work because of their commitment to what they produce. We have seen that a craftsman 
may take pleasure in the quality of what he produces. Similarly, someone may value 
working in a factory if the factory makes vaccines, or produces helpful inventions 
(things that improve people’s lives).  
Examples such as this suggest that, even if activities are work in Schlick’s sense, 
they can be thought valuable to the people who engage in them. There is nothing in 
Schlick’s discussion of play to suggest that the outcomes of our working activities 
couldn’t themselves be valuable. (I will return to this issue in Chapter VI, where I 
discuss whether our ultimate concerns are arbitrary). 
 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has revealed two ways in which activities might be thought 
valuable. Firstly, we can value an activity for its own sake – we just love doing the 
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activity. Or, we may value the activity because of the results of the activities. In many 
cases, there can be activities which we think of as valuable for both reasons.  
I suggested that the fact that we find an activity inherently valuable might 
provide an adequate response to my curious friend’s question. At the very least, this 
discussion seems to imply that engaging in play really is valuable for the person who 
plays (and they couldn’t be mistaken about this).  
But, it doesn’t look as though we have shown that play genuinely matters. 
Activities that count as play are valued for their own sake. So, we can know that the 
person themselves thinks that the activity is valuable. But (my curious friend might ask) 
why does the fact that the person thinks the activity is a worthwhile one prove that it 
really is worthwhile? It is not clear that we have managed to produce any reason for 
thinking that this really matters (beyond the obvious fact that it will matter to them). I 
think the same can be said of those activities that we value because of the positive 
results that they produce. It is perfectly understandable that you would think it matters 
that you are able to contribute towards something you value. But, as I said in the last 
chapter, the fact that you think it is valuable does not guarantee that it really is valuable.  
Also, the discussion in this chapter has tended to focus on quite everyday 
examples. This kind of discussion seems far from what some people are asking when 
they ask ‘does anything matter?’ They might say that they are asking whether anything 
ultimately matters, whether there is a meaning to life etc. (For more on this, see chapters 
V and VI). In this context, the thought that they happen to find something inherently 
valuable may look beside the point. It might be said that, surely ‘in the scheme of 
things’, someone’s personal satisfaction in an activity doesn’t look that important.  
In the next chapter, I will examine whether there are good reasons for thinking 
that nothing could genuinely matter. (In other words, assess whether all answers to my 
curious friend’s questions are equally bad or groundless). We would be in an even more 
absurd position than the one Nagel described if it were true that, while people think 
things matter (the unavoidability of seriousness) nothing could actually matter (life is 
meaningless). This leads on to a discussion (in chapters V and VI) of whether life has a 
meaning. Only after having resolved this question will I begin giving concrete defences 
of the view that some things genuinely matter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DOES NOTHING MATTER? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last chapter, I argued that activities carried out in the spirit of play are 
activities that are (by our own estimation) inherently valuable. Even so, this doesn’t 
seem enough to show that such activities genuinely matter. For example, it seems that 
my curious friend is entitled to ask; how can you justify the claim that your belief that 
the activity is valuable makes the activity really valuable? Nothing that has been said so 
far would allow us to justify the claim that it really matters whether (or not) an activity 
is inherently valuable to you. We might say that we can see why it would matter to a 
particular person that their activities are inherently valuable ones. But this takes us back 
to a point I have made repeatedly. Just because something matters to a particular person 
(the unavoidability of serious) it doesn’t guarantee that it really matters. In fact, if it 
only matters in virtue of the fact that we think it matters, our claims about what matters 
will be arbitrary (as there will be nothing to choose between them).   
In Chapter II, I argued that Nagel’s claims about the inescapability of doubt are 
unconvincing. I don’t want to give up the attempt to give a justification for the view that 
some things really do matter to human beings. And the fact is that Nagel hasn’t given us 
any reason to think that an attempt to justify the claim that some things matter is in any 
worse a position than any other form of justification. In this chapter, I will be exploring 
a new threat to the idea that some things genuinely matter. I will be assessing arguments 
which attempt to show that no claim that something matters could ever be justified. If 
this were true, then all answers to my curious friend would be a mistake (despite the 
fact that we think some things matter.) The arguments are based on facts about the 
world (section 2) facts about our existence (sections 3 and 4) and facts about our 
activities (section 5). If any of these arguments are justified, then we will have to accept 
that nothing could genuinely matter (matter in a genuine, non-arbitrary way). I will be 
arguing that none of the arguments gives us any reason to think that nothing could 
genuinely matter.  
As will become clear in later chapters, even if it is accepted that there are no 
good reasons for thinking that nothing could genuinely matter, there still remain other 
possible threats to claims that there are things that genuinely matter. (In particular, 
threats concerning science and religion. I will be attempting to overcome these further 
worries in the next chapter).  
Each argument I discuss in this chapter attempts to show that nothing could 
genuinely matter. Most of the discussions concern whether anything could be said to be 
genuinely significant or meaningful. The relationship between things mattering to us, 
and being significant (or meaningful) to us will be explored in detail in later chapters. 
For now, it seems clear that, when we say that something matters, we mean that it is 
significant in some way (and to say that something is significant means that it must 
matter in some sense.) 
The first argument I deal with in this chapter, the argument from non-
objectivity, also provides an opportunity to start exploring what exactly we mean when 
we talk of something mattering, or being significant or meaningful. This account will be 
explored and developed in later chapters. 
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2. The argument from non-objectivity 
 
i. Objectivity and the ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ perspective 
 
 I want to examine an argument which attempts to show that any claim that 
something matters must be false (as nothing really matters, or is significant). When 
talking of the special experience argument in Chapter II, I discussed Nagel’s discussion 
of the ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ perspective (see II.5.i and ii). This is a view of the world 
in which we experience the world from ‘outside of all possible awareness’. In Chapter 
II, I argued that, unless we had reasons for taking the ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ 
perspective seriously, there was no reason to think that it was a threat to the possibility 
of things genuinely mattering. In this section, I want to outline an argument that 
attempts to give us good reasons for taking the ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ perspective 
seriously. 
The ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ perspective can be thought of as an objective view 
of the world – a description of the world, independent of any kind of awareness. The 
term ‘objective’ actually has a number of senses. In this discussion, when I talk about a 
property being ‘objective’, I mean that it is a property that is a real feature of the world, 
regardless of whether anything is aware of the world. So, to ask if significance is (or can 
be) an objective property of the world is to ask whether significance is a feature of the 
world independently of any form of awareness of the world.  
When discussing the special experience argument (see II.5.ii) I suggested that 
nothing could be significant from the ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ perspective. This implies 
that there can be no such thing as objective significance. This alone might seem a good 
enough reason to say that significance and meaning are not real (genuine) features of 
the world.  
Examples of objective features of the world are easy to find. We might say that 
there are many features of a rock (its size, its mass etc.) that are true of the rock, 
whether or not there is anyone there to perceive it. An event, such as a meteor hitting a 
house is also something that we think really happens regardless of the existence or non-
existence of anything to perceive it.  
An example of something we might think isn’t objective would be things like 
the taste of food. I happen to think that cucumbers taste disgusting. My friend Ronnie 
thinks they complement a sandwich perfectly (as long as they are cut thinly enough). 
The mere fact that there is disagreement between Ronnie and myself is not enough to 
show that ‘the way foods taste’ isn’t objective. There can after all be disagreements 
about objective matters (e.g. there may be disagreements about e.g. how heavy a 
particular rock is).  
When Ronnie says that cucumbers taste pleasant to him, I do not (usually) think 
that he has made a mistake. I accept the fact that he experiences the taste of cucumbers 
differently to me. I do not try to convince him that I am right and he is wrong, even 
though I strongly disagree with him. When Ronnie claims that cucumbers taste nice, I 
do not think he is making some factual error. This implies that we do not think that 
there is some ‘truth’ about taste that exists independently of our awareness of the world. 
In other words, we do not treat taste as an objective feature of the world.  
I want to mention another example. My main purpose in doing this is to show 
that there may be significant differences between different kinds of non-objective 
property. (In other words, the fact that a property is not objective leaves open the 
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question of whether it is simply a question of personal taste, or is in fact factual in some 
sense).  
It is might be said that colour is not an objectively real feature of the world. 
(While the world does contain objects that reflect light waves of certain frequencies, the 
world itself does not contain e.g. the colour yellow). We might say that colour is just 
something about how we (or other creatures) happen to experience the world. In this 
sense then, it not at all clear that colours are a feature of the world that would be present 
in the world if there were nothing to be aware of the world.  
Unlike the question of personal taste, while (perhaps) colours are not a real 
feature of the world, much talk of colours might still be thought to be factual in nature. 
You can make mistakes about the colour of things, even though there are no colours ‘in 
the world’ from an objective perspective. Certainly, while talk of colour may not 
describe an objective feature of the world, it would be difficult to argue that one’s 
claims about the colours of things are therefore entirely arbitrary. (That it is simply up 
to us to decide or choose what colour a particular object is). As I said, I’m not 
mentioning this example in order to draw any strong parallel between the belief that 
things matter, and the belief that something is a particular colour (although others 
have57). Rather, I am simply interested in illustrating the fact that, just because a 
property is non-objective, this doesn’t imply that there couldn’t be any rational 
constraints on the application of these properties to the world. 
In order to get clearer about the status of significance (given the fact that nothing 
can be objectively significant) in the next section, I want to set out the relationship 
between significance and awareness. 
 
 
 ii. How does significance arise? 
 
In this section, I will be arguing that meaning requires a perspective or a context. 
I will also argue that awareness is necessary if there are to be things of significance. 
But, in order to justify this I will have to assess a number of plausible counter-examples. 
After all, it seems perfectly reasonable to talk about the significance of an asteroid in 
the formation of a solar system. Or, we can talk of the significance of a winning game 
of cricket has to a nation. This seems to be the case, even though neither a solar system 
nor a nation is an individual awareness.  
I want to set out one particular event that many people seemed to find 
significant. On July 1st 2006, Cristiano Ronaldo scored a penalty for Portugal against 
England. The fact that Ronaldo scored his penalty was seen as extremely significant and 
important (but not valuable) by many of the people I know. But what was it that made 
this penalty kick so significant for so many people? After all, if I go down the park with 
a friend, and score a penalty kick against him, only my friend and I think this has any 
significance (and neither of us thinks it is particularly important). Why is it that two 
such (superficially) similar events can have such different levels of significance? 
England’s quarter final with Portugal in the world cup ended (after extra time) in 
a nil-nil draw. This meant that the winner would be decided by a penalty kick 
competition. Cristiano Ronaldo’s penalty kick was the decisive one in deciding the 
winner of the game. As a result of Ronaldo’s penalty, it was Portugal and not England 
who went into the World Cup semi-final. So, we might say that what makes Ronaldo’s 
                                                 
57 C.f. McDowell ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’ in Honderich, T. (ed.) (1985) Morality and 
Objectivity: A Tribute to J.L. Mackie pp. 110-129 
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penalty significant (as opposed to my penalty kick against my friend) is the context in 
which the penalty took place.  
We could spell out the context further, by asking why the England team 
winning, or failing to win a quarter final in the world cup is thought to be so important? 
The progress of the English team in the world cup is something that seems to have a 
profound importance for many English people. To understand why will require setting 
out a new context – the role of football in English life. We might need to describe what 
it means to support a football team - to identify with the team, to care about its progress 
etc. We might also describe the way in which people associate the success or failure of 
the national team with the status of the nation (and themselves insofar as they define 
themselves in terms of their nationality). To understand the full significance of all this, 
we might have to set out the history of football, and England’s role in it. For example, 
the rules of football were created in England. This has led to a persistent view that the 
English have some kind of ‘divine right’ to be the best nation at football. In this context, 
events such as Hungary’s win at Wembley in 1953 and England winning the 1966 
World Cup are extremely significant ones.  
It is because of all this history that a particular penalty kick acquires profound 
importance and significance for so many people. We can understand why this event is 
deemed so significant by so many people by placing the event in the context of the 
‘background story’ (the history and other narratives) people tell about themselves and 
their nation. (Of course, there is a story to be told about me and my friend down the 
park and our penalty kick. But this story doesn’t reveal the event as a particularly 
significant one.)  
The same seems true of other examples. I might describe Black Wednesday as a 
significant event in the history of the stock exchange. As with the penalty kick example, 
by saying that these events are significant, we mean that these events can be seen as key 
part of some broader narrative. In talking of Black Wednesday being significant in the 
context of the British economy, we might talk about the way the event had an important 
impact on the economic situation. We might say that it is a vital part of understanding 
why things are the way they are (for our economy). 
In many of the examples I have been discussing - even though we are talking 
about a (more or less) abstract entity (‘the English nation’, ‘the economy’) - it appears 
right to think that what makes something (e.g. a penalty kick, a fall in the value of the 
stock market) significant is related to the fact that it is seen (experienced) as significant 
by a large number of (English) people. After all, if an event held no significance for 
English people, it is difficult to see how it could be said to be significant for the English 
nation. So, in these cases at least, we might still retain the idea that to be significant is 
always to be significant for someone or something with awareness. (I will return to this 
thought in Chapter V.5, but it will become most important in Chapter VII.2). 
At the start of this discussion, I mentioned the fact that a collision between two 
planets could be said to be a significant event in the formation of a distant solar system.  
In this case, it seems natural to say this, even though neither the solar system, nor the 
planets involved in the collision, could be said to be conscious or aware in any sense. 
But, unlike the ‘English nation’, it looks like we are unable to reduce this talk of 
significance to the perspective of particular individuals. It looks as though this is a case 
that shows that no kind of awareness at all is necessary for this event to be significant. 
We might still retain the idea that there is a relationship between this context 
(the history of the solar system) and the perspective of human beings. Certainly, the 
concept of a ‘solar system’ is a way of thinking about certain objects that has been 
devised by human beings. (Which isn’t to say it is the only possible way to understand 
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them). At the very least, we can say that our understanding of the solar system (indeed 
the very idea of a solar system) is based on (and arises out of) a vast amount of human 
study and systematising.  
So, there still seems to be some sense in which the fact that an event is 
significant is dependent on the way in which those with awareness relate all the 
different objects and events to each other. After all, without the perspective of the 
people attempting to understand the distant solar system, we are simply left with 
another event in the universe. Of course, this is not to say that the event involving the 
collision of the two planets only happens if we adopt a (in this case, human) perspective 
on the event. The fact that the collision of the planets had such and such an effect is 
independent of human involvement58. The event happening is an objective fact about 
the universe. Nevertheless, the fact that the event has a form of significance is 
something that is only revealed when something with awareness adopts a perspective on 
the events. 
 
 
iii. Why nothing is significant from an objective perspective 
 
If (for the moment at least59) this account of significance is accepted, it becomes 
clear why the objective perspective reveals a world containing nothing of significance. 
The objective view of the world is one which systematically excludes all forms of 
awareness. As such, it excludes from the world anything that could be the source of 
significance.  
There are two possible attitudes we can take to the fact that nothing is (or could 
be) objectively significant. First, we might say that it is senseless to ask whether there is 
any objective significance. (We might say that ‘objectively significant’ is an oxymoron. 
To demand that we must reveal meaning in the world from the ‘sub specie aeternitatis’ 
perspective is demanding something both impossible and senseless.) Alternatively, we 
might say that there it is a reasonable question to ask, and the answer is that there is 
(obviously) no objective meaning.  
There is perhaps something to be said for both of these attitudes. But, if it is 
senseless to ask whether anything is objectively significant, there will be little reason to 
be threatened by the fact that we cannot provide a satisfactory answer. It is the second 
stance that may suggest that the fact that nothing is objectively significant is a threat to 
finding things that genuinely matter. As it is, there may be something to be said for the 
second stance. After all, the objective stance on the world or on particular events is one 
possible perspective that we (human beings) can adopt. Given the fact that we are 
talking about a perspective (even if it is one that excludes all forms of perspective) 
asking about whether anything is objectively significant need not be senseless. So, it 
seems better to say that it is obvious that there can be no such thing as an objective 
meaning - the objective perspective is one that could never reveal anything meaningful 
(but, we might continue, this should be no surprise, given the nature of the objective 
perspective – a perspective that explicitly excludes anything that could be the source of 
significance).  
                                                 
58 There is perhaps an ambiguity in the meaning of the word ‘significant’. By significant, we may mean 
something like ‘measurable effect’. So, in the case of the collision of the planets there may be a sense in 
which we might talk of an event having a large effect on what happened subsequently, without any 
implication of ‘deeper’ significance.  I am primarily interested in this ‘deeper’ kind of significance. 
59 In Chapter V, I will examine another two challenges to this account of significance (see V.4.i and 
V.4.iv). 
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Still, if we accept that meaning is not objective, this may suggest that we must 
be making some kind of mistake if we think that anything genuinely matters. After all, 
there is a long tradition of arguing that objectively real means robustly (properly) real. 
In this context, the fact that there is no objective meaning might suggest that meaning 
cannot be properly real. It might be said that meaning and significance only have a 
‘mere’ subjective reality, i.e. it seems to us that there are significant things in the world, 
but this view is ‘all in our mind’. If it is thought that the only possible meaning there 
may be would be subjective, we may have to accept that nothing really matters. 
The key question I am interested in throughout this thesis is whether we are 
making some kind of mistake in thinking that things genuinely matter. In this context, 
the fact that no significance is revealed from an objective perspective doesn’t decide 
this issue. If it is an open question whether there is anything in the world that is 
genuinely significant, the fact that there is no significance from the objective 
perspective could not help us decide this question. Whether or not our world contains 
anything of genuine significance, the objective perspective will necessarily reveal a 
world without meaning (regardless of the facts).  
More than this, there seem to be good reasons for thinking that the objective 
view of the world is not a complete view of reality. If there are creatures with awareness 
in the world, it is difficult to see how the facts about their awareness could be a part of 
the objective account of the world. Of course, there will be objective facts about the 
creatures with awareness. But, the way things are for them (which is after all a fact 
about them) cannot properly be accommodated in a view of the world independent of all 
awareness. If this is true, then an objective view of the world simply cannot be a 
complete account of reality.60 This might seem especially true in the context of a 
discussion about the reality of significance, given the fact that significance is 
inextricably linked to awareness, to taking a perspective on things. 
Given the fact that significance is a real feature of our experience (the 
unavoidability of seriousness seemed to show this – see Chapter II, sections 3 & 4) we 
might accept that significance does not have an objective reality, but still argue that it 
does have some form of reality. As I argued when I discussed examples of non-
objective properties, the fact that a property is not objective leaves open many questions 
about the status of such properties. (Things are not either scientifically real, or simply a 
matter of taste – like whether you enjoy the taste of cucumbers). 
So, there need be no contradiction between human beings, from their 
perspective, thinking things matter, and the fact that, from an objective perspective, 
nothing is revealed as mattering. The objective perspective is one we are capable of 
taking on the world. It is a perspective where we explicitly exclude all forms of 
awareness, and so exclude the possibility of any significance and meaning. It is for this 
reason that we will not find any significance in an objective view of the world. It is not 
because nothing could be significant. For these reasons, I take it that the fact that the 
objective perspective reveals a world without significance doesn’t imply that we must 
be making a mistake when we think things really matter. Having said that, I think we do 
have to accept that it is not open to us to say that things genuinely matter to us in virtue 
of the fact that the world objectively contains things of significance. (Although I will in 
fact argue that objective facts about us can play a role in deciding what genuinely 
matters. See VII.2).  
                                                 
60 This is close to a point Nagel himself makes in the last chapter of Mortal Questions. “So reality is not 
just objective reality, and the pursuit of objectivity is not an equally effective method of reaching the truth 
about everything.” (Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge p. 213) 
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What seems clear from this section is that the mere fact that nothing is 
objectively significant need not lead us to think that nothing genuinely matters. But, 
perhaps there are other reasons for thinking that nothing could be genuinely significant 
for us. In the next two sections, I will look at whether there are any facts about our 
human existence which imply that nothing could genuinely matter to us. 
 
 
3. The argument from scale 
 
People will often justify the view that life must be meaningless (must lack any 
kind of significance) by making reference to the scale of human existence. It might be 
thought that, because our existence is so physically small, and so brief (in comparison 
with the universe as a whole) our actions, our choices and our life couldn’t really 
matter. If we look at a single human existence in the context of the universe as a whole, 
we can see how insignificant a portion of the universe their physical form is. Similarly, 
if we look at the duration of a single human existence in the context of the amount of 
time the universe has existed we will see how insignificant the amount of time they live 
for. Even if we are looking at the human race as a whole, we can see how insignificant 
the amount of time the human race has existed is in relation to the universe. As Nagel 
himself says, “We are tiny specks in the infinite vastness of the universe.”61 
Given the insignificant scale of human existence, we can see how difficult it is 
for our actions to have any kind of significant effect on things (on the universe). The 
world (the universe) has existed for billions of years before we were born, and will 
carry on existing for billions of years after our death. In these circumstances, it seems 
difficult to see how any of the actions we perform now could possibly have any kind of 
lasting effect on the universe. Similarly, given our size in relation to the universe it is 
difficult to see how we can make any kind of significant difference. So, when we see 
the scale of the universe, we cannot help but get some perspective on our relative 
‘importance’.  
This might allow us to provide a reason for taking Nagel’s special experience 
argument (see II.5.i) seriously. The argument from non-objectivity was an attempt to 
show why we should take Nagel’s distanced perspective on events seriously. In the last 
section, I argued that the fact that significance is not objective doesn’t imply that the 
belief that things matter is arbitrary. Perhaps the argument from scale might give us a 
better reason to take a distanced perspective on our lives seriously. It gives us reason to 
think that, when we step back from human life (and take up a universe-wide 
perspective) we are seeing things as they really are, and so realise our insignificance in 
relation to this.  
Having said all this, it is not clear that there is any kind of relationship between 
something’s size or (or the duration of its existence) and whether that thing matters62. In 
order to see this, imagine that our life just the way it is (i.e. when we are the size we are) 
is meaningless. (In other words, we would be making a mistake in thinking that 
anything in our life matters). If our life is meaningless when we are the size we are, it is 
not at all clear why or how being larger would improve the situation. There is no reason 
to think that going above a certain size would suddenly make our lives more 
meaningful. 
                                                 
61 Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge p. 11 
62 There may be some relationship (e.g. we may think – other things being equal – that writing a book is 
likely to matter more than writing an undergraduate essay). The argument is that size alone is not the 
determining factor. 
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Similarly, it is not clear how existing for longer will suddenly make something 
meaningful. For example, imagine a piece of rock that has survived from the first 
formation of rocks after the big bang. Of course, this rock might be significant for 
someone. They might use this rock to prove something about the big bang. But, in this 
case, it is this that is significant. The mere fact that the rock has existed for a very long 
time alone does not make it significant. The same is true for something’s size. A remote 
planet might be many trillion times bigger than the flea that started the spread of the 
black plague. By itself, the fact that a planet is substantial in size doesn’t play any role 
in telling us whether it matters or not. (I think we are back to the argument that in order 
for something to be significant, it has to be significant from a particular perspective).  
In terms of the duration of our existence, this argument suggests that, unless we 
live longer, life would have to be meaningless. But, in this case, a life that existed for 
longer (or forever) would need to have some feature which makes it lead to a 
meaningful existence, which our current existence doesn’t share. It is not clear what this 
feature could be beyond the mere fact that it will last a greater length of time. But as 
I’ve already said, whether our life is meaningful or meaningless seems entirely 
unrelated to how long that life lasts. As it is, lasting forever doesn’t (in itself) make 
something ‘significant’.  
Perhaps it might be suggested that, because we live for such a short period of 
time, nothing we do can make a lasting impact. “It is often remarked that nothing we do 
now will matter in a million years.”63 It might be thought that, given this fact, we have 
to accept that we cannot have any truly lasting effect on the universe. In other words, 
nothing that we do really matters. But it is not clear though that an argument of this type 
proves that life is meaningless. This kind of argument just seems to beg the question 
against anything mattering. For a start, we may not want to concede that nothing we do 
now will matter in a million years. For example, if writing my PhD matters now, there 
doesn’t seem any principled reason why it couldn’t matter in a million years. (Though I 
grant it is incredibly unlikely). To justify this argument, we would first need to show 
that nothing we do now will matter in a million years. Then we need to show why the 
fact that nothing we do now will matter in a million years shows that nothing matters 
here and now. After all, it is not clear that we have any reason to think that in order for 
something to matter, it must still matter a million years from now.  
In a similar way, because our size is tiny in comparison with ‘all that exists’ (the 
universe) it might be thought that our choices or activities couldn’t possibly register 
from this bigger perspective. Taking up the perspective of ‘all that exists’ (perhaps 
something akin to Nagel’s special experience) makes us realise that our activities 
couldn’t possibly have any impact on the universe as a whole. Again though, there 
doesn’t seem to be any reason for thinking that, in order for any of our actions to matter, 
they must matter from a universe-wide perspective. I will cover this issue in the next 
chapter, which is devoted to an issue related to this. There, I will be assessing whether, 
life has a ‘universal’ meaning. This will involve assessing whether (in order for 
something to be genuinely meaningful or significant) there has to be a story we can tell 
about the universe as a whole which reveals everything in the universe as meaningful. 
For now though, the argument from scale doesn’t provide any good reasons for thinking 
that nothing could matter because of the short duration of our lives, or because of our 
size. In the next section, I want to examine an argument that is also based on the short 
duration of our lives. I will be examining whether the fact that we all eventually die, 
might have an impact on the possibility of life mattering.  
                                                 
63Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge p. 11 
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4. The argument from mortality 
 
In the discussion of death in Chapter I, I assumed that death is the end of our 
existence (see I.2). Perhaps, if this is true, this gives us good reasons for thinking that 
our lives couldn’t be meaningful. As Tolstoy said: “Sooner or later my affairs, whatever 
they may be, will be forgotten, and I shall not exist. Then why go on making any 
effort?”64 There is an obvious link here with the last argument, the argument from scale. 
In this case, the problem identified is not that our life span is brief. The problem is that 
our life comes to an abrupt end. 
It might be thought that all human efforts, plans, projects etc. are futile because 
we will eventually die; so all these plans just end in nothingness. In this sense, our life is 
like a story that abruptly ends half way through. Because the story just ends, we never 
get to find out the ‘meaning’ of the events described. The claim that all aims we have 
will eventually be cut off ‘in mid air’ has strong parallels to Nagel’s epistemological 
argument (See II.5.iii) Given the fact that in the end we just die, this argument seems to 
provide us with good reasons for thinking that all chains of reasons really do come to an 
abrupt end.  
But, as we saw when looking at the epistemological argument, the fact that a 
chain of justification comes to an end doesn’t prevent it being a reasonable justification. 
Similarly, the fact that a plan comes to an end doesn’t prevent it mattering. As Nagel 
himself says;  
 
No further justification is needed to make it reasonable to take aspirin for a 
headache, attend an exhibition of the work of a painter one admires, or stop a 
child from putting his hand on a hot stove. No larger context or further purpose 
is needed to prevent these acts being pointless.65  
 
 
So, just because my visit to an exhibition is now over, this doesn’t necessarily 
mean that it wasn’t a worthwhile thing to do. If it is possible for things that end to be 
meaningful, then the fact that I will one day die doesn’t rule out the possibility that there 
are things that genuinely matter. Death may prematurely bring an end to certain aims 
and activities. But, it is not at all clear how this would undermine the aims that a person 
achieved in their life. Just because some aims and activities of a person may be cut off 
(and so there may be a problem with saying that these aims or activities mean 
something) death doesn’t have this effect in the vast majority of cases. 
This argument (as with the last argument) makes it seem like an eternal 
existence would bring something to life (would give it the possibility of being 
meaningful) that a mortal existence couldn’t have. (In fact, Williams66 provides 
interesting reasons for thinking that eventually all eternal lives must become 
meaningless.) If the afterlife is to be meaningful, it must have some meaningful content 
beyond the simple fact that it lasts forever. But, there doesn’t seem to be any reason for 
                                                 
64 Cited in Edwards, P. (2000) ‘The Meaning and Value of Life’. From Klembe (ed.) The Meaning of 
Life. Oxford University Press: Oxford p. 137. The discussions in sections 4 &5 are in part based on 
Edward’s arguments in this paper. 
65 Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge p. 12 
66 Williams, B. (1973) The Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge  
‘The Makropoulos Case’ 
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thinking that there is some kind of ‘special’ content that our mortal lives couldn’t also 
have. As I have repeatedly said, there is no reason to think that were we to exist for a 
longer period this would somehow makes things (that currently don’t matter) suddenly 
matter.  So, none of the arguments discussed in this section gives us any reason to think 
that nothing could genuinely matter simply because we are mortal. 
 
 
5. The argument from Pessimism 
 
In this chapter, the first argument (the argument from non-objectivity) was based 
on the claim that nothing could genuinely matter because of the nature of the world. The 
next two arguments (the argument from scale and the argument from mortality) were 
based on the claim that nothing could genuinely matter because of the nature of our 
existence. The final argument in this chapter claims that nothing could genuinely matter 
because of the nature of our goals, and the consequences of achieving our goals.  
Schopenhauer sets out an extremely pessimistic account of life67. He argues that 
nothing in life could matter because human activities cannot have satisfactory ends. (As 
we shall see, this has obvious affinities with the epistemological argument). 
Schopenhauer claims that, when it comes to our aims: 
 
People either fail to achieve the ends they are striving for or else they do achieve 
them only to find them grossly disappointing.68 
 
 
Schopenhauer argues that, even if we do achieve our aims, we find the 
achievement of our aims grossly disappointing. He claims that this is the case because 
the achievement of our goals brings us no lasting satisfaction. Whenever we succeed 
with an aim we have been pursuing, this doesn’t represent any kind of end point. It 
simply leaves a hole that is filled by immediately setting off on the pursuit of a new 
goal. So, while there may be some fleeting enjoyment, we are ultimately disappointed, 
and realise that we need to find new goals. These new goals will be found to be 
ultimately disappointing for the same reasons.  
The first issue to look at is whether Schopenhauer is right that, if our aims were 
of this kind, nothing could matter. It is difficult to see how (if Schopenhauer is right) we 
could have a life involving real satisfaction. If our aims could only have these ‘meagre’ 
consequences, it is difficult to see how our actions and our aims could genuinely matter. 
Let us assume for the moment then that, if the pursuit and achievement of our aims is 
the way Schopenhauer describes, we may have real concerns about whether anything 
genuinely matters. 
Still, there seems to be a number of problems with Schopenhauer’s argument. 
Firstly, we have already seen reasons for doubting the claim that meaning can only 
come from the pursuit of goals. It was clear in the last chapter that not all activities are 
‘goal’ driven (in particular, see III.5). Schlick’s discussion of play made clear that we 
often engage in activities (such as playing the guitar) for their own sake. When the 
                                                 
67 For a clear account, see Edwards, P. (2000) ‘The Meaning and Value of Life’. From Klembe (ed.) The 
Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press: Oxford, particularly pp. 134-6 
68 Edwards, P. (2000) ‘The Meaning and Value of Life’. From Klembe (ed.) The Meaning of Life. Oxford 
University Press: Oxford p. 135 
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meaning of an activity is contained within itself, Schopenhauer’s dilemma concerning 
the futility of pursuing ends doesn’t seem pressing. 
Secondly, we might question whether the achievement of goals is always 
ultimately disappointing. One of the assumptions of Schopenhauer’s argument is that all 
goals have a neat definitive ending. In the last chapter (see III.9) I discussed examples 
where people are committed to the results of their work. Now, if someone is devoted to 
(say) the health of others, there is no reason to think that this is a goal with a specific 
end point. It is not as if this person would be aiming for any kind of final date when this 
goal will be reached. Schopenhauer’s account assumes that all activities aim to achieve 
a conclusive goal. In fact, when people are concerned with (e.g.) their family, or the 
health of others, they are rarely aiming some definitive moment when their aim (of 
caring for their family or for others) is conclusively achieved. So, Schopenhauer is 
wrong to say that whether our actions matter or not will be solely determined by the 
brief moments that follow the achievement of the goal.  
Even when an activity is based solely on reaching some end point, it is not at all 
clear that the pleasure you feel at reaching a goal is always short lived. For example, in 
the early nineties, I recorded a CD with a band I was in. Finishing the recording was 
enjoyable, and it felt worthwhile. But the pleasure didn’t end there. Any time I feel like 
it, I can listen to the CD, and (most times) get pleasure out of that. This suggests that 
there are cases where the positives I gain from achieving a goal are not confined to 
some brief pleasure at the moment of completion. 
Similarly, if we think of someone who has the goal of meeting a partner and 
having a child, it seems a mistake to think such a person is only looking for a short lived 
positive feeling of success if they achieve this. They might say that the purpose of 
achieving this goal is to spend the rest of their life enjoying being with their family, and 
having strong relationships with them. In that sense, nothing is over when the goal is 
reached. 
In the end then, Schopenhauer’s account of human activity (as exclusively goal 
directed, with a short lived positive feeling that accompanies success) is just too 
simplistic. There is little in any of his arguments to make us think that human life must 
be meaningless. Having said that, there are certain kinds of activities that may find 
Schopenhauer’s argument troubling.69 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
None of the arguments I have looked at give us conclusive reasons for thinking 
that life is meaningless. When discussing the argument from scale (section 3) I argued 
that something’s size (or the duration of its existence) is irrelevant to whether something 
matters. The argument from mortality (section 4) presented an argument similar to the 
epistemological argument. I argued that there is no reason to think that only activities 
that carry on forever can really be meaningful. Just because life ends, it doesn’t mean 
that nothing could be meaningful. And there is certainly no reason to think that there is 
some quality (beyond mere infinite existence) that makes immortal existence a 
candidate for being significant that mortal existence couldn’t have. 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism (section 5) was found to be particularly 
unconvincing. His claims about the futility of seeking ends are extremely overstated. 
                                                 
69 For example, Schopenhauer’s account of the significance of ends might actually apply to the actions of 
an addict, or someone who acts compulsively. (This will be explored in Chapter VI – particularly 10.ii). 
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We saw in the chapter III that not all activities are goal directed. I also argued that it is 
not at all clear that the only positive things we get out of achieving a goal are fleeting 
pleasure at the completion of the goal. 
 The most important argument I looked at was the first one. In section 2, I 
examined the thought that, because significance does not ‘show up’ from the objective 
perspective, we should accept that all talk of significance must be a mistake of some 
kind (there cannot really be anything that genuinely matters). I argued that the fact that 
we should accept that nothing objectively matters. (So, we have ruled out the possibility 
that things genuinely matter in virtue of objective features of the world). But, I argued 
that it is still an open question whether anything genuinely matters.  
 Even if the arguments in this chapter are accepted, we do not yet have any 
reason to think that anything genuinely matters. I have shown that there are no good 
reasons for thinking that nothing could be meaningful (that all answers to my curious 
friend’s questions must be equally bad). But it is still unclear whether there are any 
good answers to my curious friend (and what makes them good answers). 
 Before attempting to argue that some things genuinely matter (in chapters VII 
and VIII) I want to turn to questions related to the meaning of life. In the next chapter, I 
will outline two ways in which life could be said to have a meaning. I will discuss the 
way in which religious beliefs appear to provide us with a way of revealing the fact that 
the universe as a whole is genuinely meaningful. I call this universal meaning. This 
thought may suggest that, in order to show that life is meaningful (or to show that some 
things genuinely matter) we will need to make reference to religious accounts of the 
universe. I will be assessing whether this is true, and whether religious beliefs can help 
us show that some things genuinely matter.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
DOES RELIGION PROVE WHAT MATTERS? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In this chapter, I want to start looking at issues related to the meaning of life. I 
start this chapter by distinguishing two different ways in which we might talk about life 
having a meaning. The first of these is universal meaning. This chapter is principally 
concerned with whether life has a universal meaning. Life has a universal meaning if 
there is a true story about the universe which reveals the fact that everything is 
meaningful. I will be examining the kinds of claims that can provide universal meaning 
(i.e. religious answers to the meaning of life). It seems that, if it could be shown that a 
religious account of the universe were true, this would provide us with good reasons for 
saying that some things genuinely matter. 
It might be thought that the scientific account of the world has shown that all 
religious accounts of the universe are false (and so science has shown that there is no 
universal meaning). I examine whether this is true, and also whether it is possible to 
prove (to my curious friend’s satisfaction) that a religious account of the universe is 
true. This discussion appears to lead to a deadlock. I end this discussion by arguing that 
there is no reason to think that science can prove that there is no universal meaning. 
But, I also argue that religion is not capable of proving that life does have a universal 
meaning. If this is accepted, then it seems that we cannot use claims about universal 
meaning as a way of answering my curious friend’s questions. I am attempting to prove 
that some things genuinely matter. If we cannot prove the truth of religious claims about 
the universe, then it looks as if religious claims are not going to be able to help me 
provide satisfactory answers to my curious friend’s questions. 
My intention is to find a way to assess whether anything matters that is 
independent of issues to do with religion (and to explore whether life is meaningful 
independently of issues to do with universal meaning). Before doing this, there is 
another potential threat that religious views might cause to any attempt to prove that 
some things genuinely matter. I will explore three different arguments which attempt to 
show that, unless we make reference to a religious account of the meaning of life, 
nothing could genuinely matter. Each of these arguments present us with reasons to 
think that God (or religious belief systems) provide something that is necessary if 
anything is to be genuinely meaningful. None of these arguments gives us any reason to 
think that religious accounts of the universe are necessary if anything is to genuinely 
matter. Having said that, the discussion does bring up a number of challenges that will 
need to be met, if my project of outlining things that genuinely matter independent of 
religious belief is to be acceptable.  
The last three chapters of this thesis constitute an attempt to set out what 
genuinely matters (independent of religious beliefs) keeping in mind the challenges that 
have been set in this chapter. I do this by switching my attention to the perspective of 
the individual human being. I end this chapter by providing reasons why this is a 
reasonable step to make. But, it also becomes clear that we do not find that things 
genuinely matter simply by switching to the perspective of the individual.  
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2. Universal and personal meaning 
 
This chapter, and the next one is (in part) an attempt to assess whether life has a 
meaning. I will be arguing that, even if we dismiss the possibility of objective meaning, 
there are (at least) two other ways in which life can be said to have (or fail to have) a 
meaning. The two types of meaning I will discuss are: 
 
Universal70 meaning: To say that life has a universal meaning is to say that there 
is an answer to the meaning of life which reveals the fact that everything (or, at 
the very least all human life) is meaningful. I will describe attempts to show how 
religious accounts of the universe (if true) would explain the meaning and 
significance of everything, in virtue of life’s relationship to a universe-wide 
‘narrative’. 
 
Personal meaning: A person’s life is personally meaningful if they experience 
their own life as being meaningful. What exactly this might involve will be the 
topic of the next chapter71. 
 
Universal meaning, and particularly the way in which religious accounts of the 
universe can provide universal meaning will be the focus of this chapter. It certainly 
seems to be the case that, one of the things people may mean when asking whether life 
has a meaning is whether there is some story we can tell about the universe as a whole 
which makes everything (in the universe, or all human life) meaningful and significant. 
They might hope that there is some bigger story by reference to which we can gain a 
new understanding of the role and purpose of human existence, and our existence as an 
individual.  
In Chapter IV, I argued that there were difficulties in making sense of the 
existence of meaning from an objective perspective (IV.2.iii). Religious accounts of the 
(universal) meaning of life do not face these same difficulties. Unlike the objective 
perspective, religious accounts of the universe provide us with the kind of context, or 
perspective, through which the meaning and significance of things can be explained (or 
revealed). In many cases, religious beliefs can provide the perspective of a particular 
awareness. For example, one could think of the perspective provided by the 
(omniscient) awareness God has of the world.  
But, even if a religious creed makes no reference to something with awareness 
(Buddhism and Taoism may be examples) at the very least religious beliefs provide 
exactly the kind of broader story that would reveal the significance of things. They are 
narratives that explain the significance and meaning of everything. 
As will become clear in the next chapter, religious beliefs can also be a source of 
personal meaning (can be part of the reason why someone experiences their own life as 
                                                 
70 Initially, my intention was to centre this chapter around Edwards’ distinction between cosmic and 
terrestrial senses in which life could have a meaning (in Edwards, P. (2000) ‘The Meaning and Value of 
Life’. From Klemke (ed.) The Meaning of Life. Oxford University Press: Oxford pp. 133-52). My 
distinction between universal and personal meaning is, in some respects, similar to Edwards’ distinction. 
But I found Edwards’ discussion unhelpful in drawing out what is involved in experiencing your own life 
as meaningful, so the structure and content of this chapter is largely my own. 
71 In the next chapter it will become clear that a number of caveats need to be added to this claim, but 
there is no need to discuss these here. 
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meaningful). In Chapter VI, one of my aims will be to show that there are other (non-
religious) ways in which people can find their own life personally meaningful. 
My main aim in this thesis is to try to discover whether anything genuinely 
matters. At the very least, we might think that if there is a universal meaning (in virtue 
of some religious account of the meaning of life) this would provide us with an very 
good reason for saying that some things genuinely matter. My discussion of religious 
accounts of the meaning of life will have two aspects. Firstly, I will try to discover 
whether we are able to prove the correctness of particular religious accounts of the 
meaning of life. (Only if we can do this will it be reasonable to use religious beliefs as a 
way of showing my curious friend that some things genuinely do matter). I will argue 
that it is not possible to prove any particular religious account of the meaning of life (at 
least, not in the kind of rigorous way that would satisfy my curious friend).  
So, in the next section, I want to assess whether we can use religious accounts of 
the meaning of life as a way of answering my curious friend’s questions. I want to 
assess whether it is possible to prove to my curious friend that there really is a true 
religious account of the universe. I will do this by assessing the relative merits of the 
scientific view of the world and the religious view of the universe. In this discussion, I 
make some claims about science (and religion) that may be slightly contentious. So, it is 
perhaps better to say that, my claim that neither science nor religion is able to provide 
proofs about the existence or non-existence of religious accounts of the universe is an 
assumption. (This discussion is intended to show that it is not an arbitrary assumption.) 
 
 
3. Science, religion and universal meaning 
 
Here is what many people would perhaps think was a totally satisfying answer to 
the meaning of life. Imagine the universe is a drama with a happy ending. Perhaps it is 
the playing out of the battle between good and evil, where good triumphs. In this 
context (from the perspective of someone who is aware of this story – see IV.2.ii) your 
life might have a tremendous amount of meaning and importance. Perhaps one of your 
actions leads to decisive victory for good. (Think of Luke Skywalker blowing up the 
Death Star in Star Wars.) In virtue of this larger context, it might be said that a person’s 
actions and their life is thereby full of meaning. (So, for example, the meeting between 
Luke Skywalker and Obi-Wan Kenobi at the start of Star Wars is significant in the 
context of its consequences for the story). 
So, there can be ‘stories’ (universe-wide narratives) that provide everything with 
meaning or significance (that provide universal meaning). Another example of such 
‘cosmic’ accounts of the universe would be the thought that there is a benevolent force 
behind everything. By understanding everything’s relationship to this force, we can 
understand the meaning of absolutely everything. Everything becomes meaningful or 
significant in virtue of its relationship to this force. Obviously, religious traditions are 
one example of an attempt to provide ‘cosmic’ answers to the (universal) meaning of 
life, a story about the universe as a whole that explains the meaning or significance of 
the universe.  
 
 
i. Has science proved there is no universal meaning? 
 
It might be thought that our current scientific understanding, because it is able to 
explain the existence and cause of everything, reveals to us that there is no ultimate 
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meaning to life (there is no true religious narrative that explains the significance of 
everything). Alternatively, it might be thought that science is now the only serious 
account of the universe, and it is an account that reveals a universe without any meaning 
in it. In either case, the findings of science show that life could not have any universal 
meaning. 
The first thing to be said about this kind of argument is that the consequences of 
the findings of science tend to be overstated. In order to see why, try to imagine a 
scientific experiment that proved that all religious accounts of the universe are false. It 
is not clear what form such an experiment would have. This is because the claim that 
science has proved that there is no God is not itself a scientific claim. Rather, it is a 
claim about how the results of scientific inquiry should be understood. Perhaps though, 
it might be thought that particular scientific discoveries have disproved religious 
accounts of the world’s creation. (E.g. Galileo’s view that the earth is not the centre of 
the universe, the Darwinian view that humans evolved from other creatures etc.) It 
might look as though religious accounts are attempts to describe the causes of things, 
and that science now provides a more accurate, rigorous and rational way of describing 
the causes of things. 
Even if it is accepted that science offers alternative explanations to the universe 
to those put forward e.g. by the world’s major religions, it is not clear how much this 
really undermines religion’s account of the ultimate cause of the universe. For a start, it 
is not at all clear that science is fundamentally a tool for revealing the ultimate cause of 
everything. Science isn’t particularly interested in ultimate causes. If a scientist is asked 
to investigate the cause of (say) global warming, they may conclude that it is caused by 
an increased level of CO2 in the atmosphere. They may then be asked to look at why 
there has been an increase in CO2 in the atmosphere. They might make reference to the 
burning of fossil fuels, or the increase in deforestation. But, if you then want to know 
why people are using more fossil fuels, or why there is an increase in deforestation, 
scientific inquiry doesn’t seem the best way to answer these questions. As it is, we 
certainly don’t think that the scientist has to draw the causal links back to the ultimate 
cause of everything before he has answered any particular scientific question.  
The closest science gets to this kind of questions about the ultimate causes of 
things is theories concerning the big bang. But, in this context, scientific inquiry may be 
prey to a version of the epistemological argument. In drawing back chains of causes we 
might wonder if we are going to reach a first (ultimate) cause. If science reaches an 
ultimate cause, we might think that the scientific question about the cause of this cause 
has been totally unexplained. The other alternative for science is to keep drawing back 
chains of causes forever, in which case the scientist doesn’t seem to have given any 
explanation of why things are the way they are, or indeed why there is anything at all.  
This needn’t be a problem for science, as long as we recognise that science is 
fundamentally a tool for drawing out the active prior cause of an event. It is not 
particularly a tool for determining the ultimate cause of things. It is not, for example, a 
tool for describing why there is anything at all, rather than nothing, or something 
different. 
It might be argued that science is the only way to reveal the true nature of things 
and that only things that can be uncovered in a scientific experiment are real. I don’t 
think we should accept this view. Science is a way of investigating the world that has 
very specific parameters. It is only interested in certain aspects of the world. This 
‘abstracted’ way of looking at the world has proved to be extremely useful in predicting 
future events in that abstracted way of looking at things. In particular, one of the things 
that is abstracted out of the scientific world view is awareness and so meaning. In so far 
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as science attempts to provide an objective account of the world, issues concerning 
meaning cannot be clarified by scientific investigation (see IV.2). For these reasons, 
science does not look like an appropriate tool to use to determine whether and in what 
way things are meaningful.  
There is perhaps another related argument. Perhaps it might be thought that 
accounts of (e.g.) evolution show that human existence has come about as the result of 
“a purely accidental chain of essentially blind natural forces.”72 Given the fact that the 
causes of our existence are meaningless forces, this may lead us to think that nature 
itself shows us that nothing could genuinely matter. I will be arguing below that we can 
accept that the causes of the world and human nature are blind forces without thinking 
that human existence couldn’t be meaningful. To pre-empt this discussion, we might 
say that, even if the Darwinian account of evolution is accepted, it is nevertheless true 
that the ‘blind forces’ it describes have brought about human beings with a certain 
nature. If it is true that, given this nature some things genuinely matter to us, there is no 
reason to think that the fact that this nature arose as a result of ‘blind forces’ undermines 
this conclusion. 
 
 
ii. Can religion prove that there is a universal meaning? 
 
Religious beliefs certainly seem to present us with accounts of the ultimate 
causes of things, and provide explanations of why there is anything at all etc. The 
problem is that there seem to be insurmountable problems with attempting to provide 
rational justifications for religious beliefs. My own sense has been that proofs of God’s 
existence tend to be very weak, falling well short of a convincing truth to the open-
minded reader. Such attempts (even when sincere) seem more like post-rationalisations 
– more like the attempt to find the best possible rational justification for what someone 
already believe on other grounds. 
If people believe in God, but are not able to base their beliefs on rigorous 
arguments, this might seem to imply that belief in God’s existence is irrational. I would 
argue that this is too strong (as it assumes that rigorous proof is the only reasonable 
grounds for a belief). Having said that, if it is accepted that the arguments to ‘prove’ 
God’s existence are weak, this may cause a problem for anyone who bases their belief 
in the existence of God on these weak arguments. 
But, my experience is that people don’t primarily base their religious beliefs on 
rational argument. (The incredibly low success rate of Jehovah’s Witnesses seems to 
support the thought that people are not principally argued into religious beliefs.) People 
tend to either gain their religious beliefs through being brought up to see ‘God’ as part 
of the world, or they have ‘experiences’ which lead them to see God as part of the world 
and their life. These experiences can come in many forms. For example, people might 
have revelatory experiences (of being full of the love of our Lord) at a born-again rally. 
Or a Buddhist might have an experience of ‘enlightenment’ during meditation. A 
Christian might see the glory of God in nature as she walks home from church (her 
experience of the wonder of nature may reinforce her religious beliefs). We could even 
imagine a scientist who, through his scientific activity may find their religious beliefs 
strengthened by the harmony they find in the way the universe works (supporting their 
view that the universe has been ‘harmoniously’ created). 
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In these cases, it seems that there is a sense in which someone with a belief in a 
religious account of the universe can have ‘reasonable’ grounds for their religious 
beliefs. After all, their beliefs help make sense of the world for them, they find their 
beliefs are wholly consistent with their experiences etc. But, this does not mean that 
they have a conclusive proof (meet the kind of standard I am looking for, or that will 
satisfy my curious friend) for their beliefs. As I said, this need not imply that religious 
beliefs are irrational, given the fact that most people do not hold their religious beliefs 
on the basis of intellectual proofs.  
If we are looking for definitive proof of the ultimate causes of things, neither 
religious belief nor scientific method seems to be able to give satisfactory answers. 
Religious belief doesn’t seem susceptible to ‘intellectual proof’. Science does provide 
intellectual proofs for its claims about the causes of things, but it is not clear that it is a 
method that can be used to discover the ultimate cause of everything. It is (very rarely) 
focused on discovering the ultimate causes of things, and is a powerful, but abstracted 
account of the world seen from a particular perspective.73  
In the rest of this thesis then, I will assume that we cannot provide conclusive 
proofs of religious accounts of the universal meaning of life. Because of this, I want to 
leave universal meaning to one side. After all, I want to be able to provide conclusive 
justifications for claims that some things genuinely matter (I want to find satisfying 
answers to my curious friend). Given the fact that I will be unable to justify claims 
about religious accounts of the universe, I want to turn somewhere more productive. 
For the rest of the thesis, I want to turn my focus on the perspective of the 
individual human being. This will mean, in the context of questions about the meaning 
of life, focusing on personal meaning. It is not my intention to dismiss religious 
accounts out of hand. I wish to remain agnostic. I will in fact argue that, from the 
perspective of the individual, religious accounts of the meaning of life are capable of 
playing an important role in allowing someone to experience their own life as 
meaningful.  
Still, I wish to leave issues around religious belief to one side, and explore 
whether it is possible to look for answers to what matters, and whether life is 
meaningful independently of religious issues. Before I can do this though, I am going to 
have to deal with a couple of threats to the project of exploring meaning and 
significance independently of religious issues.  
 
 
4. Is God necessary if anything is to genuinely matter? 
 
In this section, I want to assess a number of arguments which attempt to show 
that something universally mattering (by virtue of its relationship to a religious account 
of the meaning of life) is the only way in which things can genuinely matter. So, if there 
is no God (or no true religious narrative) life couldn’t really be said to be meaningful. In 
order to see whether there is anything in this claim, I will be looking at three arguments. 
Each argument presents reasons for thinking that only if God exists (or only if there is a 
religious narrative) can something genuinely matter. This is because only God (or the 
religious narrative) can provide something that is necessary if anything is to genuinely 
matter. 
                                                 
73 In particular, there is no reason to think, just because scientific investigation of the natural world hasn’t 
revealed anything super-natural, that there is nothing super-natural. 
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The first argument is set out by Nozick in The Examined Life.74  There, he 
argues that, given the account of significance I have argued for (see IV.2) God is the 
only thing that can guarantee anything being genuinely meaningful. This argument sets 
out reasons for thinking that only God can provide the infinitude necessary to ground 
things genuinely mattering. I will deal with this argument quite quickly.  
The other two arguments come from Cottingham’s book On The Meaning of 
Life.75 Cottingham has two arguments for his claim that without something that only 
religion can provide, life must be meaningless. His first argument is based on the claim 
that, because there is a strong relationship between external success and 
meaningfulness, only religious narratives could provide satisfying answers to the 
meaning of life. His second argument suggests that my account of meaning (in the 
context of questions around the meaning of life) is too ‘thin’. The account of meaning I 
will be working with in the next chapter links experiencing our lives as meaningful to 
having a ‘story’ you can tell about your life which allows you to experience your life as 
a coherent whole. It is because you are able to see your life and your actions as 
meaningful in the light of these narratives that we experience our lives as meaningful. 
Cottingham argues ‘mere’ narrative is not enough to make life meaningful. He argues 
that we need to be able to distinguish between good and bad narratives, and only 
religious narratives could ground this distinction. 
I will find problems with most of these arguments. Even so, after assessing 
them, it is clear that there are questions I will need to satisfactorily answer if my project 
of assessing meaning independently of religious accounts of the meaning of life is to 
succeed. 
 
 
i. If my account of meaning is right, do we need God? 
 
The way in which I have described meaning (playing an important role in some 
larger context) may look like it is prey to a new version of the epistemological 
argument. Think of the example I used in introducing this idea. I argued that what made 
Ronaldo’s penalty meaningful was the fact that it was decisive in deciding the quarter 
final of the world cup. Imagine someone who is unconvinced that this event really is 
meaningful. We might try to convince them by telling them say that the penalty was 
meaningful because the progress of the England football team in the world cup 
depended on it – and this is something that is itself meaningful. But, it seems that if 
someone is unconvinced that the progress of the England team matters, we will need to 
justify the claim that this matters. As we have seen with the epistemological argument, 
this kind of questioning can carry on indefinitely. Nozick argues that this consideration 
should lead us to accept that, in order for anything to be genuinely meaningful, there 
must be a God. He argues for this in the following way: 
 
About any given thing, however wide, it seems we can stand back and ask what 
its meaning is. To find a meaning for it, then, we seem driven to find a link with 
yet another thing beyond its boundaries. And so a regress is launched. To stop 
this regress, we seem to need … something which is unlimited, from which we 
cannot step back, even in imagination, to wonder what its meaning is.76 
                                                 
74 Nozick, R. (1989) The Examined Life. New York: Simon & Schulster. 
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 The parallels with the epistemological argument (see II.5.iii & iv) should be 
clear. In both cases, just stopping somewhere in attempting to justify why something is 
meaningful is thought to be unsatisfactory. As it happens, Nozick is suggesting that 
there is somewhere that we can stop that is satisfactory. We can stop at something that 
is unlimited, or ‘infinite’. (Though it may remain an open question why this is thought 
satisfactory, and why nowhere else is thought unsatisfactory). In response to this 
argument, I think we can just repeat the point made when discussing the 
epistemological argument. The important question is whether the places that we end up 
stopping this regress are any good. In describing examples of things that genuinely 
matter, I will be providing places whether it seems reasonable to stop (this will be done 
in Chapters VII and VIII). If I can show this, then we will have no reason to think that 
the only reasonable place to stop is at something unlimited (God). 
 
 
ii. Cottingham’s description of the deadlock between science and religion 
 
Cottingham, in On The Meaning of Life77 has a position that is very similar to 
the position I have been defending in section 3 of this chapter. In the second chapter of 
On The Meaning of Life, Cottingham argues (as I have) that the religious and scientific 
perspectives end in a ‘deadlock’78. In this sense, it looks as though I can count 
Cottingham as an ally.  
 
If we are simply looking around us, without any preconceptions either of a 
theistic or of an atheistic kind, then the observed facts seem to lead to a stand-off 
when it comes to evaluating the nature of the cosmos we inhabit. 79  
 
But, even though he has a position very similar to mine, Cottingham goes on to 
argue that someone’s life can only be said to be meaningful if there is a God. (Or 
perhaps better, life can only be meaningful if lived in the light of a faith in the existence 
of God).  
In the final three chapters, I wish to explore whether anything (in a human life) 
matters independently of theistic belief. If Cottingham is right, then this project will be 
futile. So, I will need to assess whether Cottingham’s argument is justified. I will argue 
that his arguments are not particularly strong. But, discussing his view will bring 
forward a number of challenges that any non-religious account of the meaning of life 
will need to meet. 
 
 
iii. Cottingham’s argument from luck 
 
 In (what I am calling) the argument from luck, Cottingham makes two claims 
about meaningfulness. These are given as (a) and (b) below. Cottingham goes on to 
show how these two claims cause two problems. He then presents religious belief 
systems as the only way to overcome these two problems. The two claims he makes are: 
                                                 
77 Cottingham, J. (2003) On The Meaning of Life Routledge: Oxon 
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perspectives to read On the Meaning of life, especially pp. 32-63. 
79 Ibid p. 62 
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(a) Worthwhile activities are an integral part of a meaningful life. This is a claim I 
have no problem with. This relates to the discussion in Chapter III, and is 
something I will argue for in more detail in chapters VI and VII. 
 
(b) According to Cottingham, these worthwhile activities (that form an integral part 
of a meaningful life) need to be (in some sense) successful. When we engage in 
an activity that gives our life meaning, “we require it not just to be undertaken in 
the right spirit, but to achieve something.” 80   
 
I am quite happy to accept claim (a). It is a claim I will develop throughout this 
thesis. It is claim (b) that will be the real issue in this discussion. Cottingham argues 
that, because of (a) and (b): 
 
our assessment of the worth of our activities is to some extent success-orientated 
… in view of the obstacles which the pursuit of goodness often encounters, it 
seems that the path to a meaningful life offers an existence fraught with struggle, 
with chances of achieving a successful outcome that are often decidedly slim.81 
 
 According to Cottingham, this causes two problems. Firstly, it means that 
(without religious belief) whether a particular individual has (or even has the chance of) 
a meaningful life is subject to luck in a way that is unacceptable. If it is true that having 
a meaningful life is subject to luck, many people will (through no fault of their own) fail 
to have a meaningful life. This, according to Cottingham, would be ethically repugnant, 
as everyone ought to be eligible for ‘salvation’, for a meaningful life. “It is ethically 
repugnant because it goes against the long compassionate and egalitarian tradition, 
rooted in the best of Christian and Islamic thought.”82 
I hope it is clear that, in basing his argument on religious belief systems, 
Cottingham is begging the question in the context of undermining the possibility of a 
non-religious account of the meaning of life. We are looking for reasons for thinking 
that we have to believe in God from a neutral perspective. So, it will not be enough to 
show that the teachings of major religions, suggest that we ought to think of belief in 
God as ‘compulsory’. This is, after all, no surprise. 
The second problem Cottingham identifies is that, if having a meaningful life is 
subject to luck, then the possibility of a meaningful life is not guaranteed. In these 
circumstances, life would be too ‘psychologically challenging’. We would be asking to 
people to embark on the difficult journey of life, while giving them little hope of 
success.  
I am not going to explore either of these claims in any detail. I have no problem 
accepting Cottingham’s claim that everyone ought to be capable of achieving a 
meaningful life (though it’s not clear that it is compulsory to think this). But the fact is, 
both the problems Cottingham identifies rely on the claim that the meaningfulness of 
our activities is inextricably linked to external success (claim (b)). Yet this is something 
that Cottingham himself goes on to deny. By page 83 of On the Meaning of Life, 
Cottingham starts to argue that religion teaches us that meaning isn’t inextricably linked 
to results and success (claim (b)).  
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Most forms of spirituality have in common that they aim to turn us away from 
typical preoccupations such as career, status and the accumulation of wealth, and 
prepare us instead to focus [on] our presence here at this moment.83 
 
Given the fact that the problems that Cottingham identifies are based on claim 
(b), it can start to look as though Cottingham has undermined the basis for his own 
argument. If it is, as a matter of fact, not true that the meaningfulness of life is 
inextricably linked with external success, we need not worry about the issues of the 
ethical repugnancy of luck, and the psychological despair this would imply. (After all, if 
meaning is not primarily based on external success, then there is little reason to see why 
there is any problem about luck and difficulty.) 
Perhaps then, we can set Cottingham’s argument out in a different form. Perhaps 
Cottingham’s argument is that only by adopting the religious perspective can we see 
that meaning is not success driven. (This is not what Cottingham specifically argues, but 
something like this seems to be implied by other things he says.) “Involved in [the 
religious] mindset is a turning away from evaluations based solely on external 
success.”84 
I intend to show that a non-religious account of meaning also reveals that 
meaning in life isn’t primarily focused on external success85, but rather on things that 
just about everyone is capable of achieving. If this turns out to be correct (if this 
becomes clear not only from a religious perspective, but also from a non-religious 
perspective) it is difficult to see how Cottingham’s argument presents any kind of 
challenge. 
 
 
iv. Cottingham’s argument from narrative structure 
 
Cottingham has another argument which attempts to show that religious 
narratives (religious accounts of the universe) are necessary if anything is to be 
genuinely meaningful. He defends this view in the following way. 
 
The religious perspective … offers the possibility of meaningfulness by 
providing a powerful normative framework or focus for the life of virtue.86 
 
Cottingham suggests that, without the normative ideals we can only get from 
religious narratives, all we would be left with would be ‘mere facts’ about the world and 
ourselves. In Cottingham’s view, ‘mere facts’ couldn’t provide the necessary normative 
bite. In order to explain this further, I need to say something about the link I will make 
between meaningfulness and narratives. In Chapter IV, I argued that when we talk about 
something being significant or meaningful, we mean that it has a place in a larger 
narrative (or context). We have seen how religious accounts of the universe are able to 
provide this kind of narrative. In the next chapter, I will look at what is involved in 
experiencing one’s own life as meaningful (issues to do with personal meaning). My 
account centres on the fact that, in order to experience one’s own life as meaningful, 
one needs to be able to place one’s life and actions in a certain context (have a broader 
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story to tell about your life and your actions). Up to a point, Cottingham seems to agree. 
“It is intolerable that life should consist merely of one darn thing after another.”87 
But, according to Cottingham, the ability to see one’s life in the context of a 
strong narrative one can tell about one’s own life is not enough to guarantee a truly 
meaningful life. In a footnote, when describing the relationship between meaning and 
narrative, Cottingham says: 
 
It has become fashionable to say that such intelligibility depends on our ability 
to construct a narrative account of our lives; yet since not just any narrative can 
command our allegiance as providing a meaningful story, the power of narrative 
seems dependent on prior notions of value and meaning, rather than being itself 
generative of those notions.88  
 
 As it happens, I will be also be arguing that (for reasons independent of religious 
narratives) not just any strong narrative will allow us to experience our life as 
meaningful. (This is one of the central topics of Chapter VI). I will also be providing 
‘prior notions of value and meaning’ in chapters VII and VIII.  
 
A worthwhile life will be one that possesses genuine value – value linked to our 
human nature and the pursuit of what is objectively conducive to the flowering 
of that nature.89  
 
 I will return to this quote in the conclusion. I believe I will be able to provide 
precisely what Cottingham requires by starting with the idea of narrative, and without 
making reference to any religious perspectives.  
 
 
v. Meaning without religion 
 
Cottingham is insistent that spiritual practices (which provide the necessary 
normative framework, and provide ways of seeing through the wish for external 
success) cannot be ‘reduced’ to non-religious practices or belief systems.  
 
the practices of spirituality generate a resonance, a depth of response, for which 
there is simply no analogue in the dry language of scientific rationalism or its 
associated systems of secular ethics.90 
 
human beings, in their vulnerability and finitude, need, in order to survive, 
modes of responding to the world which go beyond what is disclosed in a 
rational scientific analysis of the relevant phenomena.91 
 
In both of these quotes, Cottingham’s reference to ‘scientific rationalism’ or 
‘scientific analysis’ seems to come out of no-where. (Cottingham gives no justification 
for the claim that scientific analysis is the only alternative to the scientific perspective.) 
We have seen that the scientific perspective is not one that can reveal whether anything 
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matters. If the scientific perspective is the only alternative to religious accounts of the 
universe, Cottingham may be right that religious narratives are going to be the only way 
in which we can reveal that anything matters. But, in saying that the scientific 
perspective is the only alternative to the religious perspective, it appears that 
Cottingham is presenting us with a false dichotomy. Cottingham appears to say as much 
himself: 
 
the idea that [science] has robbed the world of its vitality and beauty, and left us 
with a dead and colourless universe, a collection of inert mechanical rubble, 
seems to be a glaring non sequitur. In our inventory of what the universe 
contains, why should we give special prominence to the rocks and stones? … 
our own nature must surely have at least some relevance to the question of the 
nature of that cosmos; and the evidence from the existence of human beings is 
that the cosmos is such as to produce beings who are eager for truth, receptive to 
beauty, and who find fulfilment in mutual affection and love.92  
 
It is my intention to put religion to one side for the rest of this thesis, and to 
focus on  examining whether there are things that genuinely matter given the nature of 
the world (and specifically given the nature of the human beings in this world). In doing 
so, I will not be focused on providing a rational scientific analysis. Rather, I will be 
talking about facts related to the nature of human existence (facts about - as Cottingham 
says - beings who find fulfilment in mutual affection etc.) I will be arguing that the 
world (seen independent of religious beliefs) need not be a meaningless place. After all, 
it contains us. I will argue that there are aspects of our existence that entitle us to say 
that there are some things that genuinely matter. While these are not ‘purely’ scientific 
facts, neither are these facts that incompatible with scientific inquiry. After all, there is a 
sense in which the scientific facts explain how we come to have the nature that we do. 
So, my account is not scientific, but neither is it in tension with any scientific evidence. 
My account is also not religious, but similarly, it is also not particularly in tension with 
any of the claims of religion. (It is based on facts about human existence that religious 
traditions do not deny.) 
 
 
vi. What will I need to show? 
 
 So, in what follows, I am going to explore whether a life can be said to be 
meaningful, and whether anything genuinely matters independent of issues concerning 
religious views and traditions. The discussion here has brought up three concerns, three 
issues that will need to be dealt with if this strategy is to be shown to be successful. 
Firstly, from Nozick’s argument, I will need to show that there are good (reasonable) 
places to stop in setting out why something matters, ones that are not ‘infinite’. This 
was, anyway, my central concern. If I can find reasonable answers to my curious friend, 
this will also show that Nozick’s view that only the ‘infinite’ can make things 
meaningful will also be shown to be unfounded. (This will be done in VII.2). Secondly, 
on the basis of my discussion of Cottingham’s argument from luck, I will need to show 
that there are reasons (independent of religious belief) to think that external success is 
not a necessary or central aspect of a meaningful life. If I can show this, then we needn’t 
worry about the problems of ethical repugnancy and difficulty. Finally, Cottingham’s 
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argument from narrative structure suggest that, in the context of issues around the 
meaning of life, I will need to show that my account of a meaningful life goes beyond 
the mere fact that there is a narrative that can be constructed around it. We need to show 
that there is a difference between good and bad narratives. I believe I will be able to 
show that I have achieved these things, independently of religious issues. (This will be 
done in Conclusion.4.viii). 
So, the rest of this thesis is then an attempt to look into whether anything 
matters, and whether life has a meaning independent of religious beliefs. This account 
will focus on facts about human existence. These facts (that we are self-conscious, that 
we have needs etc.) seem to be true, even if the conclusions of science are accepted. 
They also seem to be facts about human existence that are true regardless of whether 
there is a religious account of the meaning of life.  
 
 
5. The perspective of the individual 
 
In this section, I want to discuss the fact that human beings are able to take up a 
perspective on the world and themselves. This will lead me to defend the idea that it is 
right to think of human beings as (potential) sources of meaning and significance. This 
is because human beings are forms of (self) awareness that do (except in exceptional 
circumstances) take a perspective on the world. In light of the discussion about what 
makes something significant (see IV.2.ii) the perspective of the individual is the kind of 
perspective that can generate meaning.  
I argued in Chapter IV that the objective perspective was not one that could 
reveal the world as meaningful (see IV.2.iii). By contrast, religious accounts of the 
meaning of life provide the kinds of perspective that can reveal things that genuinely 
matter (in virtue of its relationship to a religious narrative). But, I am assuming that 
there are insurmountable difficulties in using religious accounts of the meaning of life 
as a way of answering my curious friend’s questions (Given the fact that we cannot 
provide conclusive defences of such universe-wide narratives). In this chapter, we 
haven’t yet seen any conclusive reasons for thinking that there must be a religious 
account of the universe if anything is to genuinely matter. So, my attempt to justify the 
claim that some things genuinely matter will be done without making reference to 
objective perspectives on the world (e.g. science) or to religious accounts of the 
meaning of life. 
There are probably countless different perspectives we can take on the world, 
and on our own actions and choices etc. We can ‘reveal’ the significance of events in 
the world by adopting the perspective of a nation, a particular group (e.g. political 
party), the perspective of a family, a particular individual, the human race etc. There 
seem to be good reasons for thinking that things mattering in the human world (to 
nations, to the species etc.) can be traced back to the fact that it matters to individuals 
(from their perspective). It seems difficult to see how you could say something was 
significant for the English nation, if you were unable to show how it was significant for 
at least some English people. So, it seems right to say that something can only be said to 
matter in the human world (to a nation, to the species) if it matters to some individual 
human beings. 
In the rest of this thesis, I am going to focus on the way in which the relative 
importance of events in the world is understood is by reference to what matters to a 
particular individual (from their own perspective.) In chapter VIII, I argue that human 
existence is not primarily individualistic. So, in starting from the perspective of the 
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individual, I do not mean to suggest some kind of stark individualism. I simply want to 
assess whether, using the individual perspective as our starting point, we can reveal 
things that genuinely matter. 
The perspective of the individual meets the requirements necessary to be a 
potential source of significance. Human beings have awareness. (So, they have a 
perspective on the world.) We are also (to varying degrees) self-aware. From our 
perspective (in the light of our plans, projects, values and ultimate concerns) we 
experience connections between events, we experience some events as more significant 
than others etc. It is a fact about us that we experience events in the world, and our own 
lives as having significance (in the light of certain kinds of narratives I will discuss in 
the next chapter).  
As it stands, though, the claim is merely that human beings have the potential to 
experience meaning. This claim is compatible with the thought that some people 
experience little meaning or significance in the world or their life (see II.3). Also, by 
itself, the fact that human beings experience things as significant doesn’t provide a way 
of answering my central question. The question I am really concerned with is not 
whether human beings are capable of experiencing meaning, but whether human beings 
can, on occasions, be right in thinking that something genuinely matters. As will 
become clear, there is a threat of arbitrariness (one we have come across before) if we 
adopt the perspective of the individual. 
 
 
6. The threat of arbitrariness 
 
We seem to have had a very long discussion simply to reach a conclusion I 
argued for in Chapter II, that human beings are unavoidably serious - people think some 
things matter. As I discussed in Chapter II, if things mattered solely in virtue of the fact 
that we happen to think they matter, we might have to accept that nothing genuinely 
matters (see II.6). To see this, think of my curious friend’s questions. If things matter to 
us simply in virtue of the fact that we think they matter to us then we can be assured that 
we are not making a mistake when answering my curious friend’s question. After all, all 
answers to my curious friend’s question will be justified (as long as we genuinely act as 
though they matter). But, this would suggest that it is irrelevant what we choose to think 
matters (as any answer is as good as any other). If all answers to my curious friend’s 
questions are equally right, then there can be nothing to choose between them. There 
can be no such thing as a correct (as opposed to false) view about what matters. If all 
answers are equally good, then there can be no rational consideration to help us decide 
between things that genuinely do and genuinely don’t matter. (As long as you happen to 
think something matters, then it just does. Nothing more can be said about it.) If this is 
the case, Cottingham will have been shown to be correct when he said that, without 
religious beliefs, our decisions about what matter will lack any necessary normative 
bite. Also, Nagel will have been proved right when he said that “all the contingency and 
specificity of our aims and pursuits become clear … when we take this view [we] 
recognise what we do as arbitrary.”93  
                                                 
93 Nagel, T. (1979) Mortal Questions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge p. 15. Nagel puts this 
point another way when he says “what seems to us important or serious or valuable would not seem so if 
we were differently constituted.”(Ibid, 18) This way of putting things is not nearly as threatening. Given 
this account, there may be things that are genuinely important, serious and valuable given the way we are 
constituted. I will return to this at the end of this chapter. 
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 On the other hand, if there is a contrast to draw between what really matters and 
what we mistakenly thinks matters (if we can show that some answers to my curious 
friend’s question are better than others) then it looks as though my curious friend’s next 
question is will be well motivated. My curious friend will be entitled to ask how we 
know that the thing we think matters is one of those things that genuinely matter, rather 
than one of those that doesn’t. If we are at a loss to answer my curious friend, this may 
show that we don’t know the difference between something that really matters, and 
something we only think matters. So, it looks as though we are under some kind of 
obligation to answer my curious friend’s question about why something matters, as we 
will need to show that the thing we think matters is one of those things that really 
matters, rather than one of those cases that only seem to matter. Only if we can provide 
an adequate answer to my curious friend, we can be assured that we are not making a 
mistake. If we want to argue that our claims about what matters are not arbitrary (they 
have some basis in reality) we, at the very least, need to show that some answers to my 
curious friend’s question are better than others (and perhaps show how we can tell the 
things that really matter from those that don’t). This will be done in Chapter VII. Before 
doing this, in the next chapter I want to explore what it is possible to say about the 
meaning of life from the perspective of the individual, independent of religious beliefs.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In section 3, I argued that, if we are looking for definitive proof of the ultimate 
causes of things, neither religious belief nor scientific method seems to be able to give 
satisfactory answers. Religious belief doesn’t seem susceptible to ‘intellectual proof’. 
Science does provide intellectual proofs for its claims about the causes of things, but it 
is not clear that it is a method that can be used to discover the ultimate cause of 
everything. It is (very rarely) focused on discovering the ultimate causes of things.  
I then looked at whether there was any reason to think that there is anything 
provided by God, or religious belief that is necessary if anything is to genuinely matter. 
What became clear is that, any account which attempts to describe those things that are 
genuinely meaningful, independent of religious belief, faces a number of challenges. 
Firstly, it needs to show how there can be good justifications for thinking something 
genuinely matters (places other than infinitude). Secondly, it needs to show, 
independently of religious belief, that we have reasons for thinking that meaning is not 
primarily about success, but is in fact something that just about everyone is capable of 
achieving.  
The third challenge will be a central concern in the next chapter. In the next 
chapter, I will describe the way in which, in order to experience one’s own life as 
meaningful, one needs to be able to place one’s life and actions in a certain context 
(have a broader story to tell about your life and your actions). I will argue that this 
involves having a narrative (a story to tell about your life) that relates your life and your 
actions to the things you care about most (what I will be calling your ultimate 
concerns). 
Cottingham argued that, unless we have the kind of meaning provided by a 
religious narrative, we would simply be left with the ‘mere’ facts about our existence. 
Such an account would be unable to provide the normative bite that only religious 
accounts of the universe can provide. Because of this, independently of religious beliefs, 
there could be no such thing as better or worse narratives. Any narrative will be as good 
as any other (so there is a genuine threat of arbitrariness). 
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There will be two questions I will be tackling in the next chapter. I will be 
asking whether we can justify claiming that the things we care about most (our ultimate 
concerns) genuinely matter. In the end, I will argue that the mere fact that something is 
your ultimate concern, doesn’t guarantee that those ultimate concerns genuinely matter. 
So, this chapter doesn’t allow me to answer my central question. The second question 
turns out to be more fruitful. I will be asking whether our ultimate concerns are 
arbitrary. Through assessing whether all ultimate concerns are equally good, I will find 
that there are good reasons for thinking that our ultimate concerns should not be 
selected on an arbitrary basis. This is because (for us) some ultimate concerns are 
definitely better than others in delivering the sense that our lives are meaningful. This is 
an important conclusion, given the fact that, in Chapter VII Part 2, whether or not our 
ultimate concerns are effective in delivering a meaningful life is one of the things that 
genuinely matter to us. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
ARE OUR ULTIMATE CONCERNS ARBITRARY? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last chapter, I made the decision to focus on the perspective of the 
individual. In the next chapter, I will be arguing that, from this perspective, some things 
genuinely matter. Before doing this, I want to take the opportunity to assess whether, 
from the perspective of the individual, life can be said to have a meaning. 
I will do this through assessing one potential answer to my curious friend in 
detail. The potential answer I am interested in is when we answer my curious friend by 
saying that something matters because it is the thing I care most about, it is my ultimate 
concern. For example, I might say that my family is the most important thing to me. I 
will discuss how our ultimate concerns might help us to experience our life as 
meaningful.  
It becomes clear that attempts to claim that our ultimate concerns genuinely 
matter face the charge of arbitrariness I described in V.6. I attempt to show that our 
ultimate concerns are not arbitrary, by arguing that we can make mistakes concerning 
our ultimate concerns. In Chapter VII. Part 2, I will argue that it genuinely matters to us 
that our ultimate concerns are effective in enabling us to experience our lives as 
meaningful. I will describe the way in which we can mistakenly believe that our 
ultimate concerns are effective. I will also describe the fact that some ultimate concerns 
couldn’t effectively provide the sense that our lives are meaningful (and so choosing 
such ultimate concerns would be a mistake). Through this discussion, it should become 
clear that our ultimate concerns are far from arbitrary.  
At the start of Chapter V, I described two ways in which we might ask whether 
life has a meaning. We can ask the question about all life. Asked in this way, we are 
asking whether there is something that all (human) life shares that makes all (human) 
life significant. In other words, we can ask whether life has a universal meaning. The 
last chapter was focused on assessing the kinds of narratives that provide universal 
meaning; religious accounts of the meaning of life.  
At the end of the last chapter, I put religious accounts of the universe (and issues 
to do with universal meaning) to one side, and decided to focus on the perspective of the 
individual human being. When it comes to questions concerning the meaning of life, 
focusing on the individual means switching the discussion to the issue of personal 
meaning. In particular, this means being interested in what is involved in a particular 
person experiencing their own life as meaningful.  
 
 
2. Personal meaning 
 
In this section, I want to outline what it means to experience one’s own life as 
meaningful (significant, valuable, worthwhile, important etc.) It will perhaps be better 
to start with a contrast. What does it mean to experience one’s life as lacking any 
meaning? It is possible (e.g. in cases of depression) to experience one’s life as simply a 
series of disconnected (random) events. In other words, the events in your life do not 
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hang together in any meaningful sense. As Cottingham says, “It is intolerable that life 
should consist merely of one darn thing after another.”94 
Note how this relates to the discussion of significance in IV.2.ii. There, I argued 
that things gain meaning or significance by being placed in a context. So, when a 
person’s life lacks personal meaning, we might say that they lack any broader context 
(or narrative) through which the individual events in their life are revealed as 
significant. They fail to have any broader story to tell about their life that connects up 
the different events in their life, and lends it a sense of coherence. By contrast, think of 
someone who is able to put their life and their actions in some broader context. The fact 
that they have some broader story to tell about how the disparate events in their life are 
connected will prevent their life being experienced as a series of unconnected, random 
events and experiences. 
There is much more to be said about what is involved in experiencing your own 
life as meaningful. We might think that we not just are looking for ‘any old’ story.  
Rather, we are looking for a narrative which also reveals the world we live in as 
meaningful, which identifies purposes worth living for, and which gives us reasons for 
thinking that our life makes as positive difference.  
So, we might hope that the story we have to tell about our life helps us 
experience the world as containing things of real significance and importance to us 
(perhaps the story gives us a real sense of what is genuinely important). Because our life 
and the world is experienced as significant, this motivates us to act in the world. Finally, 
it seems right to say that a central aspect of experiencing you life as meaningful 
involves having a sense that, through your actions, you are capable of making a 
difference to something you think important (you do not just make a difference, but that 
you make a valuable, significant difference.)   
 
 
3. Religious beliefs as a source of personal meaning 
 
In the last chapter, I made the decision to put religious accounts of the meaning 
of life to one side. Before finally doing this, I just want to describe the way in which 
religious beliefs can be the source of someone’s personal meaning. Many people 
experience their life as having a personal meaning (they experience their own life as 
meaningful) on the basis of their belief in a religious narrative. For example, someone 
might understand the world in the context of the stories told in the Bible. This broader 
story might allow them to experience their own life, and the world as meaningful 
(insofar as they are created by God).  
So, someone’s religious beliefs can help them make sense of their life and the 
world. In virtue of this story (the religious narrative) the world contains things of 
significance and importance (to God, and so to them). It may provide them with a sense 
that their actions are significant. For example, someone might think that a sin genuinely 
matters. And they would say that is not just significant in virtue of the fact that they 
happen to think it significant. They think it is really significant, in virtue of their beliefs 
about their relationship to God. 
Having a life that you experience as meaningful means more than this. In 
particular, we might think that it involves some sense that you think that your life and 
your actions are significant and important. It is not at all clear that the mere fact that you 
sincerely believe in a religious account of the universe will always lead to experiencing 
                                                 
94 Cottingham, J. (2003) On The Meaning of Life Routledge: Oxon p. 32 
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your own life as significant in this sense. Still, regardless of anything else, it might be 
thought that a person’s religious narrative might give them a sense that each living thing 
(including themselves) is always significant, in virtue of its relationship to God. 
 As I said in the last chapter, I want to put religious answers to the meaning of 
life to one side. In what follows, I am interested in exploring whether there are ways in 
which we can experience our lives as meaningful that are totally independent of 
religious belief. In order to do this, I want to talk about the things that matter most to 
people (what I call our ‘ultimate concerns.’) 
 
 
4. Ultimate Concerns 
 
In the next section, I will be arguing that life can be personally meaningful for 
someone, even if they don’t have any religious beliefs. In order to do this, I first want to 
introduce the idea of ‘ultimate concerns’ (the things that matter most to people). In 
order to see how the things we care most about might provide us with a sense that our 
life is meaningful, here is a description of what I will be calling ‘ultimate concerns’ 
from Richard Norman: 
 
What can make a human life into a coherent unity? It may be, perhaps, that 
one’s life is given a shape by some dominating aim and object. This may be an 
involvement in a certain kind of work; or a commitment to a religious or 
political ideal; or the focus of one’s life may be some relationship or set of 
relationships with other people, family relationships perhaps, or sexual 
relationships. To give unity to one’s life, such a dominating concern will not be 
all-embracing, but it may be the centre around which everything else organises 
itself, so that one may be able to say of it, ‘This is what ultimately matters to 
me’, and other independent interests may be integrated into one’s life by being 
brought into relation to this central concern.95 
 
I want to start by setting out a few examples of the kind of things that might 
function as an ultimate concern. (This is not supposed to be an exhaustive list). The first 
set of ultimate concerns could be loosely described as making other people your 
ultimate concern. For example, in Chapter III (Section 9: Work with worthwhile goals) I 
discussed the ways in which people may devote themselves (in a way that suggests that 
it is of ultimate concern to them) to the health or interests of other people. We could 
include in this group people who live by political ideals, teachers, health workers, aid 
workers etc. 
Of course, one’s concern for others need not be ‘professional’. In a later chapter, 
I will be discussing the value of relationships. (Chapter VIII) If asked what their 
ultimate concern was, many people would mention a particular relationship, or set of 
relationships. They might talk about their partner and children as the most important 
thing in their life. They might describe how they work long hours at work to provide for 
them etc. 
One’s ultimate concerns need not relate directly to other people. For example, 
someone might make activities such as painting, craftsmanship and film making etc. the 
central concern of their life (see the discussion of creative activities – play – in Chapter 
III). You might give this a central place because of your love of the activity, out of a 
                                                 
95 Norman, Richard (1983) The Moral Philosophers Clarendon Press: Oxford p. 165 
 77
passion or need to express yourself, or out of a love for what you produce through this 
activity.  
Or, someone can make their own self-interest their central concern. They might 
fundamentally be concerned with gaining things for themselves, or they may just be 
motivated to pursue their own happiness (the difference between these two things will 
be discussed in VII.10). 
By talking of someone’s ultimate concern, I don’t wish to suggest that it is only 
thing that matters to them. For example, someone who (ultimately) cares about their 
family will also be likely to care about their career. But they may (in part) care about 
their career because it contributes to the interests of their family. So it is not that 
someone with an ultimate concern will only care about one thing. Rather, they will care 
about any number of the things that are significant for their ultimate concerns. I will 
often talk as though people always have one single ultimate concern. But, I don’t mean 
to imply that someone cannot have more than one ultimate concern. (After all, people 
do find themselves faced with dilemmas.) It is possible that a particular activity (e.g. 
painting) and a set of relationships (with your family) are both of ultimate concern to 
you. (In dilemmas, your priorities may be tested). 96 
 
 
5. How ultimate concerns can provide personal meaning 
 
In this section, I want to look at the way in which having a strong ultimate 
concern can help make your life personally meaningful. Firstly, having an ultimate 
concern can provide you with a coherent story to tell about all the different aspects of 
your life. This can help you see how the disparate events of your life can ‘hang 
together’ in virtue of their relationship to the things you care most about. In this way, 
our ultimate concerns can help us make sense of our lives. 
 In virtue of our ultimate concerns you will experience a world that contains 
things of importance or significance to you. For example, if your family is your ultimate 
concern, the needs, health and happiness of the members of your family will be 
experienced as important and significant. So, having an ultimate concern can help you 
highlight those things that are of real significance to you.  
Because the world contains things of importance to you (things matter to you in 
the light of your ultimate concerns) you will be motivated to act. As I said, if your 
family is your ultimate concern, then the interests of your family members will be of 
real significance to you. And, if you really do care about your family members, you will 
be motivated to act in caring ways towards them. 
Imagine you are motivated to act by (say) the love of your family, to act in such 
a way as to make a positive difference to their lives. Given the fact that your family is 
something your care deeply about, you will have the sense that you make a positive 
difference to something that you consider valuable. The sense that you make a 
difference or have an impact on the world (in particular, an impact on things in the 
world you value) is certainly one thing we might be looking for in a meaningful life. 
                                                 
96 I have not attempted to explore the complexities of all this. For example, for the last six months, I have 
made finishing my PhD my ultimate concern (working on my PhD outweighed other things I think of as 
genuinely important to me – e.g. my family). I am happy to make this my ultimate concern in the short 
term, but would not want to always prioritise philosophy over my family for my whole life. In what 
follows, I often talk as though people simply have one ultimate concern. This is a simplification, but it 
does allow me to have a shorthand way of talking of the things that matter most to people. 
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 All of this suggests that, through centring our lives on certain ultimate concerns, 
we are able to experience our life as meaningful. Our lives can be seen, not as a series 
of disconnected events, but as a coherent whole that we can make sense of. In virtue of 
our ultimate concerns, certain aspects of our lives and the world will come to be seen as 
significant. Because we experience the world as significant, we will care about those 
aspects of the world and our life. If we care about them enough, we will be motivated to 
act (in accordance with our ultimate concern). Through our actions, we will be able to 
make a significant difference to something that we think of as valuable (our ultimate 
concerns). So, we will have a sense that we make a valuable, positive difference. 
It seems that, the stronger someone’s commitment to an ultimate concern, the 
more things will matter to them, and the more they will be motivated to act. This 
suggests that if we ask whether a particular person’s life is meaningful (in the personal 
sense) we are not necessarily looking for a simple yes or no. After all, “there is … 
nothing odd in saying about a man who has made a partial recovery from a deep 
depression that there is now again ‘some’ meaning in his life.”97 The question then is 
not so much whether someone has a life that they experience as meaningful, but how 
meaningful they experience their life as being. Whether or not someone experiences 
their life as meaningful is something that needs to be assessed on a case by case basis. 
There is no general conclusion we can reach about whether people in general experience 
their life as meaningful. 
 
 
6. Ultimate concerns and my curious friend 
 
In the last section, I have discussed the way in which centring your life around 
an ultimate concern can help you experience your own life as meaningful. In this 
section, I want to assess whether our ultimate concerns might help us answer my 
curious friend’s challenge. Imagine I tell my curious friend that I am going to help my 
mother. My curious friend might ask me why helping my mother matters. I might reply 
that my family is my ultimate concern (it is the thing I care most about). Because of 
this, the needs of my mother matter. So, if my curious friend asks ‘why does your 
family matter?’ I can say that this is the most important thing in my life. It is the centre 
of my life. It is the thing that matters most to me in the world. In this sense then, 
answering my curious friend’s question with my ultimate concern, appears to make my 
view that something really does matter to me entirely reasonable. 
Still, my curious friend might question whether I have any good reasons for 
making my family my ultimate concern. After all, if my decision to make something our 
ultimate concern is itself arbitrary (if I am unable to justify making something my 
ultimate concern) then citing the fact that something is my ultimate concern won’t 
provide a satisfying answer to my curious friend’s questions.  
In Chapter VI (see V.6) I argued that if things only mattered in virtue of the fact 
that we think they matter, we would have to concede that it is arbitrary what we choose 
to think matters. This same threat of arbitrariness also seems to apply to ultimate 
concerns. So, we cannot claim that something matters simply in virtue of the fact that it 
is someone’s ultimate concern. If this is the case, then it looks like it is not possible to 
make a mistake about our ultimate concerns. This implies that there are no rational 
constraints on someone’s ultimate concern. So, someone may as well pick anything at 
                                                 
97 Edwards, P. (2000) ‘The Meaning and Value of Life’. From Klembe (ed.) The Meaning of Life. Oxford 
University Press: Oxford p. 144 
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all. It doesn’t matter whether we choose to think that our family, or counting blades of 
grass is our ultimate concern. Simply by making it our ultimate concern, we would be 
sure that it matters. But, this suggests that our ultimate concerns (what matters most to 
us) will not be open to rational assessment in any way. In the rest of this chapter, I will 
be attempting to show that we can make mistakes about our ultimate concerns. I will 
also attempt to show that some ultimate concerns are better than others. 
Even if I show this (if there are rational considerations we can use to distinguish 
a good from a bad ultimate concern) I will still face the questioning of my curious 
friend. After all, if it is possible to make mistakes about our ultimate concerns, it seems 
I will owe my curious friend some guarantee that the ultimate concern I have chosen is 
not a mistake.  
 
 
7. Are mistakes about ultimate concerns possible? 
 
In this section I want to set out a couple of ways in which we might talk about 
someone making a mistake about their ultimate concerns. As will become clear, there 
can be significant differences between different ultimate concerns. We can talk about 
ultimate concerns being more or less effective. I will argue (see VII. Part 2) that it 
genuinely matters to us that our ultimate concerns are effective. If this is the case, then 
it genuinely matters that we choose ultimate concerns that are likely to be effective in 
delivering a sense that our lives are meaningful. In this section, I want to show that it is 
possible to make mistakes about our ultimate concerns. If I can show this, it will 
demonstrate that our ultimate concerns are not arbitrary. I will also say something about 
how we might assess whether an ultimate concern really is effective. This will allow me 
to set out the kinds of mistakes we can make about our ultimate concerns. 
 
 
i. Making a mistake ‘by your own lights’  
 
Imagine that (up until last year) believed that my career was all that mattered to 
me. This year, I realise that this was a mistake. Perhaps my view now is that I was 
wrong to give my job the centrality in my life that I did. As a result, I now regret 
making it my priority to be the first employee at work and the last one to leave. I have 
realised that this emphasis prevented me from gaining things that I now understand to 
be very important to me (e.g. giving time, energy and attention to my friends and 
family). In this sense, there seems to be nothing wrong with thoughts such as; ‘I thought 
it mattered to me, but I now believe that was a mistake’98.  
Imagine someone who wants to deny that mistakes are possible. They might say 
that, even in examples where we have come to believe from our own perspective that 
we have made a mistake, there is still a sense in which mistakes about what matters are 
impossible. After all, even if I come to realise that my career no longer matters, I would 
still accept that at the time it really did matter to me (after all, this is what explains the 
fact that I worked such long hours, consistently took my work home with me etc.) It can 
start to look as though we cannot be mistaken about what matters to us.  
                                                 
98 Of course, it is possible to change your ideas about what ultimately matters to you without thinking that 
your earlier view was mistaken. Someone might think that it was not a mistake to make his career the 
centre of his life, while they were single, even though, now they have a partner and child, they have 
become his ultimate concern. 
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By itself, the fact that we cannot be mistaken at the time doesn’t imply that 
mistakes about ultimate concerns are impossible. Compare the way in which, in one 
sense, it is impossible to be mistaken about what you think at a particular time. If you 
really do think that Belfast is the capital of the Republic of Ireland at a particular time, 
then you cannot be mistaken about this. This really is what you think. Of course, there is 
another sense in which you can be mistaken in thinking Belfast is the capital of the 
Republic of Ireland. By the same token, the mere fact that you cannot be mistaken about 
the fact that something matters to you at a particular time doesn’t (by itself) imply that 
there cannot be another sense in which we can be mistaken about what matters. This 
suggests that it may still be possible to think that, in our own view, we have made a 
mistake. 
 
 
 ii. Assessing ultimate concerns 
 
I introduced ultimate concerns in the context of a discussion of the meaning of 
life. The thought was that, in virtue of the fact that someone could centre their life 
around an ultimate concern, they could experience the world and their own life as 
meaningful. In section 3, I described how ultimate concerns can help us experience our 
life as meaningful. Perhaps this description can provide a way in which the 
effectiveness of our ultimate concerns could be assessed. We can ask whether a 
particular ultimate concern is effective in providing someone with a sense that their life 
has some kind of coherence. We can ask whether they provide the person with a sense 
that the world contains things of real significance and importance. We can ask whether 
their ultimate concerns motivate them. We can ask whether they provide the person with 
a sense that their life and their actions have some kind of significant, valuable impact.  
Apart, perhaps, from the issue of motivation (which I will return to in iii.) it 
seems that we assess whether someone’s ultimate concerns are effective by looking at 
how that person feels about their own life. In the example (in i.) where I came to believe 
that I had made a mistake in making my career my ultimate concern, the fact that I no 
longer thought that my career was most important to thing to me centred on the fact that 
I didn’t find myself satisfied by a life that had my career as my ultimate concern. I 
realised that it failed to deliver the sense that my life was meaningful. In this sense, 
Broadly speaking, we might say that, when ultimate concerns work effectively, they 
deliver the sense that a person is satisfied with their life, and how it hangs together. 
There is more to say about how we might assess the effectiveness of ultimate concerns. 
I will do this after assessing whether it is possible to make mistakes about whether we 
are satisfied with our life (see iv.)  
Before doing this, I want to look at the issue of motivation. One of the things we 
might hope for in a meaningful life is that we are motivated to act in the world because 
our ultimate concerns are so important to us. It looks as though this could provide a way 
of assessing the effectiveness of someone’s ultimate concerns that doesn’t just depend 
on ‘how they feel’ about their life. 
 
 
iii. Having ultimate concerns and actions that are inconsistent   
 
I want to look at another kind of mistake we might make concerning what 
matters most to us. Imagine someone who, when asked (or whenever they think 
about it to themselves) says that there is something that is of ultimate importance 
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to them. If they are never motivated to act in the light of this ultimate concern, we 
would be tempted to say that they are making a mistake about their ultimate 
concerns. For example, imagine they always say that the environment is the most 
important thing to them. If they also happen to drive a high polluting car and 
never make an effort to recycle etc. we seem to have grounds for saying that they 
have made a mistake about their ultimate concerns. If having a fast car is more 
important to them than the environmental impact of their car, then the 
environment simply cannot be the most important thing to them (despite what they 
say or think). 
 We discussed this issue when discussing the unavoidability of seriousness (see 
II.3). There I argued that what matters to someone is primarily shown through how they 
act99. So, if they are constantly given the opportunity to act in accordance with their 
(supposed) ultimate concern, but consistently put other things above it, I think we have 
good reasons for saying that they are making a mistake in their claims about what 
ultimately matters to them.  
 I myself have made this kind of mistake. I first went to university to do a degree 
in physics. I (sincerely) believed that I wanted to do a degree in physics. But, I was 
asked to leave the course before the end of the first term for lack of attendance and lack 
of effort. It is now clear to me that I never really wanted to study physics. I was quite 
weak willed and wasn’t particularly self-aware (both of these will be discussed below) 
and I think I just accepted other people’s views (particularly my father’s) that I should 
want to do a physics degree. My failure to apply myself to my studies taught me that 
physics was not that important to me. In this sense, we seem clearly able to say that I 
made a mistake. My mistake was in thinking that something mattered to me, when it 
didn’t actually matter to me. 
 One response to this could be to say that we ought to retain the idea that I was 
right to think that physics really did matter to me, but I was just weak willed (and that 
explains why I didn’t put the work in). I don’t want to deny the reality of weakness of 
will, but in this context, we might ask why I was weak willed. My sense is that what 
explains my weakness of will (in the context of physics) was the fact that I had no 
passionate connection to physics. This would also explain why, when I started studying 
philosophy four years later, I had absolutely no problem applying myself. 
 Of course, it is possible in some cases for someone’s lack of action to be 
explained by the fact that they lack the capacity to do things. For example, someone 
may, because of ill health, be unable to put large amounts of energy into the things they 
value. In such cases, we seem to be talking about a general weakness that the person 
suffers (not just weakness of will).  
Compare this with the case of someone who says that their ultimate concern is 
their family, but who always put watching Manchester United on TV above their 
family. If we take their actions at face value, we would have to say that they act as 
though watching football is more important to them than their family. (After all, when 
they are forced to choose between the two, they always put watching football first). In 
such circumstances it will not be enough to simply state that they actual care for their 
family more, but are weak willed. We would need some explanation of why their 
actions are out of step with their actual values. Otherwise, talking about weakness of 
will in this context will just look like a poor excuse.  
                                                 
99 We might add that this is true given certain constraints. They have to be capable of acting in such a way 
and are given the opportunity to act in this way. 
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This discussion suggests that, if someone’s sincere beliefs about their values are 
(to a large degree) inconsistent with their actions, we will have grounds for saying that 
they are making a mistake concerning the nature of their ultimate concerns.  
 
 
iv. Self-awareness 
 
In (ii.) I argued that how the individual feels about their life is the main criteria 
we have for whether their ultimate concerns are effective. If it is thought that it is 
impossible to be mistaken about how you feel, when someone (sincerely) says that they 
are satisfied with their life we would have to accept that it is impossible for them to be 
mistaken. 
The idea that someone could make a mistake about how they feel may look 
counter-intuitive. In philosophical terms, self-awareness is often thought of as 
unproblematic. After all, we do have a privileged form of access to the events in our 
own mind (so the story goes, from Descartes100 to Sartre). Perhaps, if we are just 
thinking about our immediate sensations and our immediate thoughts, it might be right 
to say that we have a privileged first person perspective on these things. But, I would 
argue, when it comes to our deepest desires and needs, our over-all level of happiness 
etc. there is no reason to think that the person themselves is always in the best position 
to judge these things.  
Imagine you know someone well. Perhaps, if they are particularly lacking in 
self-awareness or prone to denial, you may know them better than they know 
themselves. Think of someone like this, who says (apparently sincerely) that they are 
fully satisfied with their life (even though they seem unhappy and lack any motivation). 
In such circumstances, you may get a clear sense that (underneath the bravado) they are 
actually dissatisfied with their life. You might clearly see that they are not motivated by 
their ultimate concerns (the things they say matter most to them). In these circumstances 
(where the issue revolves around problems with their self-awareness) there do seem to 
be grounds for denying their sincere views about how satisfied they are with their lives. 
In other words, we can be right to say that they are making a mistake about the 
effectiveness of their ultimate concerns. 
 I want to discuss another example in order to show that self-awareness is not 
always a simple given. Think of the way in which it can take time for the fact that a 
relationship or an activity has become of central importance to your life to become clear 
to you (it might slowly dawn on you that someone has become the love of your life etc.) 
Similarly, think of the way it can take time to discover that you have fallen out of love 
with a person or activity. This suggests that understanding your deepest desires is not 
something that features in your experience in an immediate, clear way. We might say 
that self-awareness requires paying attention to ourselves (and, perhaps, skill and 
patience). Because of this, there is no reason to think that self-awareness is a given (or 
indeed easy). 
 Of course, this is not to deny that (given a reasonable level of self-awareness) 
the individual is the final judge of whether they are satisfied with their life. But, if there 
are grounds for thinking that someone lacks an understanding of their true feelings, it 
may be appropriate to talk of them making mistakes about their ultimate concerns. 
 
                                                 
100 I’ve always found it useful to read Descartes as showing that it doesn’t matter how hard you think 
about things (in your own head – in isolation from others) if you don’t have the help of other people, you 
won’t even be able to tell whether what you are seeing is real or merely an hallucination. 
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v. Denial 
 
Denial is one of the ways in which we can (actively) avoid self-awareness. 
Broadly speaking, I am talking about the inability or unwillingness to confront certain 
aspects of your life. This implies that you are going out of you way to avoid full 
awareness of yourself and your actual situation. In this sense, there is a clear link 
between denial and a lack of self-awareness. 
 As with a lack of self-awareness, denial can also lead someone to choose 
ultimate concerns that are not sensitive to their actual situation. For example, imagine a 
man who makes his relationship with his wife his ultimate concern. For some reason, 
his wife falls out of love with him, and she comes to think that she no longer want to be 
with him. (She leaves their home, making it clear that she is never coming back.) 
Despite this, he continues to make this relationship with his partner the centre of his life. 
(He might rationalise this by saying that, despite everything she has said and done, she 
still loves him, and will be back). We might say that such a man has ignored the clear 
evidence that his relationship with his (ex-) partner would be an inappropriate ultimate 
concern. Given the fact that he no longer sees her, he will be unable to have a 
significant effect on the thing he most values. In fact, it is difficult to see how devoting 
yourself to someone who doesn’t want anything to do with you could lead to any kind 
of lasting satisfaction.  
 It may look as though there are principled difficulties in explaining how denial is 
possible (as it seems to suggest that we both know and don’t know something at the 
same time). In the last section, I argued that understanding our true feelings about things 
requires attention. Insofar as someone is able to avoid giving attention to their situation 
and their feelings about it, we can at least understand how someone can retain views 
about themselves and their situation that are (to everyone else) clearly false. Perhaps 
denial can in part be accomplished through the attempt to constantly distract themselves 
from their situation, or the attempt to only think about those aspects of themselves and 
their situation that fit their ‘preferred’ worldview.  
Insofar as we think of them attempting to evade the truth of their situation, we 
have to assume that (on some level) they are aware of the truth. Yet, if denial is to be 
even moderately successful, there must also be a sense in which they are (on another 
level) unaware of the truth. What should be clear is that people in denial will fail to be 
(or stronger, will going out of their way to avoid being) fully self-aware. Perhaps people 
can have such a low level of self-awareness, that they are capable of sustaining 
contradictory beliefs. (This explanation of denial is just a sketch. I simply haven’t got 
the space to develop this in any detail). 
 What we can say is that, if someone is unsatisfied with their life, but in denial 
about this, it seems appropriate to say (despite their sincere claim that they are satisfied) 
that they are making a mistake concerning the effectiveness of their ultimate concerns. 
 
 
vi. Lack of awareness 
 
It is possible to have examples of mistakes concerning your ultimate concerns 
that do not arise from denial, but simply from a lack of knowledge. For example, 
imagine someone who comes to university to study philosophy, in the belief that a life 
centred around philosophy would be a satisfying one for them. They may have made a 
mistake about what exactly studying philosophy involves (perhaps they made their 
decision on the basis of reading ‘Nausea’ and a bit of Nietzsche). We might say that 
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when they made the decision to make philosophy their ultimate concern, they were not 
aware of all the relevant facts. Even if they are aware of what academic philosophy 
involves, it may take some time for them to realise that they have no real aptitude for 
philosophy (or they get no real pleasure from it). In such circumstances, we might say 
that (through a lack of awareness) they have chosen an ultimate concern that isn’t 
effective. 
 To make it clear, this kind of lack of awareness is not (necessarily) a form of 
denial. Denial would be where, perhaps because someone have invested so much in the 
thought that philosophy will make them happy, that they might avoid facing the fact that 
they are not satisfied by a life with philosophy as their ultimate concern. This would be 
a mistake. 
 
 
vii. The criteria of an effective ultimate concern 
 
 I have been discussing a number of ‘mistakes’ that someone can make 
concerning their ultimate concerns. This discussion suggests that we should amend the 
criteria of whether our ultimate concerns are genuinely effective put forward above (in 
ii.) I will be assuming that, whether someone is satisfied with their life is the criteria of 
whether an ultimate concern is effective. But, we should add that this is true only if their 
actions are consistently in accord with their ultimate concerns (they are motivated by 
their ultimate concerns – see iii.) and they have an adequate awareness of themselves 
(see iv. and v.) and their situation (see vi.) This, I would argue, is the mark of whether 
an ultimate concern is effective at delivering a satisfying life for someone.101 
 
 
8. Ultimate concerns that look badly mistaken 
 
In this section, I want to introduce three examples. These are examples that seem 
to meet the requirements of an effective ultimate concern, while at the same time 
looking like potential examples of mistakes. This takes us back to one of the challenges 
posed by Cottingham in Chapter V (see V.4.iv). I have argued that, by centring our life 
around the kind of narrative that can be provided by an ultimate concern, we are capable 
of experiencing our life as meaningful. As I discussed in the last chapter (see V.4.iv) 
Cottingham argued that, without God, we would lack the ability to distinguish between 
good and bad narratives. In terms of my discussion, this would imply that we would be 
unable to distinguish good ultimate concerns from bad ones. In this section, I look at 
examples of lives which most people would think of as unsatisfying, or as mistakes. I 
examine these examples because they seem to match the criteria of an effective ultimate 
concern. If we are unable to distinguish these three examples from lives where someone 
makes their family the centre of their life and is deeply satisfied with their life as a 
result, we might have to admit that Cottingham is right.  
                                                 
101 Many of the examples seem to reveal that problems arise concerning people’s ultimate concerns in 
virtue of the fact that their emotional and intellectual responses are not sensitive to the real situation (or to 
their feelings about the situation). Or, their actions may not be in accord with their intellectual 
understanding of their ultimate concerns. This perhaps suggests that the best way to avoid persistent 
problems is to aim to be like Aristotle’s account of the virtuous person (a person whose emotions, 
thinking and actions are in harmony, and are appropriate to their situation). C.f. Aristotle (1953) Ethics. 
Penguin: Middlesex 
 85
The first example is suffering a psychotic episode (having what would be 
described as delusional beliefs). The second is suffering a serious addiction (e.g. to 
heroin). The third is making something insignificant your ultimate concern (e.g. a life 
devoted to counting blades of grass).  
I want to look at the ways in which lives of this kind can share many of the 
properties of a meaningful life. As I said, we might worry that our ultimate concerns are 
threateningly arbitrary if there is no way to distinguish the life of an addict, or the life of 
someone with bizarre delusional beliefs from the life of someone who puts their family 
at the centre of their life, and gains a deep satisfaction as a result.  
On the other hand, few people would choose a life full of psychotic episodes 
over a truly satisfying one. This might suggest to us that (intuitively at least) people do 
not think that all ultimate concerns are equally good. In order to untangle this, I want to 
set out each example, and try to show to what extent they meet the requirements of an 
effective ultimate concern. In the next section, I will assess whether it is possible for us 
to distinguish good from bad narratives. 
 
 
i. Psychosis 
 
I am interested in what would be described as a form of mental illness. I will be 
labelling the kind of experience of the world I am interested in as ‘psychosis’. (Though 
this term also has other connotations from the one I am giving it). The kind of 
worldview I am interested in is one which involves seeing the world as saturated with 
meaning. For example, imagine someone who experiences everything in the world as 
the work of demons.  
If such a person always acts so as to thwart the evil intentions of the demons, it 
looks as though this might satisfy the criteria for an effective ultimate concern. Every 
single event in the world is made meaningful in virtue of the fact that it is the work of 
demons. It might lend a sense of coherence to their view of their life and the world. 
Events in the world would be experienced as meaningful in virtue of the fact that it is 
the work of demons. Their own life might be seen as meaningful in light of the fact that 
they may be able to thwart the work of the demons, and so they have a sense that their 
actions are significant. The fact that everything is the work of demons might make them 
highly motivated to act. In this sense, their actions may be fully in accord with their 
beliefs. So, someone suffering psychosis seem to meet all the criteria of a meaningful 
life, yet we want to say that their ultimate concerns are a mistake of some kind. 
The perspective of someone suffering psychotic episodes seems to have parallels 
to religious accounts of the meaning of life. In both cases there is a sense in which 
everything is made meaningful – by its relationship to God in the case of religious 
beliefs, or in virtue of its relationship to demons in the case of psychotic delusion. 
(Despite these parallels, it is not my intention to suggest that religious beliefs are like 
delusional beliefs.102). 
 
 
 
                                                 
102 One of the problems with psychotic episodes is that the importance of everything else diminishes. In 
Chapters VII and VIII, I will argue that our needs, our happiness and our relationships genuinely matter. 
If this is accepted, then someone suffering psychotic episodes may stop seeing the importance of things 
that are genuinely important. On the other hand, my claims about what genuinely matter seem entirely 
compatible with the beliefs of most religious traditions. 
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ii. Heroin Addiction 
 
Think of the life of someone who is seriously addicted to heroin, such that it 
becomes her main felt need. It seems right to say, at least on the surface, that her beliefs 
and her actions both suggest that getting heroin is her ultimate concern. Again (as with 
those suffering psychotic episodes) this might give her life a sense of coherence (all her 
actions are aimed at getting enough heroin). It will mean that getting money, and 
finding dealers with heroin becomes highly significant to her. She is able, through her 
actions to make a difference to the amount of heroin she has (which is something that 
matters to her). And she is certainly motivated by her concerns to act in the world. 
Again (as with psychosis) we seem to have a case that meets all the criteria of a 
meaningful life, while intuitively we feel that we ought to be able to say that such a life 
is a mistake of some kind. 
 
 
iii. Counting the grass 
 
The final example I want to discuss is the example of someone who devotes his 
entire life to something apparently trivial.103 Imagine someone says that counting grass 
is his ultimate concern (and they do, as a matter of fact, spend as much time as possible 
counting blades of grass.) 
Once again, this might give his life a sense of coherence (all his actions are 
aimed at counting blades of grass). It will mean that finding blades of grass to count, 
and being able to count them becomes highly significant to him. He is able, through his 
actions to make a difference to how many blades of grass he counts, so he is certainly 
motivated by his concerns to act in the world. Again (as with the two examples above) 
we seem to have a case that meets all the criteria of a meaningful life, while again we 
feel that we ought to be able to say that such a life is a mistake of some kind. 
 
 
9. Dealing with the problem cases 
 
In 7.vii, I argued that the main criterion of whether an ultimate concern is 
effective is whether a person living by that ultimate concern is satisfied with their life. 
But, I also argued that this is only certain to be true if their actions are consistently in 
accord with their ultimate concerns, and they have an adequate awareness of themselves 
and their situation. In each of the three examples then, we might want to ask whether 
the people we are talking about are really satisfied with their life. We might ask if they 
have a full awareness of themselves and their situation. And we might ask whether their 
actions are in line with the things they really care about. This might help us see whether 
the examples we have discussed are really effective ultimate concerns. 
 
 
i. Dealing with psychosis 
 
In the case of someone suffering psychosis, it is (perhaps too) easy to say that 
they are clearly making some kind of factual error. We might say that they have made a 
                                                 
103 This example comes from Griffin, 1986, WellBeing: Its Meaning, Measurement and Moral Importance 
Clarendon Press: Oxford  p. 323. The fact that it is not my example, and is a little abstract for my tastes 
becomes important when assessing this kind of worldview below (see section 9.iii). 
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mistake about what is happening in the world. We want to say that all the events in the 
world are not, as a matter of fact, the work of demons. There are, after all (we might 
say) no demons. And, as a matter of fact, people suffering delusional worldviews are 
normally treated as though they were making a mistake. If this is so, then we can say 
that this is a clear case of being mistaken about the significance of things (despite the 
person’s own sincere, motivating beliefs). I’m unhappy helping myself to this though, 
given the fact that I have put religious accounts of the meaning of life to one side. 
Insofar as psychotic beliefs are similar to religious beliefs, I’m not sure what grounds I 
could have for simply dismissing the view that everything in the world is the work of 
demons. (I admitted my ignorance of these kinds of issues in the last chapter). 
We seem to have good reasons for saying that people suffering psychosis are 
motivated by their ultimate concerns. If someone believes that the only way to prevent 
their destruction by demons is to wash their hands 42 times, we can clearly understand 
why (given their beliefs) washing their hands this many times matters to them. Given 
their belief system (in the case of someone suffering from psychosis) their actions look 
entirely appropriate. 
 Perhaps then, if we are genuinely working within the worldview of (say) 
someone suffering a psychotic episode, there may be a (thin) sense in which we could 
talk about such a life being satisfying (as they wouldn’t be satisfied with a life where 
they don’t try to affect the demons, but let them do whatever they want). If we look a 
little deeper though, it should become obvious that such people can rarely be said to be 
genuinely satisfied with their lives.  
If their ultimate concerns are to be effective, what is important is not just that their life 
hangs together, but that it hangs together in a satisfying way. While we have reasons to 
say that someone suffering psychotic episodes has a life that hangs together in some 
sense, there are I think reasons to deny that these lives are experienced as genuinely 
satisfying. There is a problem with saying anything too specific about such a person’s 
attitude to themselves and their life, given the vast variety of cases of psychosis. At one 
end of the spectrum, you may have people who are masochistic and depressed. At the 
other end you have people who are sadistic and tend to suffer manic episodes. In the 
first case it is perhaps clearer that such a person does not value their own life (there may 
for example, be things such as self-harming, self-abuse and self-loathing which suggests 
that such a person is not genuinely satisfied with their life). it may be more difficult to 
say this about someone whose usual state is mania, and who turns all their ‘hate’ 
outwards. I will say that, at its extreme, such people would be described as psychopaths. 
If this is a correct description of someone, we might think that (insofar as psychopaths 
are unable to fully connect with the world and other people) they are not actually a 
candidate for experiencing meaning in the sense I am interested in.  
Certainly, if someone suffering psychotic episodes is willing to undertake the 
arduous process of therapy (go through the trauma of ‘facing their demons’) we may 
have grounds for saying that they are not truly satisfied with their life as it is. We might 
also wonder if someone in this position can be said to have full awareness of themselves 
and their situation. When people are suffering psychosis, it may be incredibly unclear 
exactly how aware they are of themselves and their true situation. At the very least, their 
behaviour will be strange enough to suggest that they are having trouble being fully 
aware of themselves and their true situation. This is an issue it is too complex to deal 
with here. At the very least, there seem to be a number of reasons to suggest that 
someone suffering psychosis is unlikely to satisfy the criteria of an effective ultimate 
concern. 
 
 88
ii. Dealing with addiction 
 
 Again, the actions of a heroin addict look (in one sense) highly rational. We can 
understand why it matters to a heroin addict to find some heroin. (After all, they have an 
unbearable longing that only heroin will take away). In other words, it is clear why 
getting heroin matters to them. As with the person suffering psychotic episodes, given 
their felt needs, their actions again look entirely appropriate.  
 Again though, if we scratch beneath the surface of an addict’s view of 
themselves and their life, there may be a number of reasons for thinking that such a life 
is not valued by the person themselves. (In which case it is difficult to see how we could 
say it is personally satisfying). There might be ample evidence that they do not value a 
life primarily focused on taking heroin. They may warn other people of the dangers of 
heroin (they would not recommend their lifestyle). They may experience self-loathing – 
they may be horrified that they are willing to sacrifice everything other than heroin in 
order to feed their addiction.  
While it is clear that their life is centred around heroin, we again seem to have 
grounds for denying that their life hangs together in a satisfying way. For a start, heroin 
users can fall into a life of heroin, without giving up the idea that there are other things 
that really matter to them. But, given their addiction, they may be unable (as things 
stand) to act in accord with other things they care about. (There will be a mismatch 
between their actions and the things they care about). The fact that they may damage 
their relationships (which they still value) while feeling that they cannot help but act the 
way they are, may lead to things like self-loathing and self-harm. (There may even be 
cases where we might want to talk about taking heroin as a form of self-harm). In these 
circumstances, it is not at all clear that addicts do experience their life as valuable. They 
may indeed feel trapped by their addiction, and think of their addiction as the source of 
their unhappiness. 
 One of the reasons why they may not experience their life as meaningful is that 
their activities appear to be valueless in the way described by Schopenhauer. (See IV.5) 
Someone strongly addicted to heroin has a life full of the pursuit of goals with 
(increasingly) short-lived positive results – which, when achieved are simply replaced 
by new cravings. When taking heroin gets to the point where it simply takes away the 
unbearable craving for heroin, we might understand (given their felt needs) why this 
person is acting in this way, but it is difficult to see how such a life could lead to any 
kind of lasting satisfaction.  
 There may be reasons for thinking that there is a relationship between addictions 
of this kind and denial. There may be reasons for thinking that addiction (particularly to 
mind and mood altering drugs) might be motivated by denial. The fact that drugs get 
you ‘out of your head’ will make it a convenient tool to use if you wish to avoid full 
awareness of your situation. Even if you are not motivated to take drugs by denial, 
taking drugs is likely to be an impediment to full awareness of yourself and your 
situation.  
As with the case of suffering a psychotic episode, the ways in which people in 
these situations may fail to meet the criteria of an effective ultimate concern for any 
number of these (or other reasons). Nothing can be said ‘in general’ about all cases of 
addiction or suffering psychosis. But, the discussion of these examples has shown that 
there is no reason to think that people who are highly addicted to heroin, or who are 
suffering from psychotic episodes have effective ultimate concerns. There is certainly 
no reason to think that cases like this can’t be clearly distinguished from genuinely 
effective ultimate concerns. In both cases, there are a variety of plausible problems 
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surrounding whether such people are truly satisfied with their lives, whether they have a 
full awareness of their situation and whether their actions really are in line with what 
they care most about. In other words, I will continue to argue that the idea that personal 
satisfaction (with all the caveats) is the central criterion in judging whether someone’s 
ultimate concerns are effective. In the next section, I want turn to the example of 
someone who devotes their life to something that looks particularly insignificant – 
counting blades of grass. 
 
 
iii. Dealing with the grass counter 
 
If a man can devote his life to counting blades of grass, and he seems satisfied as 
a result, we might be forced to accept that, trivial though it seems, such an ultimate 
concern can be effective for him. 
There is though, something that troubles me about this example. As it stands, the 
example is quite abstract. In particular, I wonder how we could set out the details of 
such a case. If I were to hear of such a person, I might wonder if, perhaps, their 
behaviour is compulsive, or I might wonder if they were high on the autistic spectrum. 
Certainly, the behaviour of this man looks potentially obsessive compulsive. His 
behaviour might be, not so much a passionate belief in the value of counting blades of 
grass, but more like the need to absorb himself in an activity in order to avoid reflection 
on some other aspect of his situation. A full account of his situation and his behaviour 
may clearly show that he is far from being truly satisfied with his life and his situation. 
 On the other hand, imagine we discover that this man is really satisfied with his 
life. My suspicion, if this really is the case, is that such a person may be very high on 
the autistic spectrum. There are clear reasons for making this assumption. We have 
reasons for thinking (for anyone capable of experiencing the world as meaningful) that 
activities like counting blades of grass couldn’t be effective ultimate concerns. After all, 
through this activity, someone would make no significant difference to the world. The 
activity is so basic, in that it allows for little self-expression (there is no real 
spontaneity, variety or development in the activity).  
 It may well be that someone who is high on the autistic spectrum could be 
satisfied with a life devoted to counting blades of grass. But then, we perhaps have good 
reasons for thinking that (insofar as autism seems to involve what might be called 
‘meaning blindness’104) people high on the autistic spectrum are going to have 
particular difficulties having the kind of meaningful life I am concerned with. 
This discussion suggests that, for most people, some activities (ones that are 
exclusively passive in relation to the world) could not be an appropriate ultimate 
concern. Elsewhere in this thesis, I claim that there are other things that could be 
effective ultimate concerns. In VII.9, I argue that pleasure for pleasure’s sake couldn’t 
be an effective ultimate concern. In Chapter VIII, I argue that pursuing our narrow self-
interest couldn’t be an effective ultimate concern. If it is accepted that these kinds of 
ultimate concerns are mistakes, then our choice105 of ultimate concern isn’t arbitrary, 
                                                 
104 Jordan, R. (1999) Autistic Spectrum Disorders Dave Fulton Publishers: London. Jordan describes one 
aspect of autism as “the inability to make meaningful connections.” p. 1 
105 In some contexts, talk of choosing ultimate concerns may be misleading. There is definitely a sense in 
which people can discover meaning in their life and the world (as opposed to simply making an abstract 
decision to value something ‘for no reason’.) You might find that a particular activity or relationship has 
become your ultimate concern even though you were not initially motivated to do engage in the 
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and shouldn’t be made on in an arbitrary way. After all, we need to make sure that we 
don’t choose an ultimate concern which couldn’t be effective. 
In Chapter V, I discussed Cottingham’s claim that, unless we have the kinds of 
narratives that only religious belief systems can supply, we would have no way of 
distinguishing good from bad narratives (stories in virtue of which our life is 
meaningful). The examples of psychosis, addiction and grass counting seemed to make 
this claim threatening. Intuitively, we feel that these kinds of narratives are a mistake. 
Yet, their lives have exactly the same kind of narrative structure that is required if life is 
to be meaningful. As it happens, the discussion of these examples has shown that not 
just any narrative will in fact do. The examples we have discussed, while providing the 
person with a strong narrative to their life, fail to be an effective ultimate concern (they 
are not satisfying narratives, they are mistakes). It seems that, without the help of 
religion, we are able to distinguish good from bad narratives (ultimate concerns). I have 
more to say about Cottingham’s challenge, but this will be done in the conclusion (see 
Conclusion.4.vii). 
 
 
10. Are ultimate concerns arbitrary? 
 
 In this chapter, I have argued that it is possible to make mistakes concerning our 
ultimate concerns. There are (broadly speaking) two central ways in which we can make 
real mistakes (that persist). We can make mistakes due to a lack of awareness, or we can 
make mistakes due to the addictive or compulsive nature of our behaviour. 
 Firstly, someone might (through a lack of awareness, of their situation or their 
own true feelings) carry on living by an ultimate concern that shows no signs at all of 
being effective. As long as we have a reasonable level of self-awareness, someone may 
come to realise that making something their ultimate concern has not led (and shows no 
sign of leading) to a satisfying, meaningful life. This might realise that, in one sense, 
they made a mistake. (Though they may think that they were right to give it a try). As 
long as someone has the awareness (and perhaps the strength) they can bring their 
mistake to an end. In these circumstances, such a person has learnt something about 
what they care about most, rather than being simply mistaken. 
By contrast, if someone lacks awareness of their situation or their true feelings 
about their situation, they can fail to notice (perhaps through the fact that they lack the 
skills necessary) or fail to pay attention (perhaps through denial) to the fact that their 
ultimate concern is not making them satisfied, or shows no sign of making them 
satisfied. A lack of self-awareness can also make you believe that something is your 
ultimate concern even though, if your actions are taken at face value, it doesn’t seem to 
be the thing you most value. It seems right to call cases like these genuine mistakes. 
 Secondly, addiction can act so as to distort the things we really care about. 
Addiction might make an addict incapable of acting as though her family is more 
important to her than heroin, even though her family is her ultimate concern. Addictions 
and compulsions generally appear to be cases that match Schopenhauer’s account of 
activities (see IV.5). Insofar as an addict’s behaviour is directed at achieving a short-
term aim (at the removal of a painful craving) which brings no positive lasting 
satisfaction, it is not clear how such behaviour could help us achieve a satisfying 
meaningful life. So, we might say that they have chosen an ultimate concern that 
                                                                                                                                               
relationship in order to gain an ultimate concern. It may even strike you as surprising that this has now 
become your ultimate concern. (But you do not doubt that it has).  
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couldn’t lead to a satisfying life. It also seems right to call this a mistake. (Psychopaths 
and autistic people could not make a mistake, as they are not candidates for the kind of 
meaningful life I have been discussing.) 
There is another sense in which we might think that ultimate concerns are not 
arbitrary. There seems to be a sense in which, from the perspective of the individual, not 
just any ultimate concern (even ones that might be capable of leading to a satisfying 
life) will do. For example, it seems that people can think that some activities could be 
potentially effective ultimate concerns for some people, we may at the same time think 
that they could not be effective for them. For example, I have gone to a couple of line 
dancing events. Having experienced the music, the activities involved etc. I sincerely 
believe that I could not (currently) imagine making line-dancing my ultimate concern. 
Given my musical tastes, the kind of activities I find satisfying etc. a life of line dancing 
wouldn’t give my life a sense of coherence which would motivate me, could make me 
satisfied with my life. Now, this is not to say that other people couldn’t make line-
dancing the centre of their life. (After all, there was a man at the line dancing event who 
seemed to do just this, and as far as I could see, he seemed very happy and satisfied as a 
result.) If making something our ultimate concern is to be effective, making that 
ultimate concern the most important thing in our lives has to work. It has to lead to a 
satisfying, meaningful life. Therefore, it is by no means true that any randomly chosen 
ultimate concern will do for a particular individual. (Some activities and relationships 
will be unsuitable for us). This suggests that we should not pick our ultimate concerns 
in an arbitrary way (at random). For any given individual, not just any activity can be 
experienced as satisfying or valuable. If we have reasons for thinking that having a 
satisfying life genuinely matters to us (as I will argue in VII.Part 2) it will genuinely 
matter to me whether my ultimate concerns are effective.106 We might say that the 
effectiveness of our ultimate concerns needs to be ‘tested against experience’. If we 
want our ultimate concerns to be effective, we need to choose on the basis of what 
really satisfies us.  
 
 
11. Conclusion 
 
It seems right to say that there is a sense in which not just anything will do for a 
particular individual as an ultimate concern. If something is going to work as an 
effective ultimate concern for me, I will have to find it satisfying. Given the fact that 
people have different tastes, aptitudes etc. it looks as though only certain things could 
(potentially) make someone’s life meaningful. At this stage, some people may want to 
‘dig their heels in’. They might argue that our tastes and preferences are themselves 
arbitrary.  
I’m not sure we need to go into that. It is probably enough to say that, as a 
matter of fact, different things satisfy different people. How an individual feels (given 
adequate awareness of themselves and their situation, a lack of denial and as long as 
their actions are consistently in accord with what they think) is the mark of whether an 
ultimate concern is effective at delivering a satisfying life for them. It seems right to say 
                                                 
106 This may actually be part of the explanation of why people are motivated to believe (despite the 
evidence to the contrary) that their ultimate concerns are delivering a meaningful life. In other words, this 
may be part of the motivation behind denial. 
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that not just anything is capable of delivering this sense of satisfaction (even if it is true 
that our tastes are arbitrary). 
The caveats to the claim that how we feel is the mark of an effective ultimate 
concern arose out of the descriptions of a number of ways in which people may make 
mistakes about their own experience of how satisfying and meaningful their lives are. 
Through a lack of awareness of their situation or themselves they might come to believe 
that their ultimate concerns are effective when they are not. In these circumstances, we 
might say that they are not in the best position to say whether their ultimate concerns 
are really effective.  
We are now in a position to say that our ultimate concerns are not arbitrary. 
They are not arbitrary to the extent that not just anything will do as an ultimate concern 
– it has to be something capable of leading to a satisfying life, and it has to, as a matter 
of fact make us satisfied. We might say that our ultimate concerns need to be sensitive 
to what makes us genuinely satisfied with our lives. If they are to be effective for me 
(and it genuinely matters to me that they are effective – see VII. Part 2) my ultimate 
concern must satisfy me and motivate me and provide a sense of coherence to my life 
(and it must be sensitive to our actual situation and our real feelings). When someone 
(in full awareness) meets all these conditions, we can say that they are not mistaken in 
making something their ultimate concern (as opposed to those who lack self-awareness, 
suffer extreme addiction etc.)  
 My central concern in this thesis is to discover whether anything genuinely 
matters. Given the arguments in this chapter, are we able to say that, if someone makes 
line-dancing their ultimate concern (and is satisfied as a result) then line-dancing 
genuinely matters? We can certainly say, given the right circumstances that such a 
person is not making a mistake in thinking that line dancing is an effective ultimate 
concern. And, they would be right to think that it genuinely matters that to them that this 
should be the case. But it simply doesn’t follow from this that it is true that line dancing 
genuinely matters in any wider sense. As I have repeatedly said, the fact that line-
dancing matters to them will not be enough to show that it genuinely matters in any 
wider sense. 
In this chapter, I have suggested that, given the way we are constituted (our 
tastes, preferences, abilities etc.) and given our situation, some claims about what 
matters from the perspective of the individual will be better than others (in terms of 
their effectiveness). In the final two chapters, I want to turn to facts about how all 
human beings are constituted. I will be arguing that our vital needs our happiness and 
our relationships with others are things that genuinely matter to all people in virtue of 
the way human beings are constituted (in virtue of our nature.) I will start the next 
chapter by explaining what grounds these claims, by explaining what makes it the case 
that these things genuinely matter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 93
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
DOES ANYTHING GENUINELY MATTER? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last chapter, I argued that our ultimate concerns are not arbitrary, as in 
order to be effective they need to be sensitive to what genuinely satisfies us. (I argued, 
amongst other things that we can make mistakes about our situation, or about our real 
feelings) One of the things this implies is that some activities (e.g. excessively passive 
or uncreative ones) and some relationships (e.g. ones with people who want nothing to d 
with you) are totally unsuitable as ultimate concerns107. Still, it seems right to say that 
we cannot, in the abstract, say what will, or ought to be someone’s ultimate concern. 
And, there is no reason to think that simply because something is our ultimate concern, 
this ensures that our ultimate concern genuinely matters. Our ultimate concerns 
certainly matter to us, and (as will become clear in Part 2 of this chapter) it genuinely 
matters that our ultimate concerns deliver a sense that our life is meaningful. But, this 
doesn’t mean that simply by making something our ultimate concern, it comes to 
genuinely matter. I want to now leave aside questions concerning the meaning of life. (I 
will return to these issues in the conclusion.)  
For the last two chapters, I want to attempt to set out three examples of things 
that genuinely matter. In this chapter, I will argue that our vital needs genuinely matter 
to us (see Part 1). I will also argue that our happiness (and that our ultimate concerns 
effective) genuinely matters (see Part 2). In the next chapter, I will argue that our 
relationships with other people genuinely matter. Before setting out these examples, I 
want to say something about what grounds the claim that these things genuinely matter. 
So, before turning to the examples, I want to try to describe why our needs, our 
happiness and our relationships genuinely matter to us.  
  
 
2. Why some things genuinely matter from our perspective 
 
In what follows, I want to assess whether there are some things that genuinely 
matter to all people. My aim in the next two chapters is to show that there are some 
things (our needs, our happiness and relationships) that genuinely do matter to us. The 
claim that these things genuinely matter to us is grounded in facts about the nature of 
human existence. Specifically, there are two facts about human existence that I want to 
focus on. The first is that we are self-conscious. In Chapter II, Nagel linked both the 
unavoidability of seriousness and the inescapability of doubt to the fact that we are self-
conscious. My account is different from Nagel’s, but I will also argue that some things 
genuinely matter in virtue of the fact that we are self-conscious. The other fact about 
human existence that I am interested in is the fact that we have needs. This, we might 
say, is a fact about human existence. 
                                                 
107 I also suggest that the pursuit of ‘mere’ pleasure (VII.9) and the pursuit of our own narrow self-interest 
(see chapter VIII) are unsuitable ultimate concerns. In the conclusion, I also argue that the pursuit of 
wealth, status and power for their own sakes are unsuitable ultimate concerns.  
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It may look as though there are problems with using the fact that we have needs 
as a way of arguing that some things genuinely matter. After all, the fact that we have 
certain vital needs might be described as an objective fact about us. But, I have argued 
(see IV.2) that we cannot ground things genuinely mattering in objective facts about the 
world. In this context, I might perhaps be accused of claiming something that is I myself 
have said is impossible.  
In order to see why I am not contradicting myself, think of the way in which we 
might describe the fact that a plant needs light and water as an objective fact about the 
plant. We may accept that this is true, while still denying that getting enough light and 
water matters to the plant. (As I have repeatedly argued, to be significant is to be 
significant from an ‘aware’ perspective.) So, it might matter to me whether my 
houseplant gets enough water, but there is something odd about talking about these 
things mattering to the plant itself.108 Still, in certain circumstances, we might think that 
the plant’s needs are significant (as we are able to adopt a perspective on the plant and 
its needs). From our perspective, it seems we have a choice whether or not we are going 
to regard the needs of the plant as significant for us. My central claim is that this is not 
the case when we become aware, from our perspective of our own needs.  
So, the claim that our needs matter can be construed as arising out of objective 
facts about the world. But it does not arise out of the objective facts alone. It is only 
when a perspective is taken on objective facts that anything will be revealed as 
genuinely mattering. When we take a perspective on our own needs, these things are 
revealed as mattering in a non-arbitrary way. They genuinely matter to us. This is 
grounded in the way in which facts about ourselves (perhaps in relationship to the 
environment in which we find ourselves) are experienced from our own perspective. 
When the perspective we take on the world (the fact about our needs) is the perspective 
of ourselves, when we see these facts about existence as a part of ‘our story’, they are 
thereby revealed as genuinely mattering. 
This claim is not meant to be an attempt to argue that meaning can only arise for 
human beings. I wish to remain agnostic about the kinds of beings there may be in the 
universe (i.e. God, angels, aliens etc.) Rather, I want to make a quite general claim. We 
might say that, when any creature is capable of taking up a perspective (the kind that 
can reveal significance) on its own needs, its own needs will thereby be revealed as 
genuinely mattering to them. 
In all of this, we are staying within the context of the perspective of the 
individual. In some ways, this might suggest that the conclusion that our needs 
genuinely matter to us is unsatisfactory as an account of the things that genuinely 
matter. After all, this seems to suggest that things only matter subjectively. There may 
be something in this. But when I claim that something genuinely matters to us, the focus 
is supposed to be on the ‘genuinely’. Given the account of significance described in 
IV.2, it was always going to have to ground the claim that some things matter by 
reference to some from of awareness.   
We wanted to know if anything genuinely mattered. The fact is that, from the 
perspective of the individual, we can be very clear that we would not be making a 
mistake in thinking that our needs genuinely matter to us. We are absolutely right to 
think that our needs matter. In thinking this, we are not making a mistake.  
I am going to argue that, because it is an objective fact about us that we have 
needs, and because we are self-conscious (capable to taking up our perspective on our 
                                                 
108 We can ‘metaphorically’ talk of it mattering to the plant – in that it is something the plant needs. But, 
it would generally be accepted that we do not mean that the plant itself thinks that it matters. 
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own needs) our vital needs, our happiness and our relationships with others all 
genuinely matter to us. This is not to say that these things could never be outweighed. 
(Something can genuinely matter without mattering absolutely).  
In this chapter, I want to defend the idea that we are not making a mistake in 
thinking that our own needs (Part 1) and our own happiness (Part 2) both matter to us. 
In claiming this, I mean that these things don’t just matter to us in virtue of the fact that 
we think (or act as though) they matter (although it is certainly true that we do think and 
act in this way). They matter in virtue of facts about the nature of our existence. 
In Part 1, I will argue that our vital needs matter to us in a non-arbitrary way – if 
we think they matter to us, we are not deciding that they matter on some kind of random 
basis. They are things that matter to us, regardless of whether or not we want them to 
matter, or regardless of whether we choose to think they matter. My discussion of why 
our own needs matter to us also provides an opportunity to return to the question of 
whether our own death is bad for us. After all, one of the reasons why our needs matter 
to us is because our own death would be bad for us. 
In the case of happiness, I will argue that happiness is universally valued. As a 
matter of fact, all human beings wish to be happy. This will require some clarification, 
and I will need to show how my account of happiness avoids the charge of emptiness. 
(The charge of emptiness is avoided by showing that, even though everyone wants to be 
happy, this doesn’t mean that happiness just is whatever anyone happens to want.) In 
part, my claim will be that being happy (being satisfied with our life) is a human need. 
It is not a vital human need (such as food, sleep etc.) It is what we might call an 
existential need. It seems right to call happiness a need, in virtue of the fact that it is a 
(universally) felt need. 
 
 
PART 1 : VITAL NEEDS 
 
3. Meeting our needs really matters 
 
Given the features of our existence, there are certain things that human beings 
require – that we have to have. In Part 1, I will be arguing that our vital needs (food, 
water, sleep and shelter/clothing seem the best examples) genuinely matter to us. I will 
be arguing that our needs matter to us in a non-arbitrary sense (it is not up to us to 
decide whether or not they matter, it is not a random decision to think our needs matter 
to us). We do (generally) act as though these things matter to us. I will be arguing that 
we are right to do so. 
I want to examine whether citing our needs might provide a way of answering 
my curious friend. Imagine my curious friend asks me why eating my dinner matters. I 
say to him, ‘I’m hungry. If I do not eat, I will eventually die. I need to eat.’ Of course, 
my curious friend might then ask me why it matters to me whether I die or not. On the 
one hand, there is a temptation to say that this is one of my curious friend’s questions 
that seems wholly unmotivated (‘It just does’ seems a reasonable response).  
Having said that, we can think of examples (such as deep depression) where 
people no longer care whether they die (they may even be motivated to take their own 
life). So, there may be circumstances in which someone might find the question ‘why 
does it matter if you die or not?’ pressing. If someone’s own life no longer matters to 
them (if they are deeply unhappy, and cannot see how their life is - or is capable of 
being - valuable) we may have good reasons for saying that their needs no longer matter 
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to them. (As we will see, someone in this position is likely to answer my curious 
friend’s questions in a different way.) 
This might suggest that our vital needs are only hypothetical needs - needs that 
we have because of some pervious choice we have made. So, for example, I might say 
that I need a passport. But I only need a passport because I have decided that I want to 
travel to Barcelona. 
Someone may say that all our needs, even our vital needs are actually 
hypothetical in the way needing a passport is. They might say that I only need food 
because I have chosen, or decided that I want to stay alive (or because we have chosen 
to think of certain things as needs). If this is the case, then it looks as though my curious 
friend’s next question becomes pressing again. If my vital needs are only seen as needs 
because of some prior choice I have made to value something (my life) then my curious 
friend seems justified in asking me to justify my prior decision to value my life. 
 I will argue that our vital needs are not hypothetical needs. We do not think that 
our vital needs matter because of some choice we make to think that our continued 
existence matters to us. I will in effect be arguing that my need for food is not 
dependent on some prior choice (in the way my need for a passport is).   
Before doing this, I want to say something else about our vital needs, which 
suggests that thinking our needs matter is not a choice we make. There is a sense in 
which needs force themselves on us.  If you try to ignore (say) the need to eat, your 
hunger will eventually make itself un-ignorable. (You will end up with unbearable 
cravings). In this sense, it looks as though the failure to meet your needs can be a source 
of pain. There seems to be a genuine sense in which the importance of our vital needs 
makes itself transparent to you in your experience, even if you make every effort to 
ignore them. It looks as though these consequences of failing to meet our needs are 
beyond our control. (We do not choose to feel pain if we fail to meet our needs). 
 
 
4. Is life valuable? 
 
In this section, I want to assess whether (and in what circumstances) we can talk 
of our life being valuable. Hopefully, this will help assess whether valuing our own life 
is a ‘free choice’. This also provides an opportunity to return to the question of whether 
our own death matters to us. In Chapter I, I discussed Nagel’s claim that, while death is 
(given my assumption that death is the state of non-existence) a neutral state, life isn’t a 
neutral state. Rather, life is valuable. Because of this, death involves the loss of (or 
missing out on) something of value. At the very least then, we can say that if my life is 
valuable then my death is a bad thing for me. This section should put me in a position to 
assess the circumstances in which our own death can be bad for us. 
If Nagel’s argument (that death is bad because life is valuable) is correct, then it 
looks as though we will have good reasons to meet our needs. If my life really is 
valuable to me, then my needs will matter to me. My needs (at their most extreme) are 
necessary for the continuation of my life. So, if our own death is bad for us, we will 
have good reasons to meet our needs.  
I now want to make some attempt to outline, in the light of the discussions 
throughout this thesis, a number of different ways in which a life may be experienced as 
valuable. I am going to mention three (potential) ways in which life can be said to have 
valuable content: Pleasure, satisfying activities and making a valuable contribution. (A 
fourth one, happiness, will be discussed in the second half of this chapter). I will also 
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discuss the sense in which a life could be said to be potentially valuable. This list is not 
supposed to be an exhaustive one. 
 
 
 i. Pleasure 
 
Human beings find many things pleasurable. We saw in Chapter II that there 
may be reasons for thinking that not all pleasures are valuable to us (e.g. the kiss that 
breaks up your happy marriage). Still, we might say that (other things being equal) 
being pleasurable just is valuable to us. 
What does it mean to say ‘other things being equal’? We might say that, until we 
know the context surrounding the pleasurable event, we do not know whether the 
pleasurable event is valuable. For example, if the pleasurable event damages something 
of real importance to you (your ultimate concerns, or your needs say) you can have 
reasons for not regarding a pleasurable event as valuable. Still, we might say that (if the 
pleasurable event happens without being problematic in terms of other things you value) 
being pleasurable just is valuable. (Or perhaps we might say that pleasure just is 
valuable, but in certain circumstances, this value can be outweighed.) On the other 
hand, if pleasure arises in the context of contributing to our ultimate concerns, or if it is 
part of meeting our needs, it seems we definitely have good reasons to say that 
something valuable is happening to us. 
Before moving on to the next possible source of value in a life, it seems worth 
saying, in the context of our needs, that if pleasure is valuable, then the pain of 
deprivation (of failing to have our needs met) is something we would be right to think 
has a negative value for us. 
 
 
 ii. Satisfying activities 
 
In Chapter III, I discussed the way in which we may come to regard some 
activities (play) as inherently valuable. To talk of an activity being inherently valuable 
is to say that we couldn’t be mistaken about whether it really is valuable to us (as it 
contains its value ‘within itself’). This means that you find these activities personally 
satisfying. You think doing these activities just is a positive way to spend your time. 
Once again, we may want to say that such activities are only valuable other 
things being equal (or they are valuable, but can be outweighed). For example, if you 
engage in these activities in such a way that you fail to meet your needs (see III.8) or in 
a way detrimental to your ultimate concerns we may have reason to say that the value of 
the activities has been overridden (there can on occasion be things that are more 
valuable than the mere fact that an activity is found personally satisfying). 
 
 
 iii. Making a valuable contribution 
 
When talking of people whose lives have a personal meaning (see Chapter VI) I 
discussed the way in which someone may experience their life as meaningful (in part) 
because their actions have a positive impact on things that ultimately matter to them 
(see VI.5). For example, if my ultimate concern is my family, and through my actions I 
am able to make a positive contribution to the lives of my family (by helping them meet 
their needs, pursue their interests, become happy etc.) I will perceive my own life and 
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my actions as valuable in virtue of the fact that it makes a positive difference to 
something I value.  
Similarly, in the discussion of having a vocation (see III.9) I described the way 
in which certain kinds of work activities (ways of earning a living) could also be ways 
of acting on your ultimate concerns. If you are ultimately concerned with the (e.g.) 
health of others, then working in a hospital can be a way of making a difference through 
your actions to things of ultimate concern to you. 
In both of these examples (because these people will have a real sense that their 
life is valuable insofar as it makes a valuable contribution to something they value) they 
will have good reasons for thinking that their life is valuable, and so will have good 
reasons for wanting to meet their own needs.109 
 
 
 iv. Potential 
 
In this section, I want to explore whether there are reasons for thinking that all 
human beings have a life that is valuable in some sense (i.e. potentially valuable). I have 
set out three ways in which a life may be said to have ‘valuable content’. (As I said, this 
list is not supposed to be exhaustive in any way). There may be a case for saying that all 
human life contains something of value. In many cases, the presence of this kind of 
positive content might provide us with good reasons for thinking that our life is 
valuable110. But it also seems fair to say that some human lives may contain more 
events with a negative value (pain, suffering etc.) than positive (valuable) content. In 
these circumstances, would we be right in saying that their life isn’t valuable, and so 
their needs don’t really matter to them? 
Before exploring this in more detail in the next section, I want to assess whether, 
even if you do not think you life is (currently) valuable, there is a sense in which your 
life has a potential value (it has the potential at some future time to be valuable to you). 
What might we base this claim on? Perhaps we might say that it is always 
possible (and this is something that we can improve our chances of through our efforts) 
for someone’s life, which currently lacks value, to improve. It is always possible that, in 
the future, someone may become truly happy and content with their life. 
Still, we might have to admit that not all human life is valuable (not even 
potentially). It may possible for someone to make mistakes about whether their life has 
any potential value.111 But, it seems right to say that some human lives appear to lack 
valuable content (even potentially). Think, for example, of someone who has a fatal 
illness. It may be possible, using the most advanced medical treatments, to keep them 
alive for a couple of months. But, these months will be full of extreme pain. They will 
carry on living, but will be incapable of enjoying any aspect of their life. They could not 
                                                 
109 While (except in extreme cases) we cannot be mistaken about whether we find something pleasurable, 
or find an activity satisfying, we can be mistaken about whether we are making a valuable contribution to 
something we value. It can be true (even if you do not experience it as such) that through your actions, 
you make a significant difference to things you value (Think of the film It’s a Wonderful Life). Similarly, 
you can believe that you are making a significant difference to something when in fact you aren’t. (For 
example, you might be misled into thinking that you are playing a vital role in a project, when in fact 
other people are making all the significant decisions.) 
110 In Part 2 of this chapter, I will be arguing that this alone is not enough to ensure a satisfying life. It is 
possible to imagine a life that contains things of value to you, but which fails to lead to you being 
satisfied. 
111 We might have reasons for thinking that someone in depression or suffering psychosis is not in a 
particularly good position to see whether their life has potential value in this sense. 
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spend any quality time with the people they love, they could not engage in valuable 
activities. There is also no realistic hope that their life has the potential to change for the 
better (there is absolutely no hope of remission). In such circumstances, it is difficult to 
argue that this life must be valuable, regardless of how it is experienced112. So, it seems 
that we cannot argue that human life is always potentially valuable. 
 
 
5. Is the desire to carry on living a choice? 
 
In this section I want to look at two examples of situations where we may have 
reasons for saying that people do not value their needs or their life. The first example I 
will discuss is depression. Given the fact that I want to argue that our vital needs matter 
to us in virtue of the nature of human existence, someone suffering extreme depression 
looks like a clear counter-example to my claim. It is, after all, an example of someone 
with the same nature as us, who doesn’t care about their own needs. Also, in the context 
of the discussion of whether our vital needs are only hypothetical needs, this example 
may suggest that our vital needs are only ‘felt’ needs because of some prior decision to 
value our own life. The second example I discuss is martyrdom. Such people, in acting 
against their vital needs, or in sacrificing their life suggests that thinking our needs 
matters is a ‘free choice’. Both these examples seem to show that (in extreme 
circumstances) people can choose not to meet their own needs. This might imply that, if 
we care about meeting our needs, this must also be a choice. 
 
 
 i. Depression 
 
When discussing the unavoidability of seriousness (see II.4) I discussed the 
example of someone suffering extreme depression. A person suffering depression seems 
to be a case of someone who doesn’t think anything matters. In these cases (especially if 
there is some reason to think that the potential for them living a valuable life is slim) 
such people may have difficulty seeing why their needs might matter to them. (Which 
may explain why suicide becomes a ‘live option’ for them). It may look as though this 
is an example of someone who is making a choice not to value their needs. But it should 
also be clear that the life of a depressive, insofar as it is a life that is experienced as 
meaningless, unhappy and lonely, does not look like the kind of life anyone would 
choose113. In coming to be depressed, someone may come to think that their vital needs 
don’t matter. But this is because they (regrettably) find their life lacking value, not 
because they have chosen to see their life as valueless. By the same token, people who 
experience their life as (potentially) valuable are not making a choice to think their life 
is valuable (unless they are in denial). 
It might be thought that the example of extreme depression shows that my claim 
(that our vital needs genuinely matters to all people in virtue of our nature) cannot be 
universal. After all, here is an example of someone who doesn’t care about their vital 
needs.  
                                                 
112 Unless there is some reason derived from a religious account of the universe – but, as I’ve repeatedly 
said, I don’t feel I’m in a position to comment on this. 
113 It is possible to think of examples where we may say of someone that they are choosing to be 
miserable. It may well be right, even in cases such as this, for us to say that such a person is still seeking a 
life they believe will be satisfying for them (we might say, they like being miserable). This seems more 
accurate than saying that they are actively genuinely seeking a meaningless, unhappy, lonely existence. 
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One way of describing people who contemplate suicide is that ending their life 
becomes a real option for them because of the fact that their deeper existential needs 
(happiness etc.) are not being met. This suggests that, even if someone does not 
experience their life as valuable, its lack of value is likely to reside in the fact that needs 
that matter to them (in this case deeper needs) are not being satisfied. In Part 2, I will 
argue that our own happiness genuinely matters to us. In chapter VIII, I will be arguing 
that good relationships with others genuinely matter to us. In saying that these things 
genuinely matter, I am saying that these things are properly thought of as needs. What 
makes them needs is the fact that they are experienced as needs. Because of this, the 
absence of happiness, meaning and good relationships is not experienced as something 
neutral. (It is experienced as a deprivation).  
So, even if we are thinking of someone who thinks they would be ‘better off 
dead’, we might say that these are not people who do not experience anything as a need. 
The fact that they do not see the point of taking care of their own needs arises because 
of other (existential) needs are not being met. This seems particularly true if it leads to 
genuine attempts to commit suicide. This is a situation in which their unhappiness 
matters so much to that they are willing to go through the effort of committing suicide 
in order to make their life stop. It seems we have reasons to say that it matters to them 
that they experience their life the way they do. In depression, someone finds themselves 
in an unbearable situation, and as such may come to believe that their life lacks value 
(and so their vital needs may not matter to them). The most important point to make is 
that none of this implies that people in depression are choosing to not value their life. 
Nor does it imply that people who are not in depression must be making an arbitrary 
decision to value their life. Because in neither case is their a ‘free choice’ to value or not 
value our life, this implies that our needs are not hypothetical needs. 
 
 
 ii. Martyrdom 
 
There are people who are not depressed, but who may still choose to forfeit their 
life or their needs (fighting in a war for their country, going on hunger strike for a 
political cause, becoming a suicide bomber dying for a cause they believe in etc.) It 
looks as though such people choose to avoid meeting their needs (hunger striker) or to 
put their life at risk (soldier), or even to end their life (suicide bomber). 
We might retain the idea that their life (and so their needs) really do matter to 
them, and say that their act of martyrdom is evidence that something matters more to 
them than their life (that it is a sacrifice worth making). So, we can retain the idea that, 
if your life is valuable to you, then meeting your needs matters in a non-arbitrary way. 
But we can say that it is still possible for this to be outweighed. (Think for example of a 
mother who goes without food in order to feed her child.) Someone can choose to 
sacrifice their life and their needs, but the examples seem to suggest that this is not 
because they believe that their life isn’t valuable, but because they think something else 
is more valuable. So, neither depression, nor martyrdom seem to support the idea that 
meeting our needs is a hypothetical need. In the next section, I want to examine whether 
the fact that something is a vital need can help us provide a satisfying answer my 
curious friend’s questions. 
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6. Justifying my needs to my curious friend 
 
I am talking to my curious friend about why I am preparing a meal for myself. 
He says ‘Why does eating this meal matter to you?’ I might reply that eating is one of 
my needs. He might then ask ‘Why does it matter to you if you meet your needs?’ I 
might reply that if I don’t eat, I will become weak and start feeling pain. If I go too long 
without food I would eventually die. My curious friend might ask ‘Why does it matter 
to you whether you live or die?’  
This may seem to be one of those questions to which ‘It just does’ seem the 
most reasonable response. If I were to give an answer, I might say that my life is 
valuable to me. My life contains a lot of valuable content (pleasure, satisfying activities, 
making a positive difference to things I value etc.) My curious friend might then ask 
‘Why does it matter whether or not you lose something of value to you?’ Again, ‘it just 
does’ seems the most appropriate response to this question. (Surely, I might say to him, 
if you understand what ‘valuable’ means, this question looks senseless.) 
Alternatively, my curious friend might ask me to justify my choice to value my 
own life. The discussion in section 4 suggests that it is wrong to talk about this as a 
choice. Either, we (rightly) think our continued existence matters, or we find ourselves 
in the lamentable position of being unable to see why our continued existence might 
matter. If (as I will argue in Part 2) human beings have a ‘felt need’ to experience their 
life as valuable, the fact that someone with depression is unable to say why their life is 
valuable suggests that something that genuinely matters is happening to them – they are 
not satisfied with their life. In all of this, it is not at all clear that people in depression 
are making a (neutral) choice about what they value. 
Even people who do not see the value of their lives might still have what looks 
like a reasonable response to my curious friend. They wouldn’t answer the question: 
‘why do your needs matter?’ in the same way I did, by saying that their continued 
existence is valuable (and so meeting their needs matters). But, if my curious friend 
asks someone who believes their life lacks value the question ‘Why does it matter 
whether you meet your needs?’ they are not going to answer this by saying that their life 
is valuable. Instead, they may say ‘If I don’t eat, the pain is unbearable.’ My curious 
friend might then ask ‘Why does it matter to you if you feel unbearable pain?’ (Again, it 
seems most appropriate to answer by saying ‘It just does’). This suggests that, even 
when you are unable to see the value of your life, your vital needs are still properly 
described as felt needs. If anything, the experience of depression suggests that people 
don’t just have vital needs (needs they have to meet in order to survive). There is also 
the need to experience their life as happy, meaningful etc. (As I said, this will be 
discussed in detail in Part 2). 
In cases where someone has a life they regard as valuable, it looks like meeting 
their needs (as prerequisites of their continuing existence) really does matter to them. 
(They are not making a mistake in thinking their needs matter. Their needs don’t just 
matter because we happen to think, or act as though they matter). Even in cases where 
someone does not experience their own life as valuable there may still be good reasons 
for thinking that their needs do matter to them in a non-arbitrary way. (Due to the fact 
that their life is potentially valuable, or due to the fact that failing to meet their needs 
leads to suffering). 
When I claim that our needs really do matter to us in a non-arbitrary way, I am 
not claiming that they matter in some absolute way. As I’ve said, the thought that our 
needs really do matter is compatible with the thought that on occasions (because our 
needs are not the only thing that matters to us) our vital needs can be outweighed by 
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other considerations (our existential needs in the case of depression, or our ultimate 
concerns in the case of the martyr). 
 
 
7. Should my needs be my ultimate concern? 
 
I do not want to suggest that meeting our own needs ought to be our ultimate 
concern. We might almost say that it is unfortunate if we find ourselves in a position 
where meeting our needs has to be our central concern. Someone who has to focus all 
their energy on finding ways of meeting their needs will certainly find it more difficult 
to have a life full of positive content. (This is not to say that it is impossible, but it may 
be more difficult). 
Think of the discussion of someone who works simply in order to meet their 
vital needs (see III.4). In Chapter III, I suggested that (in the absence of any other 
content) it is difficult to see how such a life could be valuable. Here we have an 
example of someone who does not engage in activities because they find the activities 
valuable (contributes to their ultimate concerns) or satisfying (inherently valuable) or 
pleasurable, but simply in order to meet their vital needs. I argued that it is difficult to 
see how such a life could have any valuable content, or could be experienced as 
valuable or meaningful. If a life of happiness and meaning (a life felt to be valuable and 
satisfying) is a deep human desire (as I will argue in Part 2) we might say that a life that 
has to be devoted exclusively to doing activities that lack any value, simply in order to 
survive, is regrettable. 
This seems to relate back to Schopenhauer’s pessimistic account of human 
action. (See IV.5). It is not clear how a life that consisted of simply meeting our needs 
(e.g. hunger) could bring any lasting satisfaction. If your life simply involves meeting 
your needs (which will not stop the fact that at a later stage you will again have to meet 
those same needs) you do not seem to be achieving anything that lasts. It is difficult to 
see how any lasting satisfaction could follow.   
Having said all this, given the main argument of this section (meeting our needs 
matters in a non-arbitrary sense) we can see why, if someone has no choice, choosing 
such a life is perfectly understandable. The fact that meeting our needs genuinely 
matters shows that (in a sense) a person living this kind of life is not making a mistake. 
Rather, it is perfectly rational and reasonable to live a life of unsatisfying work if there 
really are no alternatives (but, we might add, it is regrettable that this is the case).  
There are two other things to be said about such a life. The first is that such a 
person may believe that there is always the possibility that their life will improve (they 
may rightly think that there is the potential for their life to change for the better). 
Secondly, someone may spend all their time involved in activities that they see no value 
in (simply to meet their needs). But, they may work with people they like, or they may 
have other relationships in their life that they value. This can also be a source of 
valuable content for them. (In the next chapter, I will argue that relationships with 
others are something that has – or can have - genuine value for us). If this is the case, 
their vital needs will not be the only thing that matters to them (and there may be the 
possibility of real value in their life).  
So, I hope it is clear that our needs are not only hypothetical needs. They are not 
experienced as needs in virtue of some prior choice (to value my life say). It seems 
wrong to say that people in depression choose to not value their life. Rather, this is a 
fact about how they experience their life. In the same way, it would be wrong to think 
that people (who are not depressed) have made some prior decision to value their life 
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(and that once they have made this choice, they experience their vital needs as needs). 
Someone who values their life has not chosen to value their life114 and as a result of 
their choice finds that their vital needs matter. (Even if you choose to ignore your vital 
needs (e.g. by going on hunger strike) your vital needs will still be experienced as needs 
(you will feel deprived of your needs) despite your choice.  
Before turning to the claim that our happiness genuinely matters to us, I want to 
return to Nagel’s claim that death is bad for us because life is valuable (Chapter I). 
Nagel claimed that death involves the loss of (or missing out on) something of value 
(life). The conclusion I reached at the end of Chapter I was a hypothetical one; if my 
life is valuable then my death is a bad thing for me. The discussion of our vital needs 
has demonstrated that, for most people, it is true that their life is valuable. It has also 
become clear that, when people cannot see their own life as valuable (e.g. in depression, 
or during a painful death) they may then fail to see that their own death is a bad thing. 
This implies that Nagel is right to say that death is bad for us in circumstances where 
our life is valuable. Because there are a number of factors involved in assessing whether 
an individual’s life is valuable, whether someone’s death is bad for them is something 
that needs to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. 
In the discussion of depression, I suggested that experiencing your life as 
valuable (as meaningful, happy) might also be thought of as a need. (And it is in virtue 
of this need not being met, that someone can come to see their life as not worth living.) 
In the next part of this chapter, I will attempt to support the claim that being happy is 
itself a human need, by arguing that our own happiness genuinely matters to us.  
 
 
PART 2 : HAPPINESS 
 
 
8. Happiness just does matter to us 
 
When discussing depression (see 5.i) I suggested that happiness could be 
described as a human need. It seems right to say that being happy just is a valuable state 
(for us). So, I want to argue that human beings are unavoidably orientated towards their 
own happiness. (This is a fact about our nature). Throughout this thesis, I have 
discussed a range of things that human beings value. I will be arguing that it is right to 
give happiness a special status. 
In fact, the major issue I tackle in Part 2 is how we should define happiness. We 
could define happiness as whatever it is that everyone aims for. And, of course, it will 
follow from this that human beings unavoidably aim for their own happiness. The 
problem is that this claim faces the charge of emptiness (everyone unavoidably aims for 
what everyone aims for). Avoiding the charge of emptiness involves explaining how 
(while everyone wants to be happy) people can come to want things that don’t actually 
make them happy. So, given the fact that people can be mistaken about those things that 
will lead them to be happy, I am not saying that whatever people aim for is called 
happiness. My discussion will also lead me to attempt to define happiness in a way 
which strongly parallels the definition of a personally meaningful life (described in 
Chapter VI).  
                                                 
114 Perhaps people in denial could perhaps be described as people who (mistakenly) choose to value their 
life. 
 104
9. You cannot be mistaken in thinking that you aim to be happy 
 
The claim that our happiness matters in a non-arbitrary sense is not based on the 
fact that just about every person (as a matter of fact) happens to aim for their own 
happiness (although this happens to be true).  
There may be many different things that human beings aim for (for example, 
wealth, relationships, achievements etc.) The fact is that happiness (as something we 
aim for) is special.115 Imagine I believe that wealth, status and fame are what are most 
valuable to me (my ultimate concerns). What do I do if I become wealthy, achieve a 
high status and become famous, but find that I am really not happy with my life? If 
happiness were just another thing to aim at (if our choice of what we want is arbitrary) 
then it looks a though we could just as well say; ‘I have what I want. If I am not happy, 
I can’t have wanted happiness’. In fact, if we get many of the things that we strive for, 
but find that we are still not happy, we are much more likely to think that we were 
striving for the wrong things.  
This suggests that happiness is not something we desire in the way we might 
desire wealth etc. Someone who aims to be happy is not looking for another item to put 
on their list of achievements. Rather, they are expressing their wish that the things on 
the list should ‘add up to something’, should fit together in a coherent way and should 
lead to a satisfying life. Both of these features (coherence and satisfaction as the criteria 
of a happy life) have clear parallels with personal meaning. In both cases, to find 
happiness, or meaning in your life is not to seek for yet one more end. In both cases, our 
own satisfaction with our life is the main criteria we should use in judging whether in 
fact our life is a happy, meaningful one. The parallels between happiness and personal 
meaning will be explored throughout my discussion. 
It might be argued that we can make sense of the idea of someone being 
mistaken about the fact that they wanted to be happy. Imagine someone who, in their 
attempts to be happy, focuses all their energies on having the best possible time at any 
given moment. At some later stage, they might come to realise that they want more in 
their life. Perhaps they want to tackle something serious – that involves sacrificing some 
of their pleasures and comforts. On the surface, this may look like they have decided to 
turn away from their own happiness. But, if we use another (broader) understanding of 
happiness (one that incorporates the importance of personal meaning to a satisfying life) 
we might say that they have given up the idea that they can be happy through the 
hedonistic pursuit of their own interests. They have come to understand that such a life 
doesn’t make them truly satisfied. It seems more natural to say that they have revised 
their view of the kind of life that would make them satisfied, rather than that they have 
given up wanting a satisfying life. This suggests that we cannot make a mistake in 
thinking we want to be happy, but we can be mistaken about the sorts of things that will 
make us happy. 
We return here to the idea that a lack of self-awareness can lead to making 
mistakes about what exactly makes us truly satisfied. (Once again, there are parallels 
between happiness and meaningfulness). People’s belief that their own happiness will 
result from the achievement of a given goal may be so strong, that they ignore the 
evidence that it is not making them happy (not giving them a sense that their life is 
valuable and satisfying.) This would explain how people could say ‘When I thought 
wealth and status was all that mattered, I thought I was happy, but I now realise that I 
                                                 
115 This argument is in part based on Norman’s discussion of Aristotle in Norman, R. (1983) The Moral 
Philosophers. Clarendon Press: Oxford (see pp. 39-43). 
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wasn’t satisfied.’ There might be reasons for saying that finding the kind of life that 
truly satisfies you requires a great deal of effort (see VI.7.iv).  
I want to claim that a happy life is not guaranteed by the fact that a life is full of 
what is perceived as valuable content. (I also want to deny that everyone is in a perfect 
position to understand what kind of life would make them happy.) I want to discuss two 
forms of valuable content: The experience of pleasure and the achievement of goals. In 
both cases, I will argue that being happy cannot be guaranteed by the mere presence of 
such valuable content.  
 
 
10. Can pleasure alone make us happy? 
 
In Chapter I, it was clear that pleasure is not the only thing that can be described 
as ‘good for us’. In other words, while there may be reasons for thinking that pleasure 
(other things being equal) is something we value, there are other things that we value 
that can outweigh the value of pleasure. For example, imagine that you have a kiss with 
someone behind your partner’s back. At the time, you find the kiss extremely 
pleasurable. But then your partner finds out, and as a result, they end the relationship. 
Far from thinking of the kiss as something valuable, you might come to think of that 
moment of pleasure as the worst moment of your life, and the source of your 
unhappiness. (Surely, no-one would want a life full of pleasures of this kind.) 
Obviously, it is not my intention to suggest that a life filled with pleasure 
couldn’t be a happy life. There may indeed be reasons for thinking that pleasure is an 
important component of a happy life. Rather, I want to argue that the mere presence of 
lots of pleasure does not guarantee that a life is a happy one.  
 
 
i. Are humans only motivated by pleasure? 
 
I have discussed a number of different ways in which things can be valuable for 
us, and have suggested that, while pleasure can be one of those things, there are 
occasions when the value of pleasure can be outweighed. So, it is wrong to think that 
the only things human beings are interested in (the only idea they could have of a 
valuable life) is gaining pleasure and avoiding pain.  
Imagine someone who wants to retain the idea that pleasure is the only thing that 
people aim for. They might claim that (despite my arguments) the only thing humans 
ever seek is pleasure. They might say that the reason why we do not value the kiss in the 
example above is that it leads to deeply un-pleasurable (painful) experiences; your 
regret, the pain of the end of the relationship etc. So, it is in fact true that we only seek 
pleasure, and we now regret the kiss because, in the long run, it led to lots of unpleasant 
experiences. 
The claim that pleasure is the only thing we seek may begin to look irrefutable. 
Whenever anyone comes up with something that (looks as though it) can be described 
as seeking something other than pleasure, we simply find a way of re-describing it as 
seeking pleasure (or avoiding pain).  
I want to draw on an example to get a clearer view about all this. It is an 
example I like so much that I will set out a long quote to illustrate it, and I will use the 
example again in the next chapter (against a different target, but in a similar way – see 
VIII.3.ii). 
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A group of investigators led by Dr. David Rosenham, professor of psychology 
and law at Stanford University, had themselves admitted as patients to various 
mental institutions. The hospital staff did not know there was anything special 
about them; the investigators were thought to be simply patients. The 
investigator’s purpose was to see how they would be treated. 
The investigators were perfectly ‘sane’, whatever that means, but their very 
presence in the hospital created the assumption that they were mentally 
disturbed. Although they behaved normally – they did nothing to feign illness – 
they soon discovered that everything they did was interpreted as a sign of some 
sort of mental problem … Even their protestations of normalcy were turned 
against them. One of the real patients warned them: ‘Never tell a doctor that 
you’re well. He won’t believe you. That’s called a ‘flight into health’. Tell him 
you’re still sick, but you’re feeling a lot better. That’s called insight.”116 
 
In this example, as is the case with pleasure, it was possible for the doctors to 
interpret everything the patients did as the acts of people with mental health problems. 
But, just because all the behaviour of the ‘sane’ investigators could be interpreted in this 
way, this doesn’t mean that it is true that the investigators really were insane. (The most 
shocking thing about the example is that the people working in the hospital are in a 
sense, experts about mental illness. Even so, they were unable to tell the difference 
between a sane and an insane person.) Similarly, the mere fact that every motivation can 
be re-described as though it was merely the pursuit of pleasure does not show that 
pleasure really is the only thing that motivates us. 
In both cases, it looks as though important distinctions have been lost (due to the 
ease with which we can re-describe the examples to fit a preconceived idea about what 
we presume must be going on.) If we re-describe all motivations as cases of seeking 
pleasure and wishing to avoid displeasure (or pain) we then seem to lose all the different 
ways of distinguishing between the vast array of feelings and emotions human beings 
are capable of having. Surely something important gets lost if we describe a kiss and the 
joy of a long term relationships as simply two instances of the same thing – pleasure. 
Similarly, we might think that important distinctions have been lost if we describe a 
punch in the face on the one hand, and grief and loneliness on the other as simply 
instances of displeasure.  
While it is true that all human action can be (re-described) as motivated by 
seeking pleasure, this does not mean that it is true that we only seek pleasure (just as it 
is not true that the investigators are really insane just because all their actions can be 
described as though they were insane). We do, as a matter of fact, think of other things 
apart from pleasure as valuable. I will be suggesting that a life filled with mere 
pleasurable content does not guarantee a happy life (see iii.) The reasons for this should 
become clearer if we first look at another form of valuable content, achieving your 
aims. 
 
 
ii. Achieving your aims 
 
As has already been discussed, it is possible to achieve things you have been 
working towards (in the belief that the possession of these things will make you happy) 
                                                 
116 Rachels, J. (1993) The Elements of Moral Philosophy (Second Edition). McGraw-Hill: London p. 73 
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but find that you are not, as a matter of fact, happy117. So, happiness is not just a case of 
having content that you think of as valuable (pleasure, achievements etc.) This valuable 
content needs to come together in some kind of satisfying way. We can certainly 
imagine a life that contains things of value, but which does not come together in any 
kind of coherent way, and is in fact experienced as a series of disconnected events. 
All of this suggests that happiness is not something ‘merely’ additive. As I have 
said, in this respect, there seems to be a strong parallels between happiness and having a 
life with a personal meaning. In both cases, what is important is not so much the nature 
of the content, but whether it hangs together in a satisfying way. One does not assess 
whether someone is happy by adding up positive ‘moments’ and subtracting ‘negative’ 
moments. In both cases, the final test of whether someone is happy or has a meaningful 
life is the person’s own satisfaction with their life. The mere presence of content you 
perceive to be valuable is not enough. 
 
 
 iii. Why pleasure cannot cohere effectively 
 
There may even be reasons for saying that making the accumulation of ‘mere’ 
pleasure your ultimate concern (making it your idea of a happy, meaningful life) is a 
mistake. It seems right to say that (if you are seeking pleasure for pleasure’s sake) then 
the value of a pleasurable moment will be found in that moment (not in the connection 
between that moment and other moments). We can of course have pleasure from the 
connection between events. For example, the pleasure of finishing my PhD is related to 
my goals, my aims, my ultimate concerns. In this case, we could describe the pleasure 
as ‘connected’ pleasure, as the value of my pleasure is connected to other aspects of my 
life which I think of as valuable. (Seeking this kind of pleasure is not a mistake). By 
contrast, if you simply achieve something that only has a discrete value in each moment 
(pleasure for pleasure’s sake) it is not at all clear how your life could hang together in 
any satisfying sense. 
 
 
11. The two extremes of a satisfying life 
 
I have suggested that there are strong affinities between a happy life and a 
meaningful life. It looks as though the criterion of a happy life is the same as the 
criterion for a meaningful life (see VI.7.vii). In both cases, it is not just the content of 
the life that is important. It is also important that the content of the life hangs together in 
the right way. In both cases, the final criteria of whether a life is a happy or meaningful 
one comes down to whether the person finds their life satisfying. In both cases, 
problems around self-awareness can cause people to make mistakes. When talking 
about a meaningful life, I argued that it was important that we were motivated to act in 
accord with our ultimate concerns. In the context of happiness, we might say that it is 
important that we feel that we have purposes worth living for (i.e. we are not 
depressed). So, it looks as though there is virtually no difference between happiness and 
meaningfulness. But, if we set out examples of a happy life on the one hand, and a 
                                                 
117 This is one possible explanation of a ‘mid-life crisis’. If you manage to achieve all the things you think 
of as valuable (say a house, a car, a family) but find that you are not, as a matter of fact, satisfied (you 
have a real sense that it has not made your life a coherent, satisfying whole) you may be confronted by the 
fact that you have been pursuing the wrong things (the wrong ultimate concerns).  
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meaningful life on the other, it might start to look as though there is a real difference 
between them. 
Firstly, imagine a man who devotes his life to something which leads him to be 
confronted with extreme pain and suffering, but which to him amounts to a satisfying 
life. He becomes a health worker in Africa, working with people with Aids. He gains 
some sense that he makes a difference to his ‘patients’ lives, but he is constantly 
confronted by the extreme suffering of those with Aids. (They are able to make a 
difference, but can never really solve the problem.) Still, they feel that they have ‘no 
alternative’. There are reasons for saying that such a person experiences his own life as 
valuable. We might also say that there is a sense in which he experiences his life as 
satisfying (or, at the very least, that they would not be satisfied if they didn’t help these 
people.)  
Compare this example with the case of an artist, who fills their time with 
satisfying activities to which they are deeply connected, and which gives them a deep 
sense of satisfaction. Perhaps they affect people with their work, but they would say 
their happiness arises from the fact that they enjoy and value how they spend their time. 
Once again there is a sense that this kind of life can be experienced as valuable and 
satisfying (though in a slightly different sense). 
 These examples might suggest that being happy (the second example) is 
different from having a meaningful life (the first example). What links these examples 
is that, in both cases, the people involved have ultimate concerns that hang together so 
as to be effective in delivering the sense that the person’s life is personally satisfying for 
them. In my view, these two examples are best seen as two ends of a spectrum. The 
kind of life that would satisfy most people involves a mix of commitment to worthwhile 
goals, and personally enjoyable time. The mix that is most satisfying to someone cannot 
be outlined in the abstract (they need to mix these according to their own preferences). 
As I have said, whether your life is meaningful (happy) or not is something that needs to 
be tested against experience. If having an ultimate concern that is effective will deliver 
the sense that we are satisfied with our life (which genuinely matters to us) then we 
should accept that it genuinely matters to us that our ultimate concerns are effective. 
 
 
12. My curious friend 
 
If it is accepted that it is a need to find satisfaction in your life, can the fact that 
something contributes towards our happiness provide us with a way of answering my 
curious friend’s questions? Imagine my curious friend asks why (say) teaching Tai Chi 
matters to me. I might answer that it matters to me because it makes me happy. My 
curious friend might then ask ‘Why does it matter to you if you are happy?’ Once again, 
the response ‘It just does’ seems appropriate. There may be a discussion we could have 
about what facts about human beings that makes this the case. If my curious friend is 
asking a genetic, physiological or historical etc. question, I would admit that I don’t 
know why it happens to be that human beings seek their own happiness But it’s not 
clear that I have to be able to answer this kind of discussion to think that I have given 
my curious friend a perfectly reasonable response. 
We may though face a genuinely live question if my curious friend were to ask 
me; are you right to think that teaching Tai Chi really will contribute to your happiness? 
(But then, full awareness about what will make us happy is not guaranteed). This brings 
us back to the charge of emptiness. After all, I seem to be saying that happiness just is 
whatever satisfies people, whatever that is. It is, I think, more complex than this. 
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Everyone pursues their own happiness in a concrete way. (By trying to get the things 
that they think will satisfy them). If we assume that not just anything will make 
someone happy, it seems conceivable that people can make a mistake and pursue ways 
of life (ultimate concerns) that couldn’t possibly lead to a satisfying life for them. In 
section 10.iii, I argued that pursuing pleasure for pleasure’s sake is one such mistake. In 
the next chapter, I will argue that making the pursuit of our own narrow self-interest our 
ultimate concern is also a mistake. In the conclusion, I will argue that pursuing power, 
status and wealth for their own sakes is a mistake (see Conclusion.4.iii). In this respect, 
it should be clear that I am not saying that happiness is whatever people happen to 
pursue. 
 
 
13. Conclusion 
 
At this stage, I want to make clear what is involved in claiming that our own 
needs and our own happiness genuinely matter to us. In section 2, I argued that, given 
our nature, there is no problem with thinking that things could genuinely matter to us 
from our perspective. In this chapter, I have defended the view that we are right to think 
that our own needs and our own happiness really do matter to us (it is not just that in 
some arbitrary way, all people just happen to think that these things do matter to them).  
In Chapter IV (see IV.2.iii) I argued that nothing could matter ‘objectively’. In 
this chapter, I have argued that our own vital needs, and our own happiness matter in 
virtue of our nature. But, I have argued that they don’t matter simply in virtue of our 
nature (objective facts about us). Rather, I have argued that they matter in virtue of the 
fact that we are able to take up the perspective of ourselves on the facts about our own 
nature. When we do this, we discover that our own needs and our own happiness 
genuinely matter to us. 
In Chapter V (see IV.5) I made the decision to investigate the things that 
genuinely matter independently of religious belief. It is not clear how, even if there is a 
true religious account of the universe, this would undermine the conclusions I have 
reached in this chapter. The facts about human existence I have made reference to are 
not one’s that religion generally denies. It seems better to say that if there is a true 
religious account of the universe, then perhaps there will be extra things that genuinely 
matter.  
If the arguments in this chapter are accepted, we seem to have an answer to one 
of the challenges posed by religious belief. In Chapter V (see V.4.i) I discussed 
Nozick’s version of the epistemological argument. He argued that, when it comes to 
meaning, the only reasonable place to stop would be at the ‘infinite’ (i.e. God). I argued 
that, if we could show that there were reasonable places to stop (other than the infinite) 
then Nozick’s challenge will have been overcome. I take it that the arguments in this 
chapter make it clear that some (non-infinite) things can genuinely matter. So, there are 
reasonable places to stop in defending the claim that something matters, which fall far 
short of ‘infinitude’. 
The arguments in this chapter might be thought troubling for another reason. If 
our own happiness and meeting our own needs is what fundamentally matters to us, this 
might suggest that we have good reason to be self-interested and selfish. In the next 
chapter, I will argue that this is not the case. I will use some facts about our birth to 
show that human beings are not inherently selfish. In fact, I hope to show that positive 
relationships with other people are necessary if we are to meet our needs and to be 
happy.   
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
DO OTHER PEOPLE MATTER? 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The content of the last chapter (our own needs and our own happiness genuinely 
matters to us) may suggest that the most rational attitude we can have is to only care 
about our own self-interest. In section 2 of this chapter (Birth) I will be arguing that 
other people do matter to us (in so far as they are necessary if we are to have our needs 
met.) This claim is based on the fact that all human beings are born helpless - incapable 
of meeting their own needs. If our own needs matter (as I argued in the last chapter) 
then until we are capable of looking after ourselves, other people obviously matter to 
us.118 We will need other people. 
This discussion should help moderate the fact that I have focused on the 
perspective of the individual in drawing out the things that genuinely matter. The 
arguments in this chapter show that, even if we start from the perspective of the 
individual, other people are vitally important to us right from the start of human 
existence. 
I will also be discussing egoism - the view that human beings are naturally 
selfish. I will argue that, if it is true that human beings are inherently selfish, we would 
have to accept that other people couldn’t genuinely matter to us. I will be attempting to 
show that human beings are not inherently selfish. I will also be arguing that selfishness 
is not natural to us, as human beings are naturally social in nature. 
In the second part of this chapter, I will be arguing that not only do other people 
matter insofar as they are necessary for us to meet our needs, they are also important to 
us if we are to be happy. I will argue that we require the help of other people if we are 
to learn to love ourselves and be aware of ourselves (both of which are integral to our 
happiness). Given the fact that our needs and our happiness do matter to us, then other 
people really do matter, insofar as they are necessary for us to achieve things that do 
matter to us. This might suggest that other people do matter, but still for selfish reasons. 
In response to this, I will be arguing that being selfish is incompatible with have the 
kinds of positive relationships that genuinely matter to us (see section 3.i). 
 
 
2. Birth 
 
i. Birth and needs 
 
I want to start by arguing that relationships with other people are a necessary 
and integral part of human existence119. This is to say that relationships matter to us in a 
                                                 
118 There are some complications in all this that I haven’t addressed. In particular, it might be thought that 
there are difficulties with saying things matter to a baby (given the fact that they lack self-awareness). At 
the very least though, most children will have a long period where they have some level of self-awareness 
while they are also to some extent dependent. 
119 This argument developed out of suggestions from Norman, R. (1983) The Moral Philosophers. 
Clarendon Press: Oxford (see p. 150) and Fromm, E. (2001) The Fear of Freedom. Routledge: 
London(see pp. 19-27) 
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non-arbitrary way. Our belief that relationships matter to us is not an arbitrary choice 
made with no rational constraints. In fact, it isn’t a choice at all. My argument is based 
on a fact about the way in which all human life starts. Human beings are born helpless. 
Because of this fact, human existence implies human relationships. 
Babies, without exception require a phenomenal amount of care.120 A human 
baby can do virtually nothing for itself. They need to be fed. They need to be kept clean 
(have their nappies changed etc.) They need to be given enough stimulation. And they 
need to be given the right conditions for sleep. In comparison with an adult, this list of 
needs looks quite basic. But having these needs met is vital, and it is impossible for 
them to meet their needs themselves. So, human babies require having their vital needs 
met by someone else (someone who is capable of meeting their needs.) We might say 
that human beings are born requiring care. 
Meeting a baby’s needs well can be a difficult process. They are (in one sense at 
least) born with an extremely minimal communication system. All they can do to 
inform you of their needs is to cry. They cannot communicate in any sophisticated sense 
about their current needs.121 There are a number of different ways in which a human 
baby is helpless. It is may be eight months before they can move around under their 
own control (a year – or more - until they do this standing up.) A year before they can 
feed themselves (and this is only true as long as the food has been prepared for them, 
and given to them in a way they can get to). It is two years before they can manage 
basic communication.  
 Until children become self-sufficient, some of their needs and interests will need 
to be met by others. This process of becoming self-sufficient may take different 
amounts of time in different cultures, and depending on different circumstances.122 The 
amount of time it takes to learn to take care of one’s own needs might depend (in part) 
on how sophisticated those needs are. (Do you need to be able to work a computer, 
drive a car, fill out tax forms etc. to be self-sufficient in this culture?) We can at least 
say that it is a good many years before people are capable of meeting their basic needs 
without assistance.  
 Because a relationship (of carer to cared-for) is necessary if a baby is to live, 
then relationships with other people (at least initially) are not something freely chosen. 
We might say that human beings are born into relationships. Our incredible level of 
dependency requires that, if we are to reach an age where we can achieve self-
sufficiency (a point at which, perhaps, relationships can be freely chosen) we must first 
be cared for. This means at least one relationship (the relationship of carer to cared-for) 
is a necessary part of the life of every human being that reaches a certain age. (Even 
when self-sufficiency is reached, these relationships will still form an integral part of a 
person’s history). 
All this implies that human beings do not need to ‘decide’ (from a position 
where we have no relationships with others) whether there are good reasons to think 
that relationships matter to them. Relationships with others are not something we can 
                                                 
120 Even when they die early in their lives, it is incredibly rare that people haven’t ‘tried their best’. 
121 Perhaps it’s not as simple as all this. I looked after my niece for a couple of months. To begin with, I 
did have to go through a short list (almost at random) of reasons for her crying: Is she bored? Is she tired? 
Is she hungry? Does she need her nappy changed? Is she comfortable? Is she teething? Does she have 
colic? As time went on, I found that I had a greater capacity to ‘tune in’ to the reasons for the current 
crying, so I didn’t have to go through the list in such a random way. 
122 A case could be made for saying that people in western cultures become self-sufficient much later than 
in, say, a hunter-gatherer society. 
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take or leave (at least not initially). We are born into relationships. Human existence 
already implies relationships of care (and dependency). 
 As it happens most humans are born into a whole range of relationships. We are 
born into relationships with a state (birth certificate, national insurance number etc.). In 
virtue of our relationship to the state, we are also placed in a wider range of further 
relationships – people are designated as your teachers, your social worker, your bin 
man, your postman, your local shop keeper. We are born into relationships; not just with 
our parents but also all the people your parents have relationships with - your parents’ 
wider family (my uncles, aunts, nieces, grandparents) and also their friends. (We might 
say, at least initially, that these relationships are not chosen). 
  
 
 ii. The development of children is a social process 
  
In order to learn the skills and abilities that will allow us to be self-sufficient 
(capable of looking after ourselves) we need other people. Other people teach us the 
skills required to be self-sufficient, either through instruction or by their example. 
There are connections here with a discussion in Chapter III. In that chapter, I 
suggested that the kinds of creative activities that lend themselves to play (which can be 
done in virtue of the fact that they are seen as inherently valuable or enjoyable) can also 
be those that help one develop skills (see III.6). We need other people then to learn the 
skills that increase our ability to be self-sufficient (take care of ourselves) 
We also need other people to learn the skills that can help us improve our ability 
to express ourselves. In order to learn how to express ourselves (both in language and 
through our activities) we require the help (and the time) of others. In particular, 
language is a thoroughly social acquisition. You learn your language (and so learn the 
skills required to express yourself in language and to think rationally) from other 
people. In learning a language, one does not just acquire words, but also ideas and 
concepts. You can only exist as a thinking rational individual by acquiring the language 
of a community.  
All of this suggests that, in an important sense, given the fact that the 
development of the self towards self-sufficient is a social process, and given the fact 
that relationships are an inherent part of human existence, that the self is (at least in 
part) social. Much philosophy tends to think of the self as (inherently) fully self-
sufficient and fundamentally isolated from others.123 The arguments discussed here 
suggest that full self-sufficiency is something that the self only achieves in virtue of its 
relationships with others. So, even if human beings reach full self-sufficiency, it is 
because of their connectedness to others. This will be discussed again in the context of 
the claims of egoism. 
 
 
iii. Birth and freedom 
 
The discussion so far has shown that there is a very obvious sense in which 
babies are not born free. They are born dependent. Of course, given the right kinds of 
help from other people, they are born capable of becoming free (self-sufficient). I want 
to suggest that the length of human dependency is the basis of our profound freedom. 
                                                 
123 I’m thinking in particular of Sartre’s account of the free self. Descartes and Hobbes could both be 
accused of having a similar view. 
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Human beings incredible level of dependency signals how little of their behaviour is 
instinctual. Think of creatures highly dominated by (innate) instinctual responses.  A 
beetle may have the instinctive response to move away from certain kinds of 
movements, seek certain kinds of smells etc. in a purely mechanistic way. One of the 
advantages of these kinds of instinctual response mechanisms is that, not needing to be 
learnt, they can be operative very quickly. This makes the young of such creatures 
highly self-sufficient very early in their lives. There is no particular flexibility or any 
real sense of development in their skills. But the skills required to make them self-
sufficient are present straight away. In this sense, purely instinctive creatures do not 
need to be cared for.  
Human beings are not the only creatures that require care. For example, chicks 
require care from their parents. Perhaps one bird has to sit on the nest, while another 
bird gets enough food for everyone. But, the skills needed for a bird to be self-sufficient 
(including flying) can be gained in about 2 months. Even animals of equivalent size to 
humans become self-sufficient much quicker than we do.  
In a western culture like ours, there may be a sense in which people don’t 
become self-sufficient until their twenties. (University students are still, at least in part, 
supported by their families, their local council and (through debt) supported by their 
future selves.) It may be a separate question when a person is capable of becoming self-
sufficient. Think of how old a child would be before – if you lost them in the wilderness 
– they would be capable of being self-sufficient. 
(To put it in a way that may be – philosophically124 – contentious) we might say 
that the enormous length of our dependency is the foundation of our freedom. Human 
beings’ incredible level of dependency signals how little of their behaviour is 
instinctual. Human existence is not like the existence of a purely instinctive animal. 
(This is one of the things we might mean by saying that we are free.) We are not born 
with (basic, rigid, inflexible) skills. Rather, we have to painstakingly learn the skills we 
can use to become self-sufficient. 
 Babies may be highly dependent. But it is incredible how much they learn (think 
about how much information a mother – who is particularly proud – can give you about 
how many developments their baby has been through in a month). Having said that, it’s 
amazing how ‘incompetent’ babies are to start off with and how little control they have 
(especially given the complexity of the skills they will eventually learn). Think of how 
much a baby has to learn in terms of control of their motor skills, before they can even 
begin to write the letters of the alphabet clearly (even if they are just copying them). 
Babies like this will eventually become capable of learning the skills required to drive a 
car, write a PhD, sell stuff they no longer want on e-bay, etc. None of these things (even 
in exceptional people) comes naturally. Each skill builds on further skills, all of which 
have to be learnt, practiced etc.  
 This may explain why human beings are dependent for so long. We take years to 
develop the skills required to be self-sufficient because the skills that we learn, or are 
capable of learning, are so sophisticated and flexible. Again, this seems to tie in to the 
discussion of play in Chapter III. There I discussed the way in which creative activities 
could be both enjoyable and at the same time develop your ability to look after yourself, 
express yourself etc. In a very obvious sense, children learn through play. 
 
                                                 
124 I do not intend to get involved in the debate between free will and determinism, though perhaps a case 
could be made on the basis of the arguments in this section that hard determinism will lose sight of a real 
distinction between rigid, purely instinctual skills on the one hand, and the kind of highly flexible skills I 
have been discussing on the other. 
 114
3. Egoism 
 
i. Egoism and relationships 
 
In the last chapter, we saw that human beings want to be happy. We ought 
therefore to be interested in how to achieve happiness. (In the last chapter, I argued that, 
in order to achieve happiness, we shouldn’t just think about getting what we want, or 
doing pleasurable things. It mattered whether the individual events and goals in our life 
cohere in a satisfying way). It might seem that, if our own needs and our own happiness 
genuinely matters to us, that one rational way to answer to pursue your own happiness 
is to maximise your own self-interest.  
I am particularly interested in the claims of psychological egoism. This is the 
claim that the only thing that ever motivates people to act is that they think that they are 
promoting their own self-interest. For example, according to Hobbes, we can say “of the 
voluntary acts of every man, the object is some Good to himselfe.”125 If it is true that 
everyone is motivated to act in this way, then events and actions would have 
significance for people only in so far as they have a bearing on their own self-interest.  
Even a selfish person is of course interested or concerned with others. But they 
are concerned with other people in so far as other people impact on their own self-
interest. (There may be a case for saying that selfishness promotes manipulation.) 
Because of this, there seem to be good reasons to say that selfish people are incapable of 
loving relationships. (When I talk of love in this chapter, I am not primarily concerned 
with sexual love. I am concerned with caring relationships with others in general).  
One central aspect of love may be the thought that the interests of the person you love 
are seen as significant and desirable enough to prompt action, concern etc. In other 
words, if you love someone, their interests become your interests (they may even, on 
occasion, outweigh your own interests). In this way, their interests can motivate you to 
act. If egoism is true (if people are only motivated to act by their own interests) then it 
looks as though loving relationships are impossible. Someone who is selfish is 
incapable of truly loving other people (the same might be said of other forms of self-
obsession – see section 4). 
  This is not to say that a selfish person is entirely unconcerned with the interests 
of other people. For example, if I am selfish, and a friend asks me to give them a hand 
moving their sofa, I might think ‘Well, if I help him, he will owe me. I know that he is 
very good at fixing computers. My computer is broken, so it is in my self-interest to 
exchange an hour of my time because in the end, it will save the £100 it would cost to 
have a professional fix my computer.’ In other words, I might think that it is worth 
acting in someone else’s interest because there are ‘instrumental’ reasons for helping 
them. In this case though, I am only being motivated by my own interests. I do not 
experience the other person’s interests as having any intrinsic value. So, even though I 
am, in a way, concerned with another person’s interests, I am still only motivated to act 
out of concern for my own interests. I do not genuinely care about their interests. I am 
not acting out of love. 
 This fact will be important in what follows. It may be thought that the arguments 
I am presenting really show that we have selfish reasons for engaging in positive 
relationships with other (as there is something in it for us). Still, if selfish people are 
unable to have truly positive relationships with others, the benefits from relationships 
                                                 
125 Hobbes, T. (1971) Leviathan. Penguin: Middlesex p. 192 
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(the needs that only positive relationships with other people can supply) will not be 
available to those who are only motivated by their own self-interest. 
 
 
 ii. Are we naturally selfish? 
 
The claim of the egoist was that people generally are only concerned with their 
own self-interest. This, according to them, is human nature. If this were the case, then 
genuine, loving relationships with others would be impossible. In this chapter, I have 
been arguing that in order to survive and develop, human beings require a phenomenal 
amount of care. In this section, I want to assess whether this provides us with a clear 
counter-example to the egoist’s claim. 
As I have said, human beings are born requiring care. Unless someone takes the 
effort to care for them (is concerned with their interests) they will die. So, we might 
reply to the egoist that someone who cares for a child must be concerned with 
someone’s interests other than their own (namely the child they care for). Given the fact 
that children (generally) survive to adulthood, someone must have been concerned with 
the child’s interests (not just their own interests). 
 A committed egoist has a possible response to this. They might say that parents 
take care of their children out of self-interest. In saying this, the egoist is making a 
claim about a parent’s motivation. So, the question is, when looking after their children, 
are parents motivated to do so purely by their own self-interest? As we saw with the 
example of helping my friend move his sofa, it is possible to act in someone’s interests 
while, at the same time, being motivated only by your own self-interest. So, it may be 
that if we look at the motivations behind child rearing, we will find that parents are 
really, at heart, acting selfishly.  
 There seem to be two plausible ways to ‘re-describe’ the actions of a parent in 
order to justify the claim that they are motivated by their own self-interest. The first 
possible selfish motivation they might be: It is in people’s own self-interest to take care 
of their children because taking care of their children makes them happy. The second 
possible selfish motivation could be: People care for their children because if they 
didn’t care for them, they would feel guilty.  
 In both cases, we might start by questioning whether the motivations as 
described could really be described as selfish. In the first case, we could ask: Why does 
taking care of their child’s interests make a parent happy? The most obvious 
explanation for this would be that they genuinely care about their child. This is why 
caring for their child makes them happy. But, if they are motivated by their care for 
another, it is less clear that they have a purely selfish motivation. It looks as though 
caring for their child makes them happy because they love their child. We might find 
that parents would feel guilty if they don’t care for their child have similarly selfless 
motivations. Perhaps they would feel guilty because they care about the well being of 
their child, and think that they ought to care for their child. If this is their motivation, 
again it is not clear that they are acting selfishly. 
 Of course, the fact that it is possible to re-describe the actions of the parent as 
though they were selfish is not enough to justify egoism. If the egoist is right, then it 
must be true that a parent’s real motivations are always selfish ones. This was clear in 
the last chapter where I discussed the fact that all human behaviour could be described 
as motivated by pleasure (see VII.10.iii). There I argued that the fact that we can 
universally describe behaviour in a single way doesn’t show that this way of describing 
behaviour is true. (In fact, as was clear with the example of the sane investigators of the 
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mental institutions, the fact that we describe behaviour as though it was always the same 
may suggest that we may be missing something important). 
 So, the question is, are parents really motivated to look after children purely in 
order to make themselves happy? It may be a fact that looking after their child does 
make them happy. Still, this does not mean that this is what motivates them to look after 
their child. It is not (usually) the thought that looking after their child will make them 
happy that makes the difference between a parent caring for, or not caring for their 
child. (And anyway, we might wonder how selfish someone is if caring for other people 
really makes them happy.) We can say something similar if the egoist says that parents 
care for their children because, if they didn’t, they would feel guilty. We might again 
wonder how common it is for people to be motivated to care for their child primarily 
from this motivation. (It is hopefully quite rare).  
 While there may (unfortunately) be cases where people are motivated to care for 
their children for purely selfish reasons, it is a big leap from this to the claim that all 
parents are motivated to care for their children for just these reasons. It is simply not 
enough that it is always possible to re-describe what someone does in selfish terms.  
In order for egoism to be justified, it needs to show that people are always 
motivated126 by such selfish reasons. In the case of a parent, the most reasonable 
explanation of the fact that they care for the interests of their child is that they love 
them. This would explain why caring for their child would make them happy. It would 
also explain why they might feel guilty if they failed to care for their child. 
It might be accepted that we are not naturally selfish. Still, it might be thought 
that the arguments in the last chapter (that our own needs and happiness really matter to 
us) shows that having a selfish attitude is still the most rational attitude we can have 
(would be the best way of ensuring that we achieve the things that really matter to us). 
So, even if we are not inherently selfish, there may be reasons for thinking that we 
ought to be selfish. In the next section, I will argue that a selfish attitude is actually a 
hindrance to leading a happy life (and, as I argued in VII.Part 2, our own happiness 
genuinely matters to us.) 
 
 
4. Happiness and self-love 
 
In this section, I am interested in the ways in which someone may be said to 
love, or care for themselves. There are a couple of things we might mean by this. We 
might say someone loves themselves if they are concerned with their own needs and 
happiness – someone who takes care of themselves. But, we might also mean that 
someone who loves themselves is satisfied with who they are – that they like 
themselves. 
I want to suggest that there is a relationship between loving yourself (in this 
second sense) and being satisfied with your life (happy). We might wonder whether 
someone can be unsatisfied with themselves (fail to love themselves in this sense) while 
being fully satisfied with their life. If you are not, to some extent, satisfied with 
yourself, it is difficult to see how you could have a belief in your life’s value. It might 
suggest that you do not perceive your life as significant, valuable etc. This suggests that 
                                                 
126 Perhaps it needs to show even more than this.  It depends on whether the claim is that all actual human 
motivation is (as it happens) self-interested, or the stronger claim that any possible human motivation is 
necessarily self-interested.  If the latter, even if it were true that all actual humans are in fact always 
motivated by self-interest, this wouldn’t be enough to prove the point. 
 117
valuing yourself (loving yourself) is a central part of being satisfied with your life, with 
being happy (in the broad sense discussed in Part 2 of the last chapter). 
Insofar as loving someone involves being concerned with their interests, it may 
look as though selfish people (given the fact that they are ultimately concerned with 
their own interests) must love themselves. I want to argue that this is not the case. I have 
three arguments to try to support the claim that selfish people (despite appearances) do 
not love themselves. 
The first is an empirical claim. The evidence from psychoanalysis127 is that 
people who are selfish (or self-obsessed generally) do not love themselves.  
 
Close observation shows that while the selfish person is always anxiously 
concerned with himself, he is never satisfied, always restless, always driven by 
the fear of not getting enough, of missing something, of being deprived of 
something … If we observe still closer, especially the unconscious dynamics, we 
find that this type of person is basically not fond of himself, but deeply dislikes 
himself.128 
 
It might seem that we need some kind of explanation of how it could be that 
someone whose ultimate concern is themselves (who puts their own needs and interests 
above everything else) doesn’t love themselves.  
 
Selfishness is rooted in this very lack of fondness for oneself … While on the 
surface it seems that these persons are very much in love with themselves, they 
are actually not fond of themselves and their … selfishness is an 
overcompensation for the basic lack of self-love.129 
 
There are a group of character traits we might describe as forms of self-
obsession. Selfishness is one such attitude. Others are attitudes like vanity, smugness, 
arrogance and narcissism. With all of these attitudes, you view the world as though you 
were superior to others, or you deserve more than others. The evidence from 
psychoanalysis then, is that forms of self-obsession are not manifestations of self-love, 
but are in fact manifestations of (or an overcompensation for) a basic insecurity. 
Intellectual smugness, for example, could be described as a strategy to find ways of 
bolstering one’s basic lack of self-love and self-esteem by finding ways in which you 
are ‘better’ than other people. This strategy suggests that you need to constantly find 
ways of ‘affirming’ your own value. In this sense, forms of self-obsession are actually a 
manifestation of a basic lack of self-love. 
 The second argument relates to the way in which selfish people attempt to 
pursue their own self-interest. There seem to be good reasons for describing selfishness 
as a form of greediness, in that it seems to contain an element of insatiability, but never 
any real satisfaction or contentment.  
 In the previous chapter, I argued that happiness doesn’t follow simply from 
gaining the things that you want (or desire). It is important both that you are self-aware 
enough to know what kind of life would truly satisfy you, and that your achievements 
need to hang together in some meaningful way.  
                                                 
127 For a more detailed discussion, see Fromm, E. (1939) ‘Selfishness and Self-love’, Psychiatry, Vol. 2., 
No. 4, November 1939.  
128 Fromm, E. (2001) The Fear of Freedom. Routledge: London. p. 100 
129 Ibid p. 100 
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 If we return to Schopenhauer’s claims about the meaningless nature of life (see 
IV.5) we might see why a selfish person’s attempts to find satisfaction are inherently 
unsatisfying. Schopenhauer argued that if we achieve our goals, we find them ultimately 
unsatisfying (as the achievement of any goal simply gives rise to a new goal that needs 
to be reached.) When discussing this claim, I argued that Schopenhauer’s account of our 
aims and goals does not apply to all human action. But, Schopenhauer’s account does 
seem true of forms of self-obsession. For example, when someone who is deeply vain 
gets complimented on their looks, there may be a short-term boost to their fragile self-
esteem. But this simply perpetuates their ‘felt need’ to be valued for their looks. 
Similarly, when someone is selfish, getting more of something may make them feel 
good. But, insofar as they are selfish, this will not bring their need to have more than 
others to an end. Rather, the next time they are in a similar situation, they are going to 
feel the need to have more than other people again. In both cases then, there may be a 
short-term satisfaction, but there doesn’t seem to be the possibility of any lasting 
satisfaction. 
In the last chapter (see VII.10) I argued that in order to achieve happiness, one 
couldn’t just think about getting what you want, or doing pleasurable things. It mattered 
whether these individual events and goals cohere in a satisfying way. So, while it might 
seem that one rational way to answer to pursue your own happiness is to maximise your 
own self-interest, if this is pursued on a purely case-by-case basis – prompted by 
immediate desires – two potential problems arise. Firstly (given the threat based on 
Schopenhauer’s pessimism) it is difficult to see how any lasting satisfaction could 
follow. Secondly, it is not clear how each of these individual achievements could add up 
to anything coherent. As with seeking pleasure for pleasure’s sake (see VII.10.iii) the 
value of the achievement of your self-interest will be found in that moment (not in the 
connection between that moment and other moments). So, it seems right to say that the 
mere fact that you often achieve a short-term gain in your self-interest cannot, on its 
own, guarantee a happy meaningful life. As the value of each event has a discrete value, 
it is not at all clear how your life could hang together in any satisfying sense. (This is an 
argument against pursuing your self-interest in ‘too narrow a way’. So, it may not be an 
argument against someone who takes a more long-term approach to pursuing their own 
self-interest).  
The third argument is based on the fact that self-obsessed people seem to be 
making some kind of mistake about their identity. In this chapter (see section 2) I have 
argued that the self is always (at least in part) a social self. In this respect, people who 
are ruthlessly selfish are acting only in the interests of their (isolated) desires. If the self 
is always (at least in part) social, we might almost say that selfish people lack self-
awareness. (and they are failing to act in the interests of their true self). The claim that 
the self-obsessed person doesn’t act in the interests of the ‘total personality’ is even 
clearer in cases such as vanity, intellectual smugness, or any form of arrogance based on 
specific abilities. A vain person believes that appearance is of fundamental importance 
in relation to self-worth. To the intellectually smug person, being intelligent is central to 
being a worthwhile person. But, insofar as they are not just intellect, or not just their 
appearance we might say that they do not love their ‘whole’ self. 
 It should now be clear that the self-love I am describing (self contentment - 
genuine fondness for the self) is very different from selfishness (those who ‘love 
themselves too much’, who are selfish or self-obsessed). I have argued that, despite the 
intuitions, selfish people do not effectively love themselves. The discussion in this 
section also suggests that selfishness can frustrate your happiness. There are in fact 
reasons for thinking that self-obsession is not a rational way to pursue your own 
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happiness. It is difficult to see how selfishness can lead to any lasting satisfaction or 
meaning. Given the fact that our own happiness genuinely matters to us, this section 
illustrates that, pursuing our own interests in too narrow a way (by not obsessing about 
your own narrow self-interest, or narrow aspects of the self etc.) is not an effective way 
to become happy.  
 So, if our happiness genuinely matters to us, we have good reasons to avoid the 
narrow pursuit of our own self-interest, as pursuing our own narrow self-interest is not 
an effective way to achieve happiness. In the next section, I will argue that people who 
are selfish (insofar as they will be incapable of truly caring relationships with others) 
will be cut off from some of the potential benefits of truly positive relationships. In the 
next two sections (5 & 6) I will attempt to describe some of these potential benefits. 
 
 
5. The value of relationships 
 
i. The importance of attention 
 
In this section, I want to discuss the ways in which gaining self-confidence and 
self-respect (believing you have self-worth, believing you are valuable) requires 
positive relationships with others. 
Firstly, I want to suggest that, unless others treat you as valuable, it is difficult to 
sustain the idea that you really are valuable. Think of a homeless person on the streets 
of London. They stand in the same place all day asking passers by ‘Any spare change?’ 
Every so often, someone talks to them, or gives them money. Occasionally, someone 
might be rude to them. But the majority of people pass by acting as though nothing has 
been said to them. The homeless person’s actions appear to have had absolutely no 
effect on the world, and the people in it. It is as though they never spoke.  
 If a person’s actions have no effect on other people (or if nobody cares about 
them) they will have difficulties in sustaining the idea that their life really is valuable. 
Homeless people in this position are found to have increasing levels of mental health 
problems.  
 
writers on schizophrenia such as R.D. Laing have shown from empirical studies 
how the constant invalidating or ignoring of a person’s actions and utterances, 
especially from within a family, can quite literally produce a loss of any 
coherent sense of who one is, or of being a person, to the point of mental 
breakdown.130  
 
Specifically, people in this position appear to have difficulty in holding on to 
any sense of a self (and certainly difficulty having any real sense of self-worth). So, it is 
extremely difficult to hold on to the idea that you are worthwhile or valuable if no one 
treats you as valuable. (If a parent behaved in this way, we would call it psychological 
abuse). By contrast, when others give their attention ‘unreservedly’ to what we say, we 
are given the message that we are worth listening to etc.  
The importance of having the attention of others might also be seen when a 
young child is starved of attention. (Imagine their only carer spends all day ignoring 
them, watching the television instead). We might say that children require attention – 
not just of their physical needs. If a child gets no attention, they would rather have bad 
                                                 
130 Norman, R. (1983) The Moral Philosophers. Clarendon Press: Oxford p. 166 
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attention than no attention. They would rather have their father shouting at them than 
live in a world of other people where their existence isn’t recognised. 
I argued in the last two chapters that part of living a meaningful, happy life 
involved having some sense that our actions make a difference, that they have an impact 
on the world. Insofar as human beings are social creatures, in order for life to be 
meaningful, it is important that our actions have an effect on the ‘social world’. In this 
context, it seems that we cannot gain the sense that we have a valuable impact on the 
world (are a valuable member of the social world) unless we have some positive 
feedback from others. 
 
 
 ii. The importance of respecting others 
 
You don’t just need other people to treat you as valuable. You also need to 
respect the opinion of those who value you. Think of what happens when someone you 
have absolutely no respect for falls in love with you. In these circumstances, you do not 
get the same sense of having your value affirmed. You are being treated as valuable. 
But, unless you respect the opinion of the person, you cannot truly take on board their 
opinion of you. 
When someone you respect - whose opinion you value - treats you as valuable, 
you are getting the strongest possible affirmation that you really are valuable. You are 
capable of having true self-confidence. (Unlike, say, the achievement of a goal that 
arises out of self-obsession, this kind of affirmation is genuinely capable of quietening 
your uncertainty about your value.) 
There may be reasons for thinking that, if you are to get your value affirmed by 
others (in circumstances where they value you, and you value their opinion) you need to 
be yourself in the relationship. The fact that they are affirming your value only works if 
you are truly yourself. Imagine you think that a side of your self is ‘shameful’. Your 
embarrassment may lead you to conceal this part of yourself from others.  The 
affirmation of your value from another will not help you in these circumstances. Their 
affirmation of your value is an affirmation not of you, but of the part of you that you 
allow them to see. Given the fact that you know that their judgement of you does not 
relate to the ‘true’ you, you know that your self is not affirmed in their love.  
 Forms of self-obsession actually seem to damage your chances of gaining the 
benefits of this kind of relationship (they can actually be a barrier to achieving the kinds 
of things that can lead to a genuine sense of self worth). Think of the effect of arrogance 
and smugness on one’s ability to affirm your own self-worth. Arrogance places a barrier 
in the way of valuing other people. The attempt to bolster one’s confidence through 
finding ways in which you are better than other people, means that you have a vested 
interest in believing that other people are less valuable than you. If you are always 
looking for ways in which you are superior to other people, you are going to find it 
particularly difficult to find people whose opinions you value. 
 
 
6. Self-awareness 
 
i. The importance of self-awareness 
 
Throughout the last three chapters, it has become clear that there is an important 
relationship between one’s capacity to seek a fulfilling life and one’s level of self-
 121
awareness. (For example, see VI.7.iv,v,vi). In this section, I want to argue that knowing 
yourself requires positive relationships with other people. People can fail to have full 
self-awareness of their deeper needs. If someone is in denial, other people may in a 
better position to describe their true situation (and even feelings) than they are. People 
can lack the ability or desire to ‘interpret’ their inner feelings. People unskilled in these 
kinds of activities may not be the best judge of their true situation. (They will require 
the help of people with more ‘insight’.) 
Denial (in part) involves putting lots of your energy into keeping up the illusion 
that you are happy. There seem to be parallels with selfishness here. Just as someone’s 
concern with their own interests can actually be motivated by their doubts over whether 
they really are valuable, so, the fact that someone in denial attempts to keep up a 
cheerful façade can actually be a manifestation of the fact that they are not happy. In 
both cases, it is tempting to describe such behaviour as a form of overcompensation. 
Cases of denial are clearly linked to self-awareness, at the very least in the sense 
that you are pretending that facts about yourself are not true. Also, insofar as denial 
involves the suppression of some element of yourself, you are not acting on the basis of 
your ‘total personality’. In this sense, denial makes it more difficult to discover what 
truly satisfies you. 
 
 
ii. The role of others in gaining self-awareness 
 
Earlier in this chapter, I argued that other people are vital in teaching us the 
skills that allow us to express ourselves. In my view, your ability to know yourself and 
your ability to express yourself are inextricably linked. Even when it comes to knowing 
what we think, I want to suggest that positive relationships with other people are 
required.  
I want to discuss an example, in order to make this convincing. I once had a 
student who came up to me after his first ever philosophy lecture. He told me that he 
had solved the meaning of life. He asked me if he could e-mail me his argument. His 
argument had 24 premises (each of them equally strange and unclear). The first premise 
was: Only physical things are real. I had to explain to him that this claim might mean a 
vast range of things. At its strongest, it might suggest that air is not real. On a weaker 
reading, it might imply that e.g. gravity is not real. As the claim stands, I had to explain 
to the student that it is not at all clear what he is trying to say with this claim. When 
faced with my questions about what exactly his claim meant, the student actually 
became unsure about what he thought. He said he needed to go away and think about it 
a bit more. 
He at least had the intelligence to recognise that his claims were not expressing 
what he thought clearly. From my point of view, there were holes and ambiguities 
throughout all of his premises. In many of the cases, when presented with these 
ambiguities, the student didn’t really know what to say. In this sense (especially given 
the student’s responses) it seems right to say that, prior to our discussion, it wasn’t yet 
clear what this student actually thought. 
The activity of philosophy (the attempt to clearly state and defend our views) 
suggests that through dialogue with others we can become much clearer about what we 
think and why we think it. It is through our attempts to communicate our thoughts to 
others that we can come to clarify and sharpen our understanding of our own thoughts. 
Writing essays, books and papers (or teaching) are all public forums. They all embody 
the idea that we need to test our thoughts in a public arena in order to fully clarify our 
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thinking. Only by expressing our views as clearly as we can, and by taking other 
people’s responses seriously, can we come to have a clear grasp on what we think and 
why we think it. Philosophy is, by its very nature, a social effort. We can come to 
understand what we think, and whether we have good reasons for our views, through 
the attempts to explain and convince others.  
All of this suggests that, unless you can get back the opinion of other people 
whose view of the world, and more importantly yourself, you respect, there is always 
the chance that the understanding you have of yourself is only true ‘in your own head’. 
If you do not listen to people whose views you respect, and take on board their 
criticisms, you cannot move towards clarity, and a proper understanding of yourself. 
There are other examples that seem to suggest that other people are of vital 
importance in helping us achieve full self-awareness. It can be particularly difficult for 
us to become aware of our own habitual behaviours. For example, I used to have a habit 
of humming a song every time I entered a room; I also used to, on occasion, to talk too 
loudly. It took very good friends (one’s I had strong relationships of trust and care with) 
to tell me that I did these things (and prompted me to think about why I did them).131  
So, positive relationships with other people are invaluable in helping us see the 
truth about our true feelings and our actual situation. In particular, when it comes to 
accepting ‘difficult’ facts about ourselves, we need people whose views we respect. 
More than this, we need people with whom we have a relationship of trust and care. It 
might be thought that, when it comes to our deepest worries (issues we may be 
defensive about) we require relationships with a high level of trust. If it is thought that 
trust can arise only in relationships in which each person is convinced that the other 
person cares for them, then people who are incapable of genuinely caring about the 
interests of others will have problems developing these kinds of relationships. 
 
 
7. Other reasons why people matter 
 
Among other things, other people are often a source of great happiness. Quality 
relationships enhance your life and are the source of valuable content. To give just one 
example, think of the pleasure there is in sharing a great joke with someone. If someone 
says something that makes you laugh (in a genuine way) there is a real sense in which 
something is shared. This might help you feel connected to other people, it might help 
you see things in a new light, or it might just make you feel good.  
It is also clear that loneliness is a component of many unhappy lives. Loneliness 
is not something that is necessarily alleviated by being around people (you can be 
lonely in the centre of London). Loneliness is caused by the fact that you do not feel 
connected to other people (or that you cannot make a good connection with others). If 
you never connect with another person, it can feel like you are disconnected from the 
social world. This is one of the ways in which life can be experienced as lacking 
meaning. I have discussed the way in which it is important to us that our lives and 
action make a difference, and have an impact. This is probably truest when it comes to 
the world of other people. This is just another reason why relationships with others are 
genuinely important to us. 
 
 
                                                 
131 Because they were habitual, it was difficult to change them. I’m grateful to Lucy and Stu (the people 
who told me these things) for helping me become more aware of myself. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
I would like to go much further in drawing the parallels between our relationship 
to ourselves and our relationships with other people. My experience has been that there 
is a direct correlation between the quality of your relationship to yourself and the 
quality of your relationships with others. We might say, that it is through loving others 
that we come to understand what real love/caring is (and so become capable of having a 
truly loving relationship to ourselves). Loving yourself, and thus having self-respect, 
self-worth and self-confidence, goes a long way towards making a life a happy, 
contented one.  
 
The affirmation of my own life, happiness, growth, freedom is rooted in the 
basic readiness and ability to love others as the incarnation of essentially human 
qualities.132  
 
Unfortunately, I simply haven’t got the space to explore this view fully. So, I 
will finish this chapter by recapping what I have been able to say. Relationships with 
other people are not something about which we have an entirely free choice. At the start 
of our lives, other people are required if our needs are going to be met. Other people are 
required if we are to learn the skills necessary to be self-sufficient, and to express 
ourselves (and so become self-aware). Even if we have reached the stage where we have 
become self-sufficient, we are already in innumerable relationships with other people 
(with the people who enabled us to reach a stage where we can make a free choice about 
relationships). 
In effect, the egoist misrepresents the context in which we make choices. It 
presents the individual as already self-sufficient, yet without any pre-existing 
connections to other people. The egoist asks us to see ourselves making our choices in a 
world in which we have no pre-existing connections with others. It can then look as 
though we need some independent (selfish) reason for being concerned with other 
people’s interests. We might say that this is an assumption of anyone who acts selfishly 
– in that they ignore their ties with others, and ignore the role of other people in 
allowing them to become self-sufficient. Instead, they see all their choices as requiring 
some current benefit to their isolated self before they will be motivated to act. Given the 
fact that the self is always (at least in part) social, the egoist misrepresents our situation.  
I have argued that, even when (if) we become self-sufficient, we still require 
positive (i.e. non-selfish) relationships with others in order to become fully self-aware, 
to have self-esteem, to feel a connection to the social world. More than this, positive 
relationships with others can be a source of happiness. 
I argued that, if human beings were naturally selfish, positive relationships with 
others would be impossible. Thankfully, I argued that there are no good reasons for 
thinking that people are only motivated by their own self-interest. While on the surface 
it may seem that self-interestedness is the best way to pursue your own needs and your 
own happiness, I have tried to show that this is not the case. As a matter of fact, 
selfishness is not a particularly effective way to be happy. It might be thought that I 
have actually been providing selfish reasons for caring about our relationships. Even if 
this is the case, I have argued that one cannot have positive loving relationships with 
others as long as we are selfish. (In other words, selfishness is self-defeating). 
                                                 
132 Fromm, E. (1995) The Art of Loving. Thorsons: London p. 4 
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This chapter is an attempt to say why our own happiness and our own needs are 
inextricably linked to positive relationships with other people. Given the arguments in 
Chapter VII that our own happiness and our own needs matter to us, it seems clear that 
other people really do matter to us. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
I am going to start the conclusion by going through each of the challenges to the 
idea that some things genuinely matter. This will allow me to set out my own positive 
proposal in the light of these challenges. This should make it clear why we are justified 
in thinking that some things genuinely matter. I will also return to the issue of the 
meaning of life (personal meaning). I want to see what lessons may be drawn from my 
discussion of personal meaning. I also want to make clear that there is no reason to 
think (in the light of the challenges set by Cottingham) that a human life could only be 
said to be meaningful in the light of religious beliefs. Finally, the title of each chapter 
posed a question to be answered. I will end the conclusion by answering each of these 
questions. 
 
 
2. Challenges to the idea that that some things genuinely matter 
 
i. The inescapability of doubt 
 
In Chapter II, I discussed the unavoidability of seriousness. This was Nagel’s 
claim that people think some things matter. This is an unavoidable aspect of human 
existence (a fact about our nature). This is something I accepted. 
In chapter II, I also discussed two attempts by Nagel to show that doubts about 
whether anything genuinely matters are inescapable. Nagel argued that we are unable to 
determine why anything matters. If true, this would suggest that we are unable to make 
decisions about what matters on the basis of any kind of rational procedure. I argued 
that Nagel’s arguments for the inescapability of doubt are inadequate. But, in the 
chapters that followed, Nagel’s arguments continued to provide ways of getting clear 
about the question of whether anything genuinely matters, through the questioning of 
my curious friend. 
I will take the second argument I discussed (the epistemological argument) first. 
This argument concerned the way in which my curious friend could put pressure on my 
claim that something matters. Any time I claim that something matters, he can ask me to 
justify my claim that it matters. Whatever answer I give, my curious friend will simply 
ask me to justify my claim that this genuinely matters. I argued that there is no reason to 
think, simply on the basis of the epistemological argument, that all claims that 
something matters are entirely arbitrary. If the epistemological argument does pose a 
problem, it poses it for all types of justification. There is no special problem for the 
attempt to show that some things genuinely matter.  
In Chapter II, I also discussed another aspect of Nagel’s inescapability of doubt - 
the special experience argument. This was the claim that human beings (given the fact 
that they are self-aware) are capable of viewing the world from a totally detached 
perspective. I argued that, unless we had some grounds for thinking that we ought to 
take this ‘perspective from which the world is meaningless’ seriously (unless there were 
reasons for thinking that it was a true account of the world) it could not cause 
‘inescapable doubts’ about whether anything genuinely matters. So, neither of Nagel’s 
arguments for the inescapability of doubt were successful. 
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ii. Objectivity 
 
In Chapter IV I discussed an attempt to prove that the special experience ought 
to be taken seriously. Another description of this detached way of seeing things is the 
objective perspective. If we think that the objective perspective reveals an account of 
the world ‘as it really is’ then it looks as though we have good reasons for taking this 
distanced perspective seriously. I argued that significance (whether something matters) 
cannot be an objectively real feature of the world. Given the fact that significance arises 
as the result of a particular awareness taking up a perspective on the world, we can see 
why an account of the world independent of all forms of awareness doesn’t reveal any 
significance. But, I also argued that the objective perspective cannot help us determine 
whether anything matters. After all, if it is an open question whether our world contains 
anything of significance, looking at that environment independent of all awareness will 
always reveal nothing as objectively significant.  
The argument from non-objectivity is an attempt to show that nothing could 
matter (all answers to my curious friend’s questions are equally bad). In Chapter IV, I 
also discussed three other attempts to show that all answers to my curious friend’s 
questions are equally bad. These were arguments based on our size, our mortality, and 
the consequences of our activities. I argued that none of the arguments in chapter IV 
gives us any reason to think that we are making a general mistake in thinking that some 
things matter. In other words, we have no reason to think that all answers to my curious 
friend’s questions are bad. 
 
 
iii. Science (back to objectivity) 
 
We might think that the results of science show that nothing genuinely matters. 
Given the fact that the scientific perspective takes up an objective view of the world, it 
should be no surprise that science doesn’t reveal anything as genuinely mattering. 
Science is a way of exploring the nature of the world independent of awareness. So, 
science doesn’t seem to be a particularly fruitful way to examine whether anything 
genuinely matters. It might be thought that evolutionary theory shows that human life is 
the result of blind, meaningless forces. I argued, as I will explain below, that even if the 
evolutionary account of the emergence of human life is true, it need not rule out the 
thought that some things genuinely matter. 
  
 
iv. Religion 
 
In Chapter V, I argued that it is not possible to use religious accounts of the 
universe to show that some things genuinely matter. It was not my intention to imply 
that religious belief is irrational. Nevertheless, there seemed to be reasons for thinking 
that we are unable to prove that a particular religious account of the universe is true. In 
these circumstances, we will be unable to use religious beliefs as a way of answering 
my curious friend’s questions (in a way that could count as a rigorous proof). 
Even so, it seemed that it might still be true that religious belief (or God) 
provides something necessary if anything is to be genuinely meaningful. In Chapter V, I 
looked at three arguments, each of which set challenges for any attempt to show that 
some things matter (or that life is meaningful) independently of religious beliefs. The 
first argument is the easiest to deal with. Nozick argued that the only way in which 
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something could be said to be genuinely meaningful was by reference to ‘the infinite’ 
(i.e. God). This had strong parallels with the epistemological argument. I argued that if 
we could come up with a reasonable answer to my curious friend (a place where it is 
reasonable to stop in justifying why something matters) we would have a reasonable 
response to Nozick’s challenge. Chapters VII and VIII showed that there are reasonable 
places to stop that fall far short of ‘the infinite’. So, Nozick’s challenge need not 
concern us. 
There were also two challenges from Cottingham. These challenges question 
whether life could be meaningful independent of religious belief. His first argument is 
based on the claim that (without religious belief) whether or not someone’s life is 
meaningful is unacceptably subject to luck. This argument is based on the claim that the 
meaningfulness of a life is inextricably related to whether the activities in that life are 
successful. In fact, Cottingham later denies that meaningfulness is inextricably linked to 
success. I took two challenges out of this discussion. Firstly, if I could show that (even 
from a non-religious perspective) meaningfulness has little to do with external success, 
there would be nothing to concern us in Cottingham’s argument. Cottingham also 
claimed that every human being ought to have the potential to lead a meaningful life. 
Although it is not clear that we have to accept this claim given the fact that Cottingham 
bases this claim on religious doctrine.  
Cottingham’s second challenge relates to the discussion of personal meaning. I 
argued that, in order to experience your own life as (personally) meaningful, you need 
to be able to place the events of your life into some kind of narrative (in such a way that 
the events of your life ‘hang together’). Cottingham argued that, without the normative 
structure provided by religious belief, we would just be left with the idea that we have a 
narrative account to tell. So, without the narrative structure provided by religious belief, 
we would be unable to distinguish good from bad narratives. We would have to accept 
that any narrative is as good as any other. 
The challenges that Cottingham sets us principally relate to whether life is 
meaningful. I will return to these issues below, after I have discussed the issue of 
personal meaning. 
 
 
3. The positive proposal 
 
None of the challenges to the idea that some things might genuinely matter were 
conclusive. But they do show us what we need to do to answer the question ‘Does 
anything genuinely matter?’ Firstly, we need to provide an adequate answer to my 
curious friend. (This would also provide us with a reasonable response to Nozick’s 
worry that only ‘the infinite’ could be a source of meaning). In other words, we need to 
show that we can be justified in stopping at a particular justification. (As we have seen, 
the mere fact that we happen to act as though some things genuinely matter will not be 
enough). Secondly, given my account of meaningfulness, we have seen that something 
can only be said to be meaningful from a particular perspective. So, any answer needs to 
involve the kind of perspective that can be the source of meaning. Thirdly, I have 
argued that religion cannot provide a conclusive way of answering my curious friend’s 
questions. (So, any answer we give cannot make reference to religious tradition). 
Fourthly, I have also argued that the scientific perspective is not one that can help us in 
finding something that genuinely matters. (So, any answer we give cannot be a purely 
scientific one).  
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I set out a position that is based on facts about human existence. While these are 
not ‘purely’ scientific facts, neither are these facts incompatible with scientific inquiry. 
(After all, there is a sense in which the scientific facts explain how we come to have the 
nature that we do.) Neither do the facts about human nature that I discuss seem to be in 
tension with religious claims. It seems that the facts about our nature that I focus on are 
true independent of religious belief. Religious beliefs may posit further characteristics 
of our nature, but they do not, for example, deny that human beings are self-conscious, 
and have needs. 
 The perspective of the self-conscious human being is the kind of perspective that 
can be the source of meaning. Human beings are capable of experiencing the world 
‘through’ a particular context. As was clear when looking at the reaction to Ronaldo’s 
penalty kick (see IV.2.ii) human beings are capable of experiencing the world in the 
light of certain narratives, histories, contexts etc. (That is why so many people I know 
were upset when Ronaldo scored his penalty). I argued that, when a human being (or 
anything for that matter) takes up a perspective on their own needs, their own needs are 
thereby experienced as genuinely mattering. This provides us with a reasonable place to 
stop in answering my curious friend’s questions. Our needs don’t just matter because 
we happen to think they matter. From our own perspective, our own needs genuinely do 
matter. On occasion, there may be other things that matter more, but from our own 
perspective, we live in a world where some things ‘already’ matter. (This shows that 
Nozick was wrong to say that only the ‘infinite’ could be a source of meaning.) 
 While I have argued that our vital needs, our happiness and relationships with 
other people genuinely matter to us, this was not meant to be an exhaustive list. So, I 
want to end this discussion by mentioning a number of things that may also genuinely 
matter to us. Firstly, it might be thought that, given the relationship between self-
awareness and a satisfying life (through a lack of self-awareness, we can perpetuate 
mistakes about what makes us satisfied) our level of self-awareness is also something 
that genuinely matters to us. Another candidate for something that genuinely matters to 
us is our freedom. Throughout my discussion of ultimate concerns, I have assumed that 
we are free to choose the kind of life we want to live (we can choose our ultimate 
concerns). There may be some circumstances in which this is less true (for example, if 
you live under a totalitarian government133). If it matters that we choose our ultimate 
concerns on the basis of what most satisfies us, it may genuinely matter to us that we 
are capable of choosing the ultimate concerns that are best for us. Given the fact that our 
needs genuinely matter, there may also be reasons for thinking that the environment 
genuinely matters to us. These are just suggestions. I just wanted to give some 
indication that the things I have claimed genuinely matter may not be an exhaustive list. 
 
 
4. The Meaning of Life 
 
i. Ultimate concerns 
 
I want to say a little more about the sense in which life can be experienced as 
meaningful. In chapter VII Part 2, I argued that it genuinely matters to us that our life is 
experienced as satisfying. This suggests that it genuinely matters to us that our ultimate 
                                                 
133 For all the rhetoric about the value of freedom in our society, it would be a mistake to think that our 
own culture is one in which freedom is a given. (C.f. Fromm, E. (2001) The Fear of Freedom. Routledge: 
London, particularly pp. 207-37) 
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concerns (the things that individual cares about most) are effective in delivering the 
sense that their life is satisfyingly meaningful. 
In chapter VI, I argued that, when it comes to being effective, our ultimate 
concerns are not entirely arbitrary. Some ultimate concerns will be better than others at 
delivering a sense that our life is meaningful. This suggests that it would be a mistake to 
pick our ultimate concerns arbitrarily. It would be a mistake to simply accept other 
people’s assertions about what ought to be your ultimate concern. It would be a mistake 
to simply adopt an ultimate concern at random, because of the felt need to have one. 
My discussion has suggested that the final test of whether an ultimate concern is 
effective is your own satisfaction with a life that has this ultimate concern as the centre 
of your life (with the caveats discussed in Chapter VI concerning awareness and 
motivation). This may suggest that there is little concrete that can be said about what 
someone’s ultimate concern should be (as it is a matter of personal taste). Nevertheless, 
in this section, I want to explore what it is possible to say, given my discussions. 
 
 
 ii. Are there ultimate concerns that couldn’t be effective? 
 
 I think we can say that two particular ultimate concerns are ineffective ways of 
attempting to achieve a satisfying life. In chapter VII part 2, I argued that, if you made 
your ultimate concern seeking pleasure for pleasure’s sake, you would face serious 
problems in achieving a satisfying (meaningful) life. This is because part of what it is to 
experience your life as meaningful is to experience the fact that the separate events in 
your life hang together in a satisfying way. There are difficulties in seeing how the 
separate pleasurable events in your life could provide a sense that the valuable aspects 
of your life cohere into a satisfying life (see VII.9). This is because the value of a 
pleasurable event for you will be found exclusively in the pleasurable moment – not in 
the connection between different pleasurable moments. Throughout Chapter VIII, I also 
argued that making your ultimate concern the pursuit of your own (narrow) self-interest 
also faces difficulties in leading to a satisfying life. 
 I made a number of other suggestions in Chapter VI. For example, I argued that 
certain activities (e.g. excessively passive ones) are inappropriate as ultimate concerns 
(see VI.9.iii) It is not at all clear how solitary, unproductive activities could provide a 
sense that we make a significant or valuable effect on the world. I also argued that 
certain relationships (e.g. with people who want nothing to do with you) would make 
inappropriate ultimate concerns (see VI.7.v).  
 
 
 iii. Power, status and fame 
 
I want to quickly say something about a number of potential ultimate concerns. 
These are the pursuit of power, status and fame. From the discussion in this thesis, it is 
perhaps understandable why people might want power (it will certainly provide them 
with a sense that they make a difference and have an impact on the world). As with 
pleasure for pleasure’s sake, it seems perfectly reasonable to think that having power 
that allows you to make a positive difference to your ultimate concerns is valuable. But, 
power for power’s sake (unless the difference you make through the use of your power 
is felt to be valuable to you) will be less able to provide you with a sense that you make 
a difference to something you value. The same kind of thing could be said about status 
and fame. Being valued (if you are awarded status or made famous) for something that 
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you value, is in a much better position to provide you with self-worth (in the case of 
status) or a sense that you are appreciated (in the case of fame) than being valued for 
something you do not yourself value. If they are connected to your ultimate concerns, 
things like power, status and fame can be considered valuable to you. But if these things 
are disconnected from the things we value (if they are pursued for their own sake) it is 
not clear that they will provide you with a sense that you make a valuable difference to 
the world.  
 
 
 iv. What kinds of activities are capable of leading to a truly satisfying life? 
 
 In chapter III, I discussed Schlick’s particular definition of work and play. I 
want to return to this discussion in order to see what kinds of activities are suitable 
candidates for paid employment. We might think that it is important that we are able to 
be self-sufficient. If meeting our own needs genuinely matters, we might think it is 
important (as an adult) that we are able to support ourselves.134 In this culture, this is 
usually achieved through engaging in economic work. 
Given the amount of time people in this culture spend working, we might think 
that it is important that your work is connected in some way with your ultimate 
concerns (otherwise the time spent at work will not form a part of the ‘story of your 
life’, despite the fact that so much of your time is spent at work). 
We might think that the discussion of play in chapter III suggested that there are 
two potential ways in which activities can provide the basis for a meaningful life. 
Firstly, someone can find an activity so enjoyable and rewarding that making this 
activity their ultimate concern (spending lots of time on this activity) fills their life with 
pleasures arising out of their ultimate concerns. If the activity is active and creative, it 
can provide you with a sense that you make a significant difference to the world. If the 
activity is creative, it will allow you to express yourself, and experience yourself as an 
active (significant) part of the world. If the activity is one requiring skill, then engaging 
in the activity will tend to improve your skill, and so improve your ability to create, and 
express yourself. This certainly looks like the kind of activity that could form the centre 
of a satisfying life. We saw in Chapter III that Schlick over-stated the centrality of play. 
Play is not the only thing that ought to matter to people. (After all, other things 
genuinely matter to us). So, even if you find an activity inherently satisfying, it is also 
important that it provides a sense that you make a difference to the world, and that it 
provides a centre to your life which provides you with a sense that your life hangs 
together in a satisfying way. It is also important that it allows you to take care of your 
needs and your relationships. After all, these things genuinely matter to you. All of this 
implies that not just any ‘inherently satisfying activity’ will do. 
Even if your working activities are not satisfying in this way, there is a second 
way in which your activities at work can help provide a sense that your life is 
meaningful. If, through your work, you are able to have a positive impact on something 
you value (something connected to your ultimate concerns) this can also connect your 
time at work to the ‘story of your life’. Insofar as you have this kind of connection to 
                                                 
134 I don’t want to suggest that it can never be right or appropriate to be dependent on others. It looks 
reasonable in certain circumstances (for example, if you are a mother with a very young child, or if you 
are genuinely incapable of meeting your own needs) to be dependent on others. But, if someone does not 
live in conditions of this kind, the fact that you are dependent is bound to have negative implications for 
your freedom and/or your relationships. 
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your work, engaging in activities that promote your ultimate concerns (which as a result 
make your life satisfying) will increase your ability to have a meaningful life. Through 
your work, you will be capable of making a positive contribution, of making a 
difference to something you value.  
These two ways in which economic work can be a source of meaning mirror the 
two extremes of a satisfying life discussed in VII.10. There is little I can say about 
which kind of work would be most satisfying for someone. That, in the end comes down 
to which kind of life they would find most satisfying (and perhaps what their options 
are.)  
Having said that, because there are some things that genuinely matter, we might 
particularly value activities that are capable of making a difference to things that 
genuinely matter (i.e. contributing to the needs, health and happiness of ourselves and 
others) in such a way that our life hangs together in a satisfying way. 
 
 
 v. What kinds of activities are not capable of leading to a truly satisfying 
life?  
 
This discussion of economic work suggests that there is a cost to work that is not 
satisfying as an activity, and does not contribute to achieving something you value. It is 
giving up your time (something of value to you – even if only potentially) in pursuit of 
some further end. If you sacrifice your time in order to achieve some further reward, the 
rewards had better be worthwhile (not driven by denial, a lack of self-awareness, 
addiction or compulsion).  
It is deeply regrettable if the rewards you get from work are mere self-
sufficiency. More than this, the arguments in this thesis suggest that if we engage in 
unsatisfying work simply to gain enough money to spend the rest of our time enjoying 
pleasure for pleasure’s sake, or to pursue our own narrow self-interest, there are reasons 
to think that this is an ineffective way to achieve a satisfying life.  
 
 
vi. Relationships 
 
Given the fact that the quality of our relationships with other people genuinely 
matters I want to look at where other people fit into our activities. Relationships with 
other people can develop out of meaningful activities (and working activities). Through 
these kinds of activities, you may join with others in the pursuit of common goals. 
These can be truly described as positive relationships. Still, relationships with people 
outside of your work place may be important (and desirable). I have argued that having 
the time and energy to spend with people (giving them your attention) is important. If 
an activity dominates in such a way that having quality relationships becomes difficult, 
this could be problematic in terms of achieving a satisfying life. 
Can anything be said about which is more important, your activities or your 
relationships? Imagine a standard dilemma. A man is forced to choose between a job he 
finds satisfying and spending as much time with his family as he would like. What 
should he do? I would want to say that there is no answer to this question (in the 
abstract).  
At the same time, we might think that the right answer may become clearer once 
the person has decided what to do. In cases where someone who is truly torn between 
these two ultimate concerns, what this person finds personally satisfying may become 
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clear in the light of their feelings and actions following their decision. (It may become 
clear that their family is most important. It may become clear that their job is most 
important. They may find that they want to find a ‘proper balance’ between the two). 
Imagine he chooses his job over his family. Perhaps he comes to regard this as the best 
decision of his life. Alternatively, perhaps he comes to think it was a dreadful mistake. 
(In other words, dilemmas, and how we feel about our choices, may teach us what 
satisfies us most). 
 Whatever else we say about relationships, I have argued that we should take into 
account the fact that positive relationships with others are (even if only initially) an 
integral part of a satisfying life. Given the fact that relationships require time and 
attention, any work that prevents you giving time (due to the excessive hours you work) 
or attention (given the fact that you put so much into your work that you have no energy 
left) is bound to have a negative effect on your relationships. 
 
 
vii. A practical question 
 
This thesis has, in part, been an attempt to think through issues concerning the 
meaning of life. There is one reservation I want to make at this stage. It seems true to 
say that finding out what kind of ultimate concern truly satisfies you cannot be 
discovered simply by thinking really hard about the issues. You will find out what 
satisfies you most, and what is most important to you by looking to the relationship 
between you and your activities and the people in the world (particularly in how you 
feel about them, and whether they motivate you.) I have argued that our ultimate 
concerns need to be tested against our experience (in the light of a reasonable level of 
self-awareness). In this sense, finding a happy meaningful life is not just a theoretical 
question – it is also a practical one.  
The key thing is to make sure that the things you think are important, and around 
which you centre your life, are truly satisfying for you, and provide a sense of 
commitment. (They motivate you to act.) Partly, this involves paying attention to 
yourself, being willing and open to discovering how satisfied you are with your life. If 
you find that you are not motivated by your ultimate concerns, have a long hard look at 
them. Even if we have a reasonable level of awareness and self-awareness, we may still 
make mistakes, but if we have a reasonable level of awareness, it will be possible to 
prevent these mistakes being perpetuated. 
You can be hampered by a lack of awareness, or a lack of self-awareness - or 
habits that are aimed at avoiding full awareness of your experience and your situation. I 
just want to mention one habit that can cause problems. Unless you are willing to try out 
different kinds of activities, or are willing to put in the effort required to build strong 
relationships, you will limit your experiences of (potential) activities and relationships. 
In this sense, having a ‘small comfort zone’ is going to limit the options you come 
across. This will make it more difficult to find connections with particular activities and 
people. You will have a better chance of finding the kind of life that truly satisfies you 
if you are willing to take some chances. So, perhaps you need to try things out, with a 
decent level of awareness and self-awareness. It looks as though the most fruitful way to 
approach this is to look for what you love, what you are committed to. In all of this, it is 
important that, in the light of what you love and are committed to, you are able to find 
active ways in which you can contribute to the things you perceive to be valuable. In 
these circumstances, you have the possibility of finding that your life ‘hangs together’ 
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in a satisfying way. You can have the sense that you make a valuable contribution to 
something that you see as important. You will feel that your life is significant. 
 
 
 viii. Cottingham’s challenges to meaning without religion 
 
In Chapters VII and VIII, I argued that some things genuinely matter to us. I also 
argued (in Chapter VI) that we can make perfect sense of a person experiencing their 
own life as meaningful independently of (irresolvable) issues around religious belief.  
(Although, it was not my intention to deny that the belief in a religious account of the 
universe may be the source of a person’s sense that their life is meaningful). 
Also, it is not clear that there is any tension between the claims I make about 
what matters and the beliefs of the world’s major religions. Few, if any, of the major 
religions would claim that in order to live properly, you should ignore your needs, 
ignore your satisfaction and ignore your relationships.135 It may well be that certain 
religious traditions might prescribe what kind of satisfying life you ought to be aiming 
for. So, they would agree that people ought to pursue a satisfying life – but, against 
what I have said, they may suggest that personal satisfaction is not the only, or the main 
criterion of the ‘right kind’ of life. Still, this disagreement doesn’t concern whether it 
matters if our life is satisfying. Rather, it seems to revolve around what kind of life is 
really satisfying.  
There were a number of challenges from Cottingham that still need to be dealt 
with. Cottingham’s first argument was based on the claim that whether or not a life is 
meaningful is importantly dependent on whether the activities in their life are 
successful. As we saw, Cottingham himself later denies that meaningfulness is 
inextricably linked to success. I argued that, if I could show that, even from a non-
religious perspective, meaningfulness is not based on whether our activities are 
inextricably related to success, there would be nothing to concern us in Cottingham’s 
argument. Cottingham argued that religious belief was one way of showing us that 
meaningfulness is not inextricably linked to external success. 
 
Most forms of spirituality have in common that they aim to turn us away from 
typical preoccupations such as career, status and the accumulation of wealth, and 
prepare us instead to focus [on] our presence here at this moment.136 
 
My discussion of power, fame and money (see ii.) appears to reveal that, even if 
we are looking at whether life is meaningful independently of religious belief, 
exclusively pursuing these kinds of superficial success seems wrongheaded. So, 
whatever way we look at it, meaningfulness is simply not linked to external success (so 
Cottingham’s argument from luck doesn’t seem to cause any kind of problem.) 
There was another aspect to Cottingham’s discussion of the argument from luck. 
Cottingham claimed that every human being ought to have the potential to lead a 
meaningful life. He argued that only religion could meet this requirement. Because 
Cottingham’s claim is based on the claims of religious tradition, it is not clear that we 
have to accept this. Still we might say that achieving positive relationships with others 
and finding satisfying ways of spending your time is the kind of thing that most people 
will be capable of achieving. 
                                                 
135 Perhaps my claims about what genuinely matters may be denied by some ‘cults’. 
136 Ibid p. 83 
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Having said this, there may be people, because of where they are born (which, 
we might say is down to luck) who may have trouble achieving a meaningful life. For 
example, someone born in a famine ridden African country, will have extreme difficulty 
in meeting their needs. As we saw in Chapter III (see VII.7) there are reasons to think 
that this would diminish their capacity to have a happy, meaningful life. According to 
Cottingham, this “is ethically repugnant because it goes against the long compassionate 
and egalitarian tradition, rooted in the best of Christian and Islamic thought.”137 
I think there may be a sense in which Cottingham is right to say that it is 
ethically repugnant if human beings are incapable of achieving a meaningful life, 
simply because of where they happen to be born. If we look at places where famine is 
rife, we might think that the rich nations of the world are part of the cause of the fact 
that some people in the world are robbed of the chance of meeting their needs (either 
through the West’s actions, or simply by omission). In this case, it may be appropriate 
to talk of moral abhorrence here. But, if this is accepted, then the fact that there are 
people in the world who are starving looks less like a case of luck. As I have said, 
because Cottingham’s claims are based on religious doctrine, it is not clear we have to 
meet this charge. Still it seems that the account I have given of a meaningful life is the 
kind of life that the majority of people will be capable of achieving. So, there is nothing 
in this discussion to lead us to think that my description of what is involved in 
experiencing our own life as meaningful misses something crucial. 
Cottingham’s second challenge relates to my claim that, in order to experience 
your own life as meaningful, you need to be able to place the events of your life into 
some kind of narrative (in such a way that the events of your life ‘hang together’ in a 
satisfying way). Cottingham argued that, without the normative structure provided by 
religious belief, we would just be left with the idea that we have a narrative account to 
tell. This, according to Cottingham would be too ‘thin’. It would not allow us to 
distinguish ‘good’ narratives from ‘bad’ ones. 
I hope I have shown that, even from the perspective of the individual 
(independent of religious belief) there is a great deal of difference between a good and a 
bad narrative. I argued that meaningfulness arises through our ability to construct a 
narrative around our ultimate concerns. My discussion has made clear that (without any 
help from religious narratives) we could still distinguish good from bad narratives. 
Good narratives are those chosen with a fair degree of self-awareness that motivate us, 
and allow us to see our life as a meaningful whole. Bad narratives fail to do this. In 
particular, I have argued that narratives constructed around achieving pleasure, self-
interest, power, status and wealth for their own sake are bad narratives.  
 My account of the things that genuinely matter also provide us with a certain 
amount of ‘normative bite’. According to Cottingham: 
 
A worthwhile life will be one that possesses genuine value – value linked to our 
human nature and the pursuit of what is objectively conducive to the flowering 
of that nature.138  
 
 In saying that our needs, happiness and relationships genuinely matter, I have 
attempted to describe things that are of genuine value to us, “value linked to our human 
nature.”139 Again, as with all of Cottingham’s arguments, there seems little here to lead 
                                                 
137 Ibid p. 69 
138 Ibid p. 32 
139 Ibid p. 32 
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us to think that, without something provided by religious belief, we couldn’t talk of life 
being genuinely meaningful.  
  
 
5. Answering the questions 
 
I am now in a position to answer each of the questions that form the title of each 
chapter. I will deal with most of these questions quite quickly, as they have already been 
covered in depth in this conclusion. But I will deal with the question of our own death 
in a bit more detail. 
 
Chapter I: Is our own death bad for us? 
 
Chapter I ended with the claim that our own death matters to us, not because 
the state of being dead is a bad one (it does not involve the presence of anything bad). 
Rather death is bad because it brings to an end something positive (being alive). In 
Chapter VII, I discussed whether life is always a positive state (see VII.4) and 
attempted to defend the claim that life can be valuable (although it is not clearly 
valuable in all cases). 
People in depression, people with serious diseases without the hope for 
remission, or people who are enslaved, may not experience their life as valuable. This is 
regrettable. In some cases it seems true to say that their vital needs may no longer 
matter to them as a result.140  
Still, you may find that your life is valuable to you. Or, you may think there is 
the potential for a quality existence, for things you find genuinely valuable. (Things like 
pleasure, satisfying activities, making a difference on things you value, positive 
relationships with others etc.) More than this, if these things ‘hang together’ in some 
kind of pleasing way, it is possible to have a meaningful, happy, truly satisfying life. In 
such circumstances, it seems that we have clear reasons for thinking that life is valuable. 
So, because death involves the loss of our life, death can rightly thought of as a bad 
thing for us. 
If life is valuable (even if it is only potentially valuable) and we are mortal, then 
this implies that our time is valuable. Because we are mortal, we are currently in 
possession of something that is both finite and valuable. One could say that the ‘finite 
resource’ we are in possession of is time. We may not know how long we are going to 
live, but we know that the time we have lived is time we are never getting back. (This 
suggests that understanding we are mortal, and understanding that life is valuable 
implies that we ought to appreciate the value of our time). 
Another aspect of fully appreciating our mortality is to fully appreciate the fact 
that one’s life is unique. (It is a once in a lifetime opportunity). If (as I assumed in 
chapter I) we cannot survive our own death, the life you are now living is a one-off 
manifestation of a unique life. Human beings are physically unique. But also, because 
of our social nature, because the development of the self occurs in a unique social 
context, we might describe human beings as particularly unique.  
If it is accepted that it genuinely matters to us that we experience our life as 
valuable, it seems that we have good reason for hoping that our own death is a problem 
for us. (As, only if our life is valuable will our own death be bad for us). Or, perhaps, 
                                                 
140 I argued that the reason why they might no longer care about their vital needs is that their deeper 
(existential) needs are not being met, or are not capable of being met. (In other words, we would be 
wrong to describe such people as not having needs.) 
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we will only feel that death is not a bad thing for us if life stops being valuable to us. 
Whether or not a particular individual’s death is bad for them cannot be answered in the 
abstract. We would need to look at the details of their life in order to see whether their 
life is valuable. Only then can the question be answered. 
 
Chapter II: Is life absurd? 
 
I argued that Nagel is right to say that human beings act as though some things 
genuinely matter. I have argued that, on occasion, they can be mistaken about the things 
that genuinely matter. Still, given the fact that it is possible to know that some things 
genuinely matter, we can also, on occasion be justified in acting as though some things 
matter. In cases such as this, there is nothing absurd about the fact that human beings 
act as though some things matter. So, we can say that human life isn’t necessarily 
absurd. 
 
Chapter III: Is work meaningless? 
 
We have seen that economic work can, on occasion be meaningless. But in 
circumstances where we find our work personally satisfying, or where it contributes to 
our ultimate concerns, there is no reason to think that work is meaningless. 
 
Chapter IV: Does nothing matter? 
 
None of the arguments that I examined for the claim that nothing could 
genuinely matter undermine the thought that some things could genuinely matter. There 
is then, no reason to think that nothing could genuinely matter. 
Chapter V: Does religion prove what matters? 
 
I have argued that we can show how some things genuinely matter 
independently of religious beliefs. So, religion isn’t the only way to show that 
something matters. At the same time, the facts about human existence that I have used 
to show that some things genuinely matter are not ones generally denied by religious 
traditions. Neither are they facts that are in tension with scientific accounts of the world. 
So, it is possible to show that some things matter without adopting either a religious or a 
scientific perspective. 
 
Chapter VI: Are our ultimate concerns arbitrary? 
 
Given the fact that it genuinely matters that our ultimate concerns are effective, I 
have argued that it our choice of ultimate concerns (what we care about most) genuinely 
matters. We need to choose ultimate concerns that are capable of delivering a sense that 
our life is meaningful. We need to avoid choosing ultimate concerns which couldn’t be 
effective, and we need to make sure we are not in denial about how satisfied we are by 
our lives. Because of this, our ultimate concerns are not arbitrary. 
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Chapter VII: Does anything genuinely matter? Chapter VIII: Do other people 
matter? 
 
I argued that some things do genuinely matter. In particular, given the fact that 
we are self-conscious; our vital needs, our happiness and the quality of our relationships 
all genuinely matter. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Given the conditions of our life, and the fact that we can take a perspective on 
our own life, some things matter to us (in a way that is non-arbitrary). We are capable of 
taking a perspective on any number of things (e.g. football matches, relationships, 
activities etc.) in such a way that we experience them as mattering. But, when we take 
up a perspective on our own needs, our needs are revealed as genuinely mattering to us. 
This does not mean they cannot be outweighed, but it does mean that our choices are 
made against this background. Whatever situation we are in, some things already 
matter.  
Against this backdrop, having a sense that our life is a happy, meaningful one 
also matters to us. We can make mistakes about the kinds of things that will lead us to 
be satisfied with our lives, but we cannot be mistaken in thinking that we want to be 
happy. It has not been my intention to tell anyone how to live their lives (although I 
have been concerned to point out potential ‘dead ends’). In the end, if you want to know 
what will truly satisfy you, you need to look to yourself, and to your ‘authentic’ 
responses to the world.  
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